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IV. Some Unresolved Federal Tax Collection Problems
A. The Reach of the Federal Tax Lien
The task of constructing a fair and equitable tax collection code was
no more than begun in the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, which con-
centrated on the immediately pressing problems in the area of the
priorities, obligations and procedural rights of creditors and other third
parties who become enmeshed with federal tax liens. The report of the
Special Committee on Federal Liens of the American Bar Association
called attention to another set of problems involving the coverage of the
federal tax lien, but concluded that such problems did not appear to
demand the kind of coordinated effort for which the committee was
appointed. It therefore commended those problems to the attention of
the interested Sections of the American Bar Association.'
1. Exemptions From Levy, In General
In order to protect debtors and their families from pauperism and
to encourage the rehabilitation of the debtors, state laws universally
provide for the exemption of certain property, or a certain value of
property, from seizure for general debts.2 The laws range in liberality
* This article has been awarded the Federal Bar Association Annual Authorship Aw-ard
in the field of taxation. This is the second of three installmcnts.---eds.
t Member of the D.C. Bar. A.B. 1936, University of Rochester, LL.B. 1939, Cornell
University.
1. 84 A.B.A. Rap. 680-84 (1959).
2. 1 W. CoLtm, B.ANu 'rcy § 6.03 (14th ed. 1960).
605
The Yale Law Journal
from the most spartan subsistence standard to the extremes reflected in
unlimited exemptions for homesteads and life insurance.3 Commonly,
however, taxes are excepted from the effect of those exemption laws,
which are more appropriately applied in circumstances where credit is
voluntarily extended than where obligations are imposed for the sup-
port of government. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that "[s]ome
minimal necessaries should be exempt even from these highly meritori-
ous claims." 4
The federal tax law contains its own rather niggardly exemptions0
and no other federal6 or state law7 can confer any exemption from levy
for federal taxes.8 Even in bankruptcy, where state exemption laws are
given effect,9 federal taxes may be collected from the exempt property
set aside to the debtor.10 It has been suggested from time to time that,
like the collection of federal court judgments (including judgments in
favor of the United States)," the collection of federal taxes should yield
to state exemption laws. That would mean, however, that, depending
entirely on each state's concept of the relative equities of debtors and
creditors, the tax lien would be unenforceable in some states against
life insurance policies, spendthrift trust income, and homesteads (rang.
ing in value from $700 in Indiana to unlimited in Minnesota), while
like property of taxpayers in other states would be subject to seizure.
3, 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCFS AND PREFERENCES § 168 (Rev. ed. 1910). The
laws are reviewed in Joslin, Debtors' Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 INI,
L.J. 355 (1959); N6te, Bankruptcy E.etnpttons, Critique and Suggestions, 68 YAt L.J.
1459 (1959).
4. Joslin, supta note 8, at 875.
5. INT, Ray. CObE of 1954, § 6334(a), Strictly speaking, these are exemptions from levy
only, and Would not preclude foreclosure of the lien on the exempt property. But a fore.
closure suit is idst unlikely in the cireunistances. See W. PLUMS &' L. WRIO1I, FEDEIIAL
TAX LIENS 19 (2d ed. 1967) (published by the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Edit.
cation of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association) [hercinafter cited
as PLUMB 9- WRIGHT],
6. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6334(c), denies any exemption not specifically enumerated
in Section 6334(a), "notwithstanding any other law of the United States." Thus, seamen's
wages, although generally exempt by federal law, 46 U.S.C. § 601 (1964), are sub ect to
levy for federal taxes. Treas. Reg. § 301.6331-1(a)(4)(iii) (1954). So also are veterans) bene.
fits (otherwise e xempt under 58 U.S.C. § 3101 (1964)), 8ervicenien's savings deposits (exentpt
from levy for "any indebtedness to the United States," 10 U.S.C. § 1035(d) (1964), but not
for taxes, 36 Comp. Gen. 106 (1956), unless a servicemen's relief act is applicable, Rev. Rill.
55-723, 1955-2 CUm. BULL. 496), and lai-d acquired Under the homestead laws, 43 US.C.
§ 175 (1964).
7. tlnited States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958); Treas. Reg. § 801.6334-1(c) (1054).
8. However, as we shall see (note 49 infra), state exemption laws come into play whenl
a taxpayer's property must be pursued into the hands of a transferee, unless a lien had
attached before the transfer. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
9. 11 US.d. § 24 (1964).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1965-66); United States v. Uefftott, 158 F.2d 657 (9th
Cli'. 1947), cdrt. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947).
11. Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272 (1882); FED. R. Civ. P. 69. If, however, the state exenip.
don law is inapplicable to judgments obtained by the state, It also does not bind the
United States. United States v. Miller, 229 F.2d 899 (3d Cit. 1956).
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It seems preferable, therefore, for Congress to consider enlargement of
the exemptions, on a uniform national basis.'-
A central problem affecting all exemption laws, state and federal, is
that they "have failed to grow up. The dollar has depreciated. Wealth
forms and occupational patterns have changed. Economic stability at
high living standards has been achieved. New attitudes toward govern-
mental responsibility for financial disaster have developed, But . . .
exemptions have inadequately respQnded to these phenomena."'u The
federal law was purportedly "modernized" in 1954,14 after 88 years
without change.' 5 True, the 1954 revision did away with the archaic
enumeration of such things as one cow, two hogs, five sheep and the
wool thereof, along with their fodder for 80 days, $25 worth of fuel,
$50 in provisions, and 5300 in furniture, and replaced it with a more
flexible $500 overall allowance for fuel, provisions, household furniture
and personal effects, arms for personal use, livestock and poultry.10 The
total exemption today, however, is scarcely more than the sum of the
amounts allowed for the specific items a century ago. Consideration
should be given to substituting a flat dollar exemption, adjusted (and
periodically readjusted)' 7 to modem economic conditions, and perhaps
varying according to the delinquent's family responsibilities, which
would be taken in whatever form of property or money best allows
the individual to satisfy his family's needs for subsistence and a fresh
start.28
The federal exemption law contains some remarkable inconsistencies
which should also be re-examinec It exempts federal and state unem-
ployment benefits, certain military pensions, and railroad retirement
pensions,' 9 but not other veterans' benefits - nor old age benefits under
12. See 84 A.B.A. REP. 681 (1959).
13. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 63 YALE UJ. 1459, 1497
(1959).
14. H.R. Rn. No. 1837, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A408 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 577 (1954).
15. INr. REv. CoDE of 1939, § 3691, corresponds to U.S. REv. STAT. § 3187 (1875), which
in turn came from the Act of July 13, 1865, ch. 184, 14 Stat. 98, 108.
16. This allowance is only for a head of a family. A delinquent taxpayer who lives
alone may be deprived of his gun and even his rocking chair, but he may take advantage
of the further exemptiorn for "necessary" wearing apparel and school books (unlimicedin
amount), as well as a $250 allowance for books and tools necessary in his trade, business
or profession (increased from the 1866 standard of $100, to allow for a century of inflation).
17. The amount might be geared to a price index, since Congress is no more lihely
than most state legislatures to keep the figure in line with conditions.
18. See Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 63 YALE LJ. 1459,
1507-09 (1959). The exemption should be conditioned on the delinquent's producing his
other property for levy; otherwise, any levy could be defeated by designating that prop-
erty as the exempt property, while other assets remain concealed or beyond reach of a levy.
19. Ir,'r. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 6334(a)(4) and (6).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 3101 (1964).
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the Social Security Act. It exempts workmen's compensation awards,2'
but not social security disability payments.22
2. Wage and Salary Levies; Other Recurrent Income
The federal tax collector can collect delinquent taxes by levy on
wages, free of any minimum subsistence exemption and of any other
restrictions such as state laws commonly impose upon such levies"3
From time to time, bills have been proposed to establish a minimum
exemption for Wages, but the difficulties involved are great. Minimum
needs vary in different sections of the country and among individuals
with disparate family and other responsibilities. Changes in the cost
of living will soon outdate figures frozen into the law today. If, to over-
come that problem, the exemption is based on a percentage of earnings,
it would almost have to be on a graduated scale, and the gradations
themselves would become obsolete with the passage of time.2 4
In practice, the absence of a minimum exemption has the salutary
effect of prompting the taxpayer to work out with the District Director
an installment payment arrangement, coupled with a partial assignment
of wages agreed to by the employer.2 5 On the perhaps questionable as-
sumption that all collection officers, if not reasonable men, at least are
practical men conscious of the need to keep the taxpayer working if the
tax is ever to be collected, that flexible procedure may well be prefer-
able to any arbitrary scale of exemptions, since it allows consideration
of the taxpayer's particular circumstances.
If the taxpayer is recalcitrant, however, the tax collector must levy
each payday and bear the risk that the employer will cooperate with his
employee to defeat the recurring levies by prepaying wages.20 The Fed-
21. INT. R v. CODE of 1954, § 6334(a)(7).
22. Kane v. Burlington Say. Bank, 320 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963).
23. Antrum v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 54 (D. Conn. 1953).
24. See Joslin, supra note 3, at 360-64. The proposed "Internal Revenue Administrative
Code," which the Treasury exposed to public comment in 1941 but which was never e.
acted, contained in Section 4122(a)(8) a graduated scale of exemptions, ranging from 50
per cent if the annual wage is below $2,400 to 20 per cent if over $10,000. In its recent
proposal designed to head off legislation for the discharge of "stale" taxes in bankruptcy
(see note 248 in the first installment of this article, 77 YALE L.J. 228 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as First Installment]), the Treasury urged that the bankrupt be required to devote
10 per cent of his net after-tax income to payment of his back taxes, unless the bankruptcy
court ordered payment of a larger amount. S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 20-21
(1966). No such court supervision, however, would be available in the case of a levy,
although provision could be made for it.
25. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6343-1(b)(4) and (5) (1954).
26. Cf. United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 19,10); United
States v. Penn, 266 F. Supp. 655 (D. Ariz. 1967). The American Bar Association proposal
contained a provision, Section 6332(b)(2), which was not adopted by Congress, Imposing
liability on the employer who prepaid in "bad faith" to enable the employee to beat a
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eral Tax Lien Act of 1966, confirming prior law, expressly declares that
"[a] levy shall extend only to property possessed and obligations
existing at the time thereof."2 That principle may be desirable in re-
lieving banks, for example, from the necessity to be alert for new
deposits in an account on which there is an earlier, unsatisfied levy.28
The rule is unnecessarily restrictive, however, when applied to levies
on regularly recurring income such as wages and salaries, trust distribu-
tions,2 9 annuities, rentals and royalties. While it is true that garnish-
ments traditionally reach only accrued income,30 the appropriateness
and utility of continuing levies has often been recognized.31
A continuing levy raises practical problems, however. It is essential
to require the tax collector to assume an affirmative obligation to notify
the payor when the liability is extinguished, since the tax might be col-
lected by other means and the payor would have no way of knowing
when to resume normal payments to the taxpayer.32 More importantly,
a continuing levy is much too drastic unless coupled either with an
exemption provision or with a discretionary power in the District
Director to designate, in the light of the particular circumstances, the
fraction of the recurring payments to which the levy applies.33
Mention should be made at this point of another matter involving
levy. 84 A.B.A. REP. 697, 725 (1959). An example of a law addressed to that problem is
D.C. CODE § 16-513 (1967).
27. INr. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6331(b), as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, Pub. L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966), codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (Supp.
IL 1965-66).
28. H.R. REP'. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966); S. Rn'. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17 (1966). Cf. Rev. Rul. 67-162, 1967 IN-r. RE%. BULu No. 20, at 37.
29. Compare Rev. Rul. 55-210, 1955-1 Cuss. BULt 544, with Leuschner v. First W. Bank
8- Trust Co., 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9734 (N.D. Cal. 1957), concerning the effect of a levY
on future trust income. The effect of the 1966 amendment, note 27 supra, on this question
is unclear.
S0. United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 19.10).
81. A good example of a law providing a continuing wage levy for the collection of
taxes is MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 322(5).
32. Such a requirement is found in the Maryland wage levy law, id. See also H.R.
REp. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966); S. Rn'. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sesi. 18(1966), regarding like notice to a life insurance company on which a lcvy has been made
for a policyholder's taxes.
33. Proposed statutory language which was submitted to, but not passed on by, the
Special Committee on Federal Liens, follows:
CONTINUING LEVY ON RECURRENT OBLIGATIONS.-If (and only i) the
notice of levy so specifies, with respect to all or any designated portion of salary,
wages, compensation for personal services, rental, annuities, income from a trust, or
other regularly recurring obligations to the taxpayer, the effect of the levy shall be
continuous from the date thereof until the liability in respect of which the levy is
made is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time. If a levy has
been made which has such continuing effect, the Secretary or his delegate shall
promptly release the levy when such levy is satisfied, and shall promptly notify the
person upon whom the levy was made that the levy is released. -
Precedent for the Director's specifying the intended reach of a levy is found in Treas.
Reg. § 80l.6352-1(a)(2) (1960), relating to bank accounts in foreign branches.
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tax levies on wages. It is now firmly established that federal taxes owed
by employees of state and local governments may be collected by levy
upon the proper officials of those governments31 But, in the absence of
express consent by Congress, the state and local governments do not
enjoy a like privilege of collecting their taxes by levy on federal sala,
ries. 35 The states cooperated with remarkable good will when Congress
instituted the system of collection by wage withholding30 and Congress
responded by accepting a federal obligation to withhold state taxes from
federal wages,37 detlaring that "it is the policy of the Federal Govern-
ment to cooperate with the states in the administration of their tax laws
to the fullest extent practicable .. in view of their cooperation with
the Federal Government in fiscal matters generally, and particularly in
withholding federal income tax from their employeeg."'' s Congress
ought now to reciprocate by accepting also the small administrative
bttrden 9 involved in honoring wage levies for state and local taxes. It
would thus complete the process, begun over a quarter-century ago, of
preventing employment by one level of government from becoming a
haven for avoidance of taxes fairly imposed by another.40
3. Liability of Gratuitous Transferees
If a taxpayer transfers property after he has incurred a federal tax
liability but before the tax has been assessed, no lien for an assessment
thereafter made against the taxpayer can attach to the property in the
transferee's hands.4' Nevertheless, the transferee may incur liability "at
34. Sims v. United States, 859 U.S. 108 (1959); Massachusetts v. lUnited States, 290 F.2d
336 (Ist Cir. 1961); Hoye vs United States, 277 F,2d 116 (9th Cir. 1960). See Plumlb, May
the States be ReqUired to Assist in the ColleCtion of Federal Taxes on Their Eitfployees?
30 GEo. L.J, 534 (1942).
35. See 27 Camp. Gen. 372 (1948), following Mayo v. United States 319 U.S, 441
(1948); cf. 26 Camp. Gen. 907 (1947), Although a tax levy It an administratlve ratler
than a judicial act, it is analogous to garnishment (cf. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.,
252 U.S. 60, 75 (1920)) to which the United States has not consented. United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Buchanan V. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 Hlow.) 19, 20 (1846);
United States v. Krakover, 377 F,2d 104 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967)I
Chilean Line, Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1965). The federal toverelV
immunity, unless waived, bars state action. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939).
86. INT, REV. CODE of 1954, § 3401(c), expressly requires withholding by states and
their political subdivisions.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 84b (1964).
38. S. R,, No. 1309, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952). See also H,R, RrP. No. 2474, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The Senate version provided also for federal withholding of mu.
nicipal income taxes, but this was eliminated in the House as too burdensonie. Sline
the cities must withhold for the Federal Government, this inequity should be coftected.
See 1953 ,NIMLO MUN. L, RAv. 69.
39, Cf. Federal Housing Admits. v. Burr, 309 US. 242, 249 (1940).
40. See Graves v. NeW York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
41. United States v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 214 F.2d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 1954): Raifaele v.
Granger, 196 F,2d 620, 623-24 (3d Cir. 1952); United States v. Haddock, 144 F. Stipp, 720
(E.D.N.C. 1956).
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law or in equity" for such unassessed tax42 if the transfer was without
adequate consideration and left the taxpayer without sufficient assets
to pay his tax liabilities, 4 3 or if the transfer was othervise fraudulent as
to creditors,4 4 or if the transferee assumed the taxpayer's liabilities.45
In such cases, federal law has provided an efficient remedy against the
transferee by assessment in the same manner as a tax liability is deter-
mined and assessed, without the need for a creditor's bill or other
cumbersome procedure under state law.4 But the substantive question
of whether the transferee is responsible for the taxpayer's liabilities is
left largely to the laws of the several states.4T
The result is that whereas a transferee of property to which a federal
lien had already attached (by assessment, notice and demand) before
the transfer may be pursued without regard to the exemptions and
other provisions of state law,4 s the absence of a state law remedy against
a gratuitous transferee of property not yet subject to lien is fatal to the
federal claim, even if it is a state exemption law that makes the remedy
unavailable. 49 It is highly desirable in the even-handed administration
of the federal tax system that transferees should not be free of liability
in one state and liable in another when they stand in precisely the same
42. Unknown tax deficiencies subsequently determined may subject the transferee to
liability, Scott v. Commissioner 117 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1941), and even the tax accruing
for the year during which the transfer occurs may be covered, if the "trust fund doctrine"
is the basis for the liability, Updike v. United States, 8 F.2d 913, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1925),
J. Warren Leach, g_ T.C. 70 (1953), although possibly not if a fraudulent convcyance is
asserted. Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1956). See Plumb, Federal Tax Liens
and Transferee Proceedings, TUL. 13TH TAx Irsr. 148, 186 (1964). This question may be
subject to the vagaries of state law.
43. See Plumb, supra note 42, at 183-4.
44, Estate of Samuel Stein, 37 T.C. 945 (1962); Meyer Fried, 25 T.C. 1241 (1956).
45. Kamen Soap Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 230 F,2d 365 (2d Cir, 1956). Problems
arising on the acquisition of a business are reviewed in Plumb, supra note 42, at 189-94.
46. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6901. With limited exceptions, however, this procedure
is not available in the collection of taxes other than income, estate and gift taxes. 1d.
§ 6901(a)(2); Lawrence v. United States, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9329 (N.D. Tcx. 1967). State
law procedures may be availed of by the Government in any case if it prefers. Leighton v.
United States, 289 U.S. 506 (1933); United States v. Scott, 167 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1948).
47. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).
48. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
49. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). It has been held that the requirements
of exhaustion of remedies against the transferor, and notice of deficiency to the transferor
as conditions precedent to pursuit of the transferee, are procedural and hence governed
by uniform federal standards (to be found in the decisions, since the statute is silent).
Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 206-07 (9th Cir. 196-), cert. deied, 373 U.S.
909 (1963). The Government also cannot be bound by state statutes barring cla-1 not
timely presented when the Government is enforcing its rights in a court proceeding.
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940). Nevertheless, one recent questionable
decision holds that the state court's decree of distribution in a probate proceeding, in
which the Government did not participate, bars collection from the gratuitous trans-
ferees. United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931, 937-38 (S.D. Cal. 1966). See
First Installment 258 n.191.
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position. 0 Congress unquestionably has the power to prescribe a uni-
form federal rule of transferee liability,51 as it has in fact already done
with respect to the estate and gift tax. 52
Four decades of experience with the federal transferee procedure
have provided a solid base for a codification of such federal rules, which
could also draw upon such sources as the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act. It would be well, however, to make clear that any liability
imposed upon a transferee by state law may also be enforced by the
Government, using the simplified federal procedure, in order to guard
against oversight and to make available any state rule which goes be-
yond the federal standard. If such a codification is not undertaken,
Congress should at least provide that, whenever a transferee would be
liable but for the effect of a state exemption law, such liability shall be
imposed.
Whether the general rules of transferee liability are to be governed
by federal or state standards, they should be supplemented by specific
federal substantive rules, the need for which will become evident in
the discussion of later subtopics hereunder. The principal such rule
would impose liability upon one who succeeds, upon the taxpayer's
death, to any property or right to property which, immediately before
his death, the taxpayer was entitled to take for his own benefit by parti-
tion or by the exercise of any power or right.53
4. Life Insurance and the Widow's Allowance
Nearly every state, out of tenderness for the bereaved, and in order to
encourage provision for family protection, has exempted life insurance
from the reach of creditors of the insured (and sometimes also of the
beneficiary), either with or without limit on the amount.54 Congress,
however, has never thought it appropriate to encourage investments
in life insurance to the point of making them a safe haven from the
federal tax collector. 5  It underscored its position in 1966 when it
50. Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 47-50 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See also i.R.
RyE. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1926); 1939-1 Cum. BuLL. (Part 2) 361, 372.
51. Commissioner v. Stem, 357 U.S. 39, 45 (1958).
52. Personal liability imposed on certain transferees by INT. REV. CODn of 1954,
§§ 6324(a)(2) and (b), is enforced through the usual transferee procedure (id. § 6901(h)),
but free of the exemptions, conditions precedent and other requirements of state law.
Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Chase Man.
hattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 256 (5th Cir. 1958). See Part IV.D, in the third installment
of this article.
53. See the discussions of life insurance, family allowances, revocable trusts, powers of
appointment, and joint tenancies, in Sections 4, 6 and 10 of Part IV.A infra.
54. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 175.81 (Rev. ed. 1940).
55. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
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moved to simplify the procedure for, and thus to facilitate, the applica-
tion of lifetime policy values to federal tax liabilities. Accordingly, if a
federal tax lien is enforced during the taxpayer's lifetime, the District
Director may now obtain, by simple levy upon the insurance company,
the loan value of the taxpayer's insurance (reduced by outstanding
loans having priority),56 If for any reason (such as absence of a loan
value) the tax collector wishes to cause the surrender of the policy and
application of the cash value on the tax, that can be done by foreclosure
suit.57
Given the policy of Congress that life insurance values over which a
taxpayer has complete command in his lifetime should be amenable to
seizure for his tax liabilities, it follows that his death should not free
those values from the burden. Yet under present law the question
whether the proceeds can be followed into the beneficiaries' hands de-
pends upon the procedural accident of whether federal or state law
governs in the particular case.'; A lien which had attached to the net
cash surrender value in the taxpayer's lifetime will follow that much
of the proceeds into the hands of his beneficiary, notwithstanding any
state exemption law.59 But if the family was fortunate enough to lose its
breadwinner before his tax liability was assessed and became a lien,cO
no part of the proceeds can be reached unless the exemption laws of
the particular state permit.61 That distinction in treatment should be
eliminated.62
That leaves the question, however, of what the uniform rule ought
to be. The Supreme Court, even in the case where the lien had attached
56. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6332(b), as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966. Formerly, there was a practical impediment to the Government's reaching policy
values during the taxpayer's lifetime, because the only way a surrender of the policy could
be compelled was through a judicial proceeding for foreclosure of the lien, a cumbersome
and time-consuming procedure during which policy values were eroded by premium loans,
or by levy on the policy itself as held by the insured. United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d
100, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1964). The new simple procedure may encourage the tax collector's
resort to this source of payment, but it has the advantage of avoiding the destruction of
often irreplaceable family protection through surrender of the policy. For the procedure,
see Temporary Treas. Reg. § 400.3-1.
57. LNT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6332(b)(3); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. United States,
331 F.2d 29 (Ist Cir. 1964).
58. See p. 611 & note 49 supra.
59. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
60. This would inevitably be the case with the income tax for the decedent's final
taxable year, and the normal delays incident to audit and litigation may result in other
deficiencies still being unassessed at death.
61. Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958); cf. Laura Lewis, 33 T.C. 215 (1959) (same
ruling as to death benefits from city retirement fund).
62. For discussions and conclusions concerning related Stern and Bess problems zee
Grayck, The Liability of a Life Insurance Beneficiary for the Insured's Income Taxes-
A Postscript on the Supreme Court's Decisions in the Stern and Bess Cases, 14 TAx. L.
Rzv. 137, 148-49 (1958); Note, 44 CoRaNr.L LQ. 278, 283-84 (1959).
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to the policy before death, has held that only the cash value at the time
of death was property belonging to the taxpayer and subject to the lien.
The balance of the proceeds-despite the fact that the insured had
power to designate his estate or his creditors to receive the proceeds-
was held not to !have been property belonging to him, because "the
insured could not enjoy the possession of the proceeds in his lifetime.'"0
Yet a power of disposition is as much an incident of ownership as the
right to possess; 4 and Congress and the courts have never doubted, for
estate tax purposes, that life insurance is "property procured through
expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death,
of having it pass to another," and is the subject of a transfer, testamen-
tary in character, to the full extent of the amount thus disposed of.05
If the taxpayer had made the proceeds payable to his estate, the entire
amount thereof could be subjected to his tax liabilities in the hands of
his distributees; that he exercises his continuing power under the in-
surance contract by ordering payment directly to them rather than to
his estate should not change the result.06
The problem is complicated by the fact that if only the amount of
the cash value is subject to tax collection, the insured may deplete that
fund during his lifetime by borrowing from the insurance company;
such loans have priority even over previously filed federal tax liens
unless the insurer had actual notice or knowledge thereof.67 Although
the policy loan can be satisfied from the entire proceeds, the Supreme
Court-stressing the spirit of the exemption laws which it had itself
said earlier were not applicable to federal tax claims-has refused to
marshal the decedent's assets by satisfying the federal tax lien from the
amount of the cash value and the policy loan from the excess proceeds. 08
That decision may cast some doubt on an earlier court of appeals de.
cision which held that if general assets of an estate, which could have
63. United States v, Bess, 857 U.S. 51, 55 (1958).
64. Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118(1940).
65. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 2042(2); Chase Nat1 Bank v, United States, 278 U.S. 327,
334, 337 (1929).
66. Mary Stoumen, 27 T.C. 1014, 1024 (1957). The Supreme Court's premise, in United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. at 56, that it is the cash value that is subject to lien during the
taxpayer's lifetime also seems faulty. While withdrawal of the cash value was the most
practical, and hence the customary, method of realizing on insurance, the policy might
lawfully have been sold, if that would realize a greater value, perhaps reflecting the
imminence of death. United States v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94, 105 (5th Ctr. 1965). But for
the practical problem of maintaining the policy, the Goverment itself might have bid it
the policy (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7405(c); 31 U.S.C. § 195 (1964)) and realized the full
proceeds at the taxpayer's death.
67. INT. R-v. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b)(9).
68. Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S, 233 (1963), overruling United States v. IBchreq,
230 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956).
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been reached for the decedent's income tax liabilities, are used instead
to pay the estate tax, the excess insurance proceeds (which might have
been taken for the estate tax) may be reached under the marshaling
principle to satisfy the income tax1 9
Those problems are not to be resolved analytically, however.
Whether the margin between the net cash value and the full proceeds
of an insurance contract is to be preserved as a sanctuary for the bene-
ficiary can be determined only by Congress' weighing the interests of
the revenue against its sympathy for the widows and orphans.7 But
Congress should address itself to the issue.
Closely analogous problems arise with respect to the allowances for
the support of widows and dependents which are provided by many
state laws.7' Although sometimes analogized to common law dower,
these allowances differ in the vital respect that they are set aside only
out of what the husband possesses at his death, while dower ordinarily
cannot be defeated by an inter vivos conveyance by the husband.72 The
family's rights are "vested," if at all, only in the sense that a forced
heir's right to a share in a decedent's estate is vested.73 In substance,
they are exemption laws rather than rules of property,74 and are no
more entitled to recognition against federal tax claims than the usual
homestead exemption lawY5
Nevertheless, there are a number of rulings and court decisions ac-
knowledging the priority of such family allowances in the estate of an
insolvent decedent, on the ground that the allowance is not a debt of
the decedent but a charge against the estate, in the nature of an admin-
69. United States v. Gilmore, 222 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 843 (1955).
Other aspects of the marshaling problem, where it cuts the other way, are considered in
Part V.F, in the third installment of this article,
70. It should be noted that, if the widow is the beneficiary and the liability arcse out
of a joint income tax return, Congtess has felt no such concern for the widow, but holds
her jointly and severally liable (INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(d)(3))-and hence permits
reaching the full insurance proceeds-even if little or hone of the income involved .as
hers or ever came into her hands. Cf. Estate of Ginsberg v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 511
(5th Cir. 1959).
71. The laws are reviewed in G. GLENN, THE LAw GOVERN NG IQUmATION § 509 (1935).
72. Dower rights, therefore, are preferred over post-marital liens for the husbands
taxes, unless state law makes them subject to defeat by the husband's transfers or by his
debts. See PLumM & WRIGHT, ch. 5, § 4.
78. See United States v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1961).
In some states, the right is not "vested" even in that sense. Jackson v. United States, 376
U.S. 503 (1964).
74. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113, 117 (5th Cir. 1960), Seiden v. Soutldand Chenilles,
195 F,2d 899, 901 (5th Cir. 1952), cf. 11 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), which was amended in 1938
to preclude double allowance of exemptions, both for the bankrupt himself (under Section
24) and for his family, if the bankrupt died pending the proceeding. See 1 W. Cortmn
BAkRUPTcy 8.01 (14th ed. 1940).
75. Sources cited note 193 ihfira.
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istration expense.70 The fact that the money or property thus set apart
is not deemed part of the assets subject to administration does not fully
answer the question, however. It is analogous to exempt property set
aside and excluded from a bankrupt estate, which is nevertheless sub-
ject to pursuit into the hands of those to whom it is delivered.77 Cer-
tainly, if a federal tax lien had attached to the property before death,
it could not be defeated by an award of the property for the family's
support.78 Where the lien had not arisen before death, on the other
hand, the absence of a remedy for private creditors under state law
would now leave the Government powerless to pursue the survivors. 1
Consistently with the recommendations herein, the exempt property
should be made subject to federally governed transferee liability rules,
regardless of whether the tax is assessed before or after death. 0
If Congress-contrary to its general policy against allowing exempt
havens from federal tax collection-should decide, upon examination
of the problem, to relent in favor of widows and orphans, the exemp-
tion should be coordinated with whatever is done about life insurance
and
(1) Applied on a uniform national basis rather than by reference
to the widely varying policies of state laws and the discretion of
probate judges, some of which go far beyond the allowance of what
could "be classed as a 'widow's mite' ";81
(2) Limited to a certain dollar amount (against which any excess
76. United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Postmaster Gen. v.
Robbins, 19 F. Cas. 1126 (No. 11,314) (D. Me. 1829); Jessie Smith, 24 B.T.A. 807, 811
(1931); I.T. 2712, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 138 (1933); I.T. 2518, IX-I CUM. BULL. 1r8 (19130);
G.C.M. 4217, VII-2 Cum. BULL. 162 (1928); I.T. 2430, VII-2 CUM. BULL. 72 (1928); In re
Estate of Carl, 43 Ohio Op. 52, 94 N.E.2d 239 (P. Ct., Franklin County, 1950). The con.
trary decisions of In re Estate of Ballard, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9777 (Mich. P. Ct., Oakland
County, 1944), and Federal Reserve Bank v. Smylie, 134 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.
1939), may be explainable by differences in state law. If the widow is herself liable for the
decedent's tax, by reason of having filed a joint return (note 70 sutpra), or because she
incurred transferee liability by receiving other property of the decedent, the property
awarded to her as widow's allowance may be seized for this liability despite a state exemp.
tion law. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1960).
77. United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947)
(homestead exemption).
78. See Postmaster Gen. v. Robbins, 19 F. Cas. 1126, 1127 (No. 11,314) (D. Me, 1829),
cf. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958). Calling the allowance an administration ex-
pense does not change its character. United States v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 384 U.S.
323, 330 (1966); United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 371 U.S. 228, 229 (1963). And, In
any event, administration expenses prevail over prior liens only if beneficial to the lcned
property. United States v. Wasserman, 257 F.2d 491 (1st Cir. 1958).
79. See p. 613 & note 61 supra.
80. See also the discussions of life insurance, revocable trusts, powers of appoinltment,
and joint tenancies, in Sections 4, 6, and 10 of Part IV.A.
81. Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1960) (house worth $20,000-2i,000).
See also Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964) ($72,000); United States v, First Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1961) ($59,604.29).
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of insurance proceeds over cash value should be charged, if such
excess is to continue to enjoy unlimited immunity);
(3) Applied to all property of whatever kind passing to depen-
dents, whether the decedent chose to invest in life insurance or
leaves his dependents only a modest home, a savings account, or
other property; 2 and
(4) Applied without regard to whether the tax lien arises before
or after death.
5. Trust Income and Future Interests
It is beyond question that a taxpayer's beneficial interest in the in-
come or the remainder of a trust may be reached for his federal tax
obligations.83 Whether the trust was created by the taxpayer or by a
third party, no spendthrift clause in the instrument itself&4 and no ee-
emption provided by state laws5 can immunize such beneficial rights
from the federal tax collector. If the taxpayer's rights are subject to the
discretion of the trustee, the tax collector can reach whatever the
trustee elects to distribute;80 and if that discretion is governed by an
enforceable standard (such as the amount necessary for support), the
Government is entitled to the amount the taxpayer could have required
the trustee to distribute. 7 No change in those rules is recommended,
for no private arrangement should make unavailable to the tax col-
lector income which a taxpayer is free to enjoy as his own.
If the taxpayer's property right is a future interest, it cannot, of
course, be reduced to immediate possession by the tax collector, but it
can probably be sold by him, whether it is vested or contingent,88
82. Life insurance is essentially a means of setting aside a fund of savings (with pro-
vision for acceleration of the accumulation in case of premature death), the fund being
available at will to the insured in his lifetime (to the extent of its then value) and pass
ing to his designees, like any investment, at his death. See I G. GLNN, F AUDULr C0.1.
vEYAcEs AND PREFERENCES § 176 (Rev. ed. 1940). The needs of the dependents are the
same whatever the form of the provision made for them. It is of interest that, as long
ago as 1942, Congress abolished the special $40,000 exemption of life insurance from the
estate tax, and imposed the same tax whatever form the decedent's property might take.
Revenue Act of 1942 § 404, 56 Stat. 798, 944, amending ImT. Rv. CODE of 1939, § 811(g).
83. Concerning a continuing levy on trust income, see note 29 supra.
84. Leuschner v. First V. Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1958): United
States v. Dallas Niat'1 Bank, 152 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1945). 164 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1947). 167
F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1948); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1944).
85. In re Rosenberg's Will, 269 N.Y. 247, 199 N.. 206 (1935), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
669 (1936). Statutory exemption of income necessary for the beneficiary's support was
denied effect in Leuschner v. First IV. Bank & Trust Co., 261 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1958).
86. REsrATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TAusrs § 155 (1959); E. Guiow, StP'DwnnrT Tnusrs
§§ 367-68 (1947); cf. Boss Co. v. Board of Commrs, 40 N.J. 379, 192 A.2d 584 (1963) (fed-
eral lien attaches to liquor license subject to state's discretionary control of transfer).
87. United States v. Taylor, 254 F. Supp. 752 (N.D. Cal. 1966). There, the grantor
sought to fortify the spendthrift provision by providing a forfeiture in the eent of a
levy, but the forfeiture was held to be a sham because of the provision for support of the
beneficiary, who thus regained his interest through the back door.
88. Cf. G.C.M. 1310, VI-I Cum. But. 101, 102 (1927), prescribing sale of a taxpayer's
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despite some questionable judicial declarations in other contexts that
contingent rights are not "property or rights to property" subject to
the lien.9 It is entirely fitting that the lien should attach to such rights,
for such value as the taxpayer may ultimately derive from them; but it
is wrong to compel their sale. Such an interest, even when vested, either
would be bought by a speculator, at heavy sacrifice to both the taxpayer
and the revenue, or would be purchased for a song by a member of the
family. Provision should be made for preserving the lien but deferring
the sale until the interest becomes a vested interest in possession (or at
least a present right to enjoy the fruits of the property), which could be
sold at a fair price. Precedent for such a provision may be found in the
law which permits deferral of estate tax payments on the value of a re-
mainder or reversionary interest until after the termination of the
preceding interestsyo In order to establish the necessity for resort to
such property, and to resolve any controverted issues on the merits
within the normal period of limitations, while memories are fresh and
records are available, provision should be made for a judicial pro-
ceeding in which the lien would be determined but not enforced. The
court could enter such order as it deemed necessary to protect the
Government's interest in the interim.9 1
6. Revocable Trwts and Beneficial Powers
. The tax collector may encounter difficulty if the taxpayer has em-
ployed any of several popular estate planning devices to avoid probate,
interest in a tenancy by the entirety, where that is permitted under state law, subject to
the survivorship rights at the other spouse. The procedure suggested below would be
applicable in such cases also. See note 226 infra,
89, in re Halprin, 280 F.2d 401, 410 (3d Cir, 1960); Home Ins, Co, v. B. B. Rider Corp,,
212 F. Supp. 457, 461-62 (D.N.J. 1963). See PLUMB & WRIoHT 20.
90. INr, REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6163. Although that deferral of payment is Optional
with the executor, the provision here suggested should be mandatory, whenever no othor
property is available for collection. Otherwise, by not availing himself of the provision,
the taxpayer could cause a forced sale of the unmarketable interest, for which a family
member might be the only bidder.
91, Proposed statutory langUage, antending INT. RFv, CODr of 1954, § 7403, which (with
variations) was submitted to, but rot passed on by, the Special Committed oa Federal
Liens, folloWs.
When any interest in property, subject to the lien imposed by sectlon 6521, may be
affected by the contingency of the taxpayer's survival of another petson, or (whether
vested or contingent) is postponed for the life of attother person or persons, no ale
of the interest of the taxpayer in such property shall be decreed durrig the llifetinue
of such other pergon or persons, but the court shall adjudicate till other matters In-
volved and shall finally determine the merits of all clails to and liens upon tle
property, and shall make such rdet is it deems necessary to protect the lien of te
Government upon such property. Such adjtdication 8hall not preclude the collection
of the tax liability from other sources; but, upon full satisfaction of the liability, the
Secretary or his delegate shall promptly file with the court a release of the lien pur-
suant to section 6325(a)(1).
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such as placing property in a revocable trust, or creating a legal or equi-
table life interest in himself with a power reserved to invade the corpus
or to appoint the remainder.92
Under general law, creditors of the grantor are entitled to reach the
corpus of property which he has transferred with a life interest and a
power of appointment reserved, even if he does not exercise the power,
and even if the transfer was not fraudulent.0 As one court said,
It is against public policy, and not consonant with natural
justice and fair dealing, as betveen debtor and creditor, that a
settlor should be permitted to play fast and loose with his prop-
erty, in such manner as to have the use of the income during life
and the right of disposing of the principal by ill at any subse-
quent time he chooses to exercise the power, thus giving him all
of the substantial benefits arising from the ownership thereof while
he has safely put his property beyond the reach of creditors.04
Yet, even in such a situation, there is some authority that creditors
cannot reach the property if the grantor chooses not to exercise his
reserved power-9
If, on the other hand, the grantor reserves merely a power to revoke,
the general rule, in the absence of statute to the contrary,00 is that the
grntor's power to make the property his own is not a property right
and cannot be reached by creditors of the grantor unless the transfer
was fraudulent.97
Where someone other than the grantor has a power of appointment
exercisable for his own benefit (including a power to invade corpus or
to take income otherwise payable to another), the general common law
rule is that his creditors cannot reach the property unless the person
asserts his dominion by exercising the power.08
A number of state legislatures have determined that creditors should
be permitted to reach property that is subject to such beneficial
92. See Heffernan & Williams, Revocable Trusts in Estatc Planning, in 2 EsrA' TAx
TEcHNIquEs 1317 (J. Lasser ed.); Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance of Probate, GO
CoLUz. L. Rrv. 108 (1960). The devices here considered would not save Income and estate
taxes, but it appears they might stave off the tax collector's enforcement arm, if state law
is applied.
93. 5 A'EacAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.14 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952; RMTATE. rr OF
PROPERTY & 328 (Supp. 1948).
94. Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 137, 67 A. 52, 53 (1907).
95. Crawford v. Langmaid, 177 Mass. 309, 50 N.E. 605 (1898).
96. P. 620 infra.
97. Jones v. Clifton, 101 U.S. 225 (1879); REsrATE.tENT (SECOND) OF TRusts § 30, com-
ment o (1959); 3 A. ScoTT, TRusts § 330.12 (2d ed. 196).
98. 5 AM ERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 23.14-23.17 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). When the
power is exercised, the courts irrationally permit the property to be reached by creditors
even if the exercise is in favor of someone other than the grantor. Id. § 23.16.
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powers,?9 on the ground that "as to my creditors, property is mine that
becomes mine for the asking, and no words can make an instrument
strong enough to hold it for me or keep it from them," 100 and Congress
itself long ago provided that powers which a bankrupt might have ex-
ercised for his own benefit shall be exercisable for the benefit of his
creditors by the bankruptcy trustee."' The wording of some of the
statutes is such, however, that they wholly fail to reach powers exercis-
able by will; 0 2 and powers exercisable inter vivos may also escape if
the grantor or other possessor of the power has died. 03
Where a federal tax has become a lien during a taxpayer's lifetime,
it is doubtful whether such rules of state law, even though they mas-
querade as rules of property rather than exemption laws, 04 inhibit the
tax collector in reaching property that is within the taxpayer's power to
enjoy. 0 5 Even if not "property," the power is a "right to property,"
and hence subject to the lien.10 6 It has been held in life insurance cases
that the courts will exercise for the benefit of the revenue a taxpayer's
power to vest property in himself.1o7 But the same life insurance analogy
warns that the absence of a remedy against the property under state law
will forestall federal tax collection if the lien did not arise before
death' 08-although the same disposition of property, effected more con-
ventionally by testamentary means, would not have escaped the tax
collector. 09
For estate tax purposes Congress has long treated a revocable trust,
and property subject to a general power of appointment, as part of the
gross estate of the person possessing the power to revoke or appoint,l0
99. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §§ 139, 163 (1945). The New York law was applied
in favor of the federal tax collector, to reach property subject to a power in the grantor,
and other property subject to a power in his wife, for taxes of the grantor and his wife
respectively. United States v. Peelle, 159 F. Supp. 45, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
100. Ullman v. Cameron, 186 N.Y. 339, 346, 78 N.E. 1074, 1076 (1906).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(3) (1964). See 4 IV. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.13 (14th ed, 1967).
102. Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881). Similarly, under the Bankruptcy Act-
Montague v. Silsbee, 218 Mass. 107, 105 N.E. 611 (1914).
103. Schofield v. Cleveland Trust Co., 135 Ohio St. 328, 21 N.E.2d 119 (1939).
104. See In re Rosenberg's Will, 269 N.Y. 247, 252-53, 199 N.E. 206, 208 (1935).105. "By the execution of deeds and the creation of trusts, the settlor did indeed sue.
ceed in divesting himself of title and transferring it to others .... but the substance of
his dominion was the same as if these forms had been omitted." Burnet v. Guggenheim,
288 U.S. 280, 284 (1933) (gift tax).
106. INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, § 6321. While property rights are determined by statelaw, state characterizations are not controlling on whether the rights which he has con.
stitute property rights. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 225, 268 (1945).
107. See note 57 supra.
108. See note 61 supra.
109. Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Fisher,57 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1944). It is assumed, of course, that the estate had insufficient
other assets. Alex Harjo, 34 B.T.A. 467 (1936).
110. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2038 and 2041(a)(2).
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and has subjected the property to the special Hen provided to secure
the estate tax liability."' Congress has also disregarded for income tax
purposes a trust which a grantor can revoke or which a third party am
take as his own,"2 but it has failed to provide expressly for the enforce-
ment of the tax liability against such property.
The law should make clear that the federal tax collector can reach
during a taxpayer's lifetime any income or corpus (whether in trust or
a leg-al interest) which the taxpayer could reach by the exercise of a
power of revocation, appointment or invasion for his own benefit, in-
cluding a power to appoint by will to his estate or his creditorsu3' Re-
sort to judicial proceedings, rather than levy, should be required where
someone other than the taxpayer has an interest, even though defea-
sible, in order to assure that property arrangements shall not be dis-
turbed if the taxpayer has sufficient other property of his own; M4 the
considerations that moved Congress, in respect of life insurance, to
eliminate the need for court proceedings in the normal caseU5 do not
apply, as these cases do not arise so often that such procedure would be
burdensome to the revenue, nor would the consequent delay normally
erode the values involved. On the other hand, if the tide-holder is a
mere nominee, or if no one but the taxpayer or his estate has an interest
in the trust, administrative action should suffice.
The law should, however, safeguard the interests of third parties who
rely on the record ownership of property standing in the name of a
trustee or nominee, since the true ownership may not be discoverable
from any recorded document." 0 In order that such trusts or nominee
arrangements may not become a haven from which a taxpayer can freely
sell or encumber his property unimpeded by intervening federal tax
111. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a)(1); cf. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 32 T.C. 1017
(1959), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.
1962). See PLsMIm & "IWRIGHT, pt. II, ch. 2.
112. INT. RE v. CODE of 1954, §§ 676, 678; see Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930);
Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d I (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945).
113. If the interest subject to the power is a future interest, the deferral provision sug.
gested at pp. 617-18 supra should be applicable.
114. 5 AMmIcN LAw oF PROPERTY § 23.18 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
115. See note 56 supra.
116. See Chicago Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 IM. 2d 535. 185 N.E.2d 670(1962), in which the Government unsuccessfuly asserted priority of its filed lien as against
later mortgagees of property held for the taxpayer by a land trust, subject to his right
to receive the income and sale proceeds and to direct a conve)ance to himfelf at any
time. The court held the mortgagees entitled to rely on record title in the trustee. A
federal tax lien is enforceable against such a land trust, however, if third parties are not
prejudiced (United States v. Lewis, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9693 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Southwest
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 23 Ill. App. 2d 174, 161 N.E.2d 697(1959)); and, if the taxpayer's interest is known, those dealing with the trustee should
likewise be bound by liens filed against the taxpayer. United States v. Code Prod. Corp.,
216 F. Supp. 281, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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liens, the law should expressly impose on trustees and nominees the
responsibility of advising the appropriate District Director of the
existence of any power over corpus or income which any person may be
entitled to exercise for his own benefit, and should provide suitable
sanctions for the enforcement of such responsibility.117
If the taxpayer dies before his power is thus exercised for the benefit
of the revenue, and if his estate subject to payment of debts is insuffi-
cient to satisfy his taxes,"" those who succeed to the property by virtue
of the taxpayer's exercise or failure to exercise his power should be
made subject to transferee liability, under the principle stated in
Section 3 of this Part.1" 9
7. Income Taxable to the Grantor or Assignor
The income of a revocable trust is, of course, taxable to the grantor,
because of his power to retake the property as his own. 120 But the tax
laws go much further in taxing the income of a trust to a grantor who
does not receive the income, and who cannot recapture the property,
where his powers under the trust instrument, or in actual practice, are
nevertheless such that he is considered to be "in substance the
owner."' 21 In the case of a family partnership, one may be taxed on the
income distributed to others if he retains too much "dominion and
117. Reacting to the Cacciatore case, the Revenue Service directed that trustees under
Illinois land trusts give notice of their fiduciary relationship under INT. R v. CODE Of
1954, § 6903, naming the beneficiaries. Rev. Rul. 63-16, 1963-1 Cuu. BULL. 350, as modified
by letter of April 26, 1963, reported in 7 CCH 1963 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6401. But
Section 6903 was enacted for a different purpose, and provides no sanction. See First
Installment 260, n.201; Cf. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6042(a)(1)(B) and 6049(a)(1)(B),
on furnishing of information by nominees concerning actual ownership. Legislation di-
rected expressly to the problem is desirable.
118. As in the case of life insurance, pp. 614-15 supra, it should not be permissible for
the executor to exhaust the general estate by paying therefrom the estate tax occasioned
by inclusion of the revocable trust or power property in the gross estate, leaving nothing
from which the decedent's other taxes can be collected,
119. P. 612 supra.
120. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 676. Power to cause the income to be distributed to or
accumulated for him will make the grantor taxable under Section 677. A person other
than the grantor may be taxed under Section 678 if he has comparable power over corpus
or income.
121. See Ifelvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-36 (1940), the rule of which has since
been modified and codified in the statute. The grantor, with certain exceptions and ini.
tations, may be taxed on the income if he has a reversionary Interest in a short term
trust for others (INT, Rav. CODE of 1954, § 673), if he or a related nonadverse party can
direct the disposition of corpus or income among others (id. § 674), if he retains or exer.
cises specified "administrative powers" (id, § 675), if a nonadverse party has power to
revest the property in the grantor (id. § 676), if a nonadver~e party has power to ctuse
the income to be distributed or accumulated for his benefit or used to pay preilums
on insurance on his life or (in certain circumstances) to support his dependents (Id. g 677),
or if part of the income of a divorce trust is designated for the support of his minor
children (id. § 682(a)).
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control" over their interestsY 2 and in any event to the extent of the
"'reasonable compensation" for his services if that is not properly re-
flected in his own distributive share.ee One who assigns the income
from property, while retaining the ownership of the property itself,
may remain taxable on that income. 2 4 And one who assigns the right
to his earnings from personal services, rendered or to be rendered,
cannot escape the liability for the tax thereon.'-
The purpose of those rules, some based on court decisions and others
codified in the law, is to prevent tax avoidance through the shifting of
taxable income from the one who earns it (or otherwise controls the
source) to relatives in lower tax brackets. But on a number of occasions
the Government has pursued to a successful conclusion its effort to tax
the transferor in such situations, only to find that he is beyond the juris-
diction or has become unable to pay the tax as a result of either the
transfer itself or reverses subsequently suffered. Frequently, the bundle
of rights which sufficed to make the transferor taxable on the income
did not include the power to retake the corpus or the income, or to
apply either in satisfaction of his debts. And traditional concepts of
transferee liability would not make the trust or other donee responsible
for the transferor's taxes beyond the year of the transfer, even if the
transferor left himself wholly without assets to pay his debts.'2 0 The
income then goes wholly tax-free, since there is no legal basis on which
the Revenue Service can refuse to refund the tax paid on such income
by the actual recipient merely because the Service is unable to collect
from the person who, under the law, is taxable thereon.1-T
The question then arises whether the tax owed by the transferor can,
on any theory, be collected out of the income which is attributed to
him, or out of the corpus of which he is deemed "in substance the
ownet." Reference may be made to what the Supreme Court said in
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e); Ba~lou v. United States, 370 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 19M).
cert. denied, 388 US. 911 (1967); Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962);
Kuney v. Frank, 308 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1962).
123. Ihr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 704(e)(2).
124. United States v. Joliet & Chicago R.R., 815 U.S. 44 (1942); 1elvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
125. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
126. American Trust Co., 18 B.T.A. 580 (1929). Conceivably, the transaction could be
found fraudulent as against the Government as a future creditor, if the tax liability was
anticipated; but proof of such fraud would be difficult. See UNtrot FnAVDULM%-r Cox-
vEYANCE Acr §§ 6-7, 10.
127. Although it has long been the practice of the Service to refrain from refunding
the tax paid by the related taxpayers until the liability of the principal tMxpayer has
been satisfied, the practice has a legal basis only in limited classes of cates. See Plumb, The
Problem of Related Taxpayers: A Procedural Study, 60 H,v. L Rv. 225, 241-43 (1952.
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holding the interest of a surviving tenant by the entireties subject to the
special lien for estate taxes of the deceased spouse:
We cannot impute to Congress an intention.., to exclude from
the tax lien property which it directs to be included in the dece-
dent's gross estate for the purpose of computing the tax.128
The usefulness of that decision, however, is limited by the fact that the
special estate tax lien is imposed on the "gross estate," a federal law
concept identical with the base on which the tax is computed.129 In
contrast, the income tax is collectible only from property and rights to
property "belonging to" the taxpayer, 3 0 or from property which he has
transferred in violation of the rights of creditors-matters which are
governed, respectively, by the state rules of property rights 3 ' and of
fraudulent conveyances. 132 Although the substantive tax concepts by
which income is taxed to one other than the recipient were themselves
initially developed by the courts' 33 (before some of them were modified
and codified in the statute) in the face of a law which likewise looked
to "ownership" of income as the test of taxability, 34 little progress has
been made in extending those concepts to the collection law.
A leading case in point is G.P. Fitzgerald,35 involving a trust which
a nonresident alien had created for his divorced wife and children, the
income from which (as the Tax Court assumed arguendo) was taxable
to the grantor, who was beyond the reach of the tax collector. The Gov-
ernment sought to collect the tax from the trustee, either as a with-
holding agent 36 or as a fiduciary who had satisfied other debts in pref-
erence to those due the United States. 3 7 The Tax Court, however,
was unwilling to impose any obligation on the trust or the fiduciary,
declaring that
there is a distinction between attributing income to a taxpayer for
purposes of reporting income and incurring tax liability and the
128. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 333 (1943).
129. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6324(a). See Part IV.D, in the third installment of this
article.
130. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6321, 6331(a).
131. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960).
132. See p. 611 & note 47 supra.
133. E.g., Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S.
154 (1942); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S, 1
(1935); cases cited notes 124 and 125 supra.
134. Substantive tax liability is based on income "of" the taxpayer (INT. REv. CovE of
1954, § l(a)), which was construed to import the concept of ownership. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930). See also Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1937).
135. 4 T.C. 494 (1944).
136. Tax must be withheld from the income of nonresident aliens under what is now
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1441.
137. REv. STAT. § 3467, 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964). See Part 1I.B in First Installment,
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determination of ownership under general rules of property law.
. . . If the trust income did not belong to Fitzgerald from the
standpoint of rights of property, as distinguished from concepts of
income tax liability, ... the requisites for enforcement and col-
lection out of the trust would fail.a3s
A single judge, concurring in the result on other grounds, disagreed
with the majority on that issue, stating that "the income tax laws are
not so mechanically deficient as to make it impossible for the [Govern-
ment] to collect an income tax upon the income of the trust" where the
income is attributed to the grantor.1a39
On the other hand, the courts have generally sustained the Govern-
ment in situations where a taxpayer has gratuitously assigned the
earnings from personal services,' 0 or where he has assigned the future
income to be derived from property while retaining ownership of the
property itself. 4 ' In one such case, the Second Circuit said that
if those payments can be imputed to the lessor as income so that
an income tax can properly be imposed upon diem, it must follow
that they are available to satisfy the tax; for it would be absurd at
once to hold that the dividends were the lessor's income for the
purpose of assessing a tax against it, but were the shareholder's in-
come for the purpose of collecting that very tax. We start therefore
with the premise that, if the shareholders are to be identified with
the lessor in one aspect, they must be in the other.1-4 2
That line of argument may be suspect in the light of later Supreme
Court decisions stressing the role of state law in the area of collection.
Yet the Second Circuit itself deemed the principles entirely reconcil-
138. 4 T.C. at 503.
139. 4 T.C. at 505.
140. In Van Meter v. Commissioner, 61 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1932), a corporate insurance
agency was taxed on renewal commissions that it had directed to be paid to its stock-
holders; the latter were held liable as tranferees, without discussion. Although the cor-
poration had subsequently dissolved, the Board's opinion, 22 B.T.A. 1202, 1206 (1931).
shows that the transferee liability was based not on a liquidating distribution but on
constructive distribution of the commissions.
141. In Commissioner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 F.2d 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 751 (1944), a corporation had leased its assets to another, many years earlier, with
a provision that rentals were to be paid directly to the lessor's stockholders. The lessor
was taxable on the rents (United States v. Joliet & Chicago R.JL, 315 U.S. 44 (1942)), but
it had no assets from which to satisfy the tax other than the barren reversions after the
99-999 year leases. Since, as a matter of substantive tax law, the rentals were considered
to have passed constructively through the corporation, the stockholders were held liable
as transferees, as if they had received currently a dividend which left the corporation
unable to pay the taxes on its current income. In United States i. Morris & Essex PLRL,
135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943), on similar facts, the court enjoined
the lessee from paying rentals to the lessor's stockholders until the tax collector had an
opportunity to levy on the income at its source, for the lessor's accumulated taxes on past
rentals.
142. United States v. Morris & Essex R.R., 135 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1943).
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able, 43 and saw no inconsistency in relying on the substantive federal
tax law concept (that the income, although assigned many years earlier,
constructively passed through the assignor when earned) as a premise
for applying state law concepts of transferee liability as if that lad
actually happened. 144 On the other hand, it must be noted that the
courts have narrowly confined that "conduit" theory even for purposes
of determining substantive federal tax liability, since they have declined
to impose a gift tax on the income payments as if the transferor had re-
ceived them when they were earned and had then passed them
gratuitously on to his assignee or to the trust beneficiary.
14
,
The law should not allow the actual recipient of income which is
taxable to another to enjoy it tax-free while the tax goes unpaid by the
person on whom it is imposed. Therefore, Congress should impose
transferee liability, measured by federal standards, 140 on the recipients
of such income without regard to whether the transferor was insolvent,
either at the time of the instrument of transfer or when the income was
received. Rather, like the donee's secondary liability for gift tax,147 the
tax should be collectible from the recipient of the income whenever the
transferor fails to pay; but, unlike gift tax liability,148 the transferee's
obligation should be limited to the amount of tax attributable to the
income so paid to the recipient. 40 Congress should determine, as a
matter of policy, whether the measure of such liability should be the
full tax computed at the transferor's tax bracket (achieving the same
ultimate result as if the income had in fact been received by the trans.
feror and paid over by him after payment of his taxes), or should be
limited to the tax which the recipient would have incurred had the
143. Rowen v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 641, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1954), reconciling Conuils-
sioner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 F.2d 774 (24 Cir. 1944). See note 141 supra.
144. See note 141 supra.
145. The "conduit" theory of gift tax liability has been rejected not only in trust cases
(commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F-2d 352 (10th Cir. 1947); Talge v. United States, 229 F. Stipp.
836 (W.D. Mo. 1964)), but also in the case of assigned rentals from property retaincd by
the assignor. Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 951
(1955).
146. This would be in addition to the federal transferee rule proposed at p. 612 supra,
Whereas that rule would embrace the transferor's entire tax liability, the present propoaal
is limited to the tax attributable to the specific income.
147. INT. RYV. CODE of 1954, § 6324(b). Solvency of the donor is immaterial. La Fortune
v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186, 194 (10th Cir. 1958), See Part IV.D, in the third install'
ment of this article,
148. INT. Rxv, CPDE of 1954, § 0324(b); La Fortune v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186,
194 (10th Cir. 1958).
149. Provided the transfer was not fraudulent, and the transferor's retained powers
over ipcome a corpus do not include the power to apply them on his debts, there would
be no justification for charging the transferee with any tax liability of the transferor
other than that on the income in question.
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income been taxed initially to him (leaving any excess to be collected,
if at all, from the transferor).!50
The reasons which support that proposal do not apply, however,
where the transfer was not gratuitous but satisfied or secured some
obligation of the transferor, even though in that case also the transferor
may remain taxable on the income.16 ' The imposition of liability on
the transferee in such a case could not be supported on the "conduit"
theory, because the Government would not have been able to reach the
income even if it had actually, rather than constructively, been received
by the taxpayer and paid over to his creditor within the taxable year.' 2
Congress has, it is true, recently expressed its policy against permit-
ting a taxpayer to tie up his future earning capacity by security
agreements having priority over intervening federal tax liens. The Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act of 1966 provides, with carefully limited excep-
tions, 1 3 that a security interest does not "exist," as against a federal tax
lien, unless the property subject to the security interest is "in existence"
when such tax lien is filed.'6 4 Thus, liens for past years' federal taxes,
if filed before the income is earned, may prevail over earlier security
assignments of such income. ic But that would still not give the Govern-
ment any preference with respect to the tax for the year in which the
income is earned, since the income will not only have become property
"in existence," but will be safely in the hands of the assignee before a
lien for such tax can arise. No reason for imposing liability on the
creditor-assignee for such tax is apparent.
150. See Plumb, supra note 127, at 266. 'Where the transferor does in fact pay the tax
on the income, there would be much equity in providing him a right of reimbursement
from the actual recipient. Id. 266-67. Such a provision is beyond the scope of this paper,
but might well be coordinated with what is recommended above. Id. 248.
151. In the absence of express statutory change (cf. Ircr. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 677(b),
682(a)), income which is to be applied to the grantor's obligations is taxable to him.
Helvering v. Stuart, 817 U.S. 154 (1942); Douglas v. WilIcuts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 US. 716, 729 (1929). If the transfer in trust itself dis-
charges the obligation, however, irrespective of the sufficiency of the trust income, the
transferor does not remain taxable on the income. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 US. 69 (1940).
152. The Government was unsuccessful in imposing transferee liability in such circum-
stances in Newman & Carey Subway Constr. Co., 37 MT.A. 1163 (1938). acquiesced in,
1938-2 Cmti. BULL. 23; Oroville Montgomery, 6 T.C.M. 983 (1947). The Fitzgerald case, 4
T.C. 494 (1944), discussed p. 624 supra, may also be explained on this ground, since
the trust income satisfied the taxpayer's obligation under the divorce settlement.
153. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 632.(c), In general, although not exclusively, the subs -
quent earnings that can be anticipatorily pledged, with priority over intervening federal
tax Hens, are those to the earning of which the creditor contributes. See pp. 663-66 infra.
154. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6328(h)(1)(A). Under prior law, security agnments of
future income were preferred in Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809, 815-16 (5th
Cir. 1964); United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1940):
Knight v. Knight, 272 App. Div. 499, 71 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 945, 80
N.E.2d 344 (1948).
155. See PLusM & WRIGHT 89-96.
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8. Co-ownership Generally; Partition
When two or more persons, not all of whom are indebted for a fed-
eral tax, share the ownership of property, the courts have had to
struggle with the problem of applying the property rights "belonging
to" the tax debtor upon his tax liability without prejudicing the in-
terests of the non-indebted owners. The results have been far from
satisfactory, and the guidance of Congress should be sought.
The federal tax collector can, of course, levy upon and sell the un-
divided interest of the taxpayer in the property, at least in the case of
a tenancy in common or of the typical joint tenancy in which the rights
of survivorship may be extinguished by severance."I But the market
for undivided interests in property is limited, and such a sale almost
inevitably will mean a sacrifice to either the taxpayer or the revenue or
both, depending on who the purchaser may be. Moreover, a proceeding
for partition will often have to follow such a sale.
The Government has sought, therefore, to shortcut the procedure by
bringing suit to foreclose the tax lien, joining all the co-owners, and
asking that the entire property be sold and the proceeds divided. One
court has sustained that procedure, holding that the federal law
authorizes the court to subject "any property" in which the taxpayer
"has any right, title or interest" to the payment of his taxes, and em-
powers the court to order a sale "of such property" and a distribution
of the proceeds according to the "interests of the parties and of the
United States."'15T Another court has held, however, that only the tax-
payer's interest in the property may be sold, whether by administrative
levy or judicial foreclosure, and that the Government as a mere lien-
holder has ho right to a partition of the property, by sale or other-
wise.s
Neither position affords a wholly satisfactory answer. The right of
the non-indebted owners to have the property partitioned in kind,
and not to have their interests sold against their will, ought to be
respected "except in cases of imperious necessity."'159 On the other hand,
the reduction of the taxpayer's interest to marketable form, by partition,
156. Tenancies by the entirety, and any other forms of co-ownership in which tie
right of survivorship is indestructible, are considered in Section 11 of Part IV.A infra.
157. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1964), relying on INT. RV.
CODE of 1954, § 7403. Trilling was approved in United States v. Mosolowitz, 269 F. Supp.
12 (D. Conn. 1967), although the court found that, even if state law controlled, the prop.
erty (a residence) could not be divided in kind.
158. Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962).
159. Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 645, 647, 132
P.2d 73, 75 (1943) (emphasis on "imperious necessity" in original); Owings v. Talbott,
262 Ky. 550, 555, 90 S.W.2d 723, 726 (1936).
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ought to precede rather than follow the sale. Congress should provide,
therefore, that the federal court may grant partition of the taxpayer's
property interest, as an incident to foreclosure of a tax lien thereon, but
that a sale of the interests of co-owners shall be ordered only when di-
vision in kind cannot be made equitably or without manifest prejudice
or injury to any of the parties. 0°
9. Joint Accounts and Savings Bonds
The interest of a taxpayer in a joint account in a bank or savings
institution,' 61 or in co-owned United States savings bonds,102 is subject
to levy for his taxes. The Service has stated:
Factors bearing on the question of the extent of the taxpayer's
interest in such an account include the nature of the tenancy cre-
ated under State law; the source of the funds deposited; the intent
of the person opening the joint account; and whether in actual
practice the account was under the control of one party even
though the other had authority to withdraw funds from the
account.163
It has been held that the Government, as the moving party, has
the burden of proving the extent of the taxpayer's interest.'0" That,
however, may well be an impossible burden to cast upon a party not
privy to the confidential relationship normally existing between
such co-owners. The problem involves one of the murkiest areas of
property law,115 in which written evidence of "the intent of the person
opening the joint account" may be contradicted by testimony that a
mere agency for convenience was contemplated, and in which, if a gift
was intended at all by the depositor of the funds, the transfer was in
most cases revocable, since there is ordinarily no obligation to account
to the other "owner" for withdrawals.6 0 Even the proof of such a
160. For a statute permitting lien creditors to obtain partition. sec CODE OF VIRcINIA(1950) § 8-690. The restriction on selling the whole when division in kind is feasible
should be a uniform rule, but drafting assistance may be derived from state statutes,
the various formulations of which are set out in 68 C.J.S. Partition § 126 (1950).
161. Riollano v. District Director, 197 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v.
Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 111 F. Supp. 152 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Rev. Rul. 55-187, 1955-1
CUAs. BuLL. 197. Bank accounts held in tenancy by the entirety are considered at p. 636
infra.
162. United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v.
Ridley, 120 F. Supp. 530, 537 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
163. Rev. Rul. 55-187, 1955-1 CuNt. BuL. 197.
164. United States v. Stock Yards Bank, 231 F.2d 628 (6th Cir. 1956).
165. See Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account-A Concept Without a
Name, 41 CAUF. L. REV. 596 (1953).
166. Id. See also R. BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 65 (2d ed. 1955);
Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952); and the authorities cited in Estate of
Evan E. Eubanks, P-H TAx Cr. MEAr. 1967-189, 26 CCH TAX CT. Mr..\. 936.
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seemingly objective fact as "the source of the funds deposited" is com-
plicated by
't.ihe peculiar features of a joint bank account [which] ... make it
d cult, if riot impossible, in most cases, to determine what portion
belongs to each depositor. A long series of deposits which cannot
be traced to their source, and a similar series of withdrawals
which cannot be traced to their destination, are normally involved.
This defect is inherent in the severalty feature of such bank ac-
counts wherein each depositor is allowed to treat joint property
as if it were entirely his own. Like any loose system of'dealing
with money, joint bank accounts sacrifice precision to convenience
and becloud the respective rights of the depositors. 10 7
Some state laws create rebuttable presumptions that the interests of
the co-owners are equal; the problem of proof is thereby eased but not
resolved for the presumption may serve only to shelter from creditors
a portion of the interest of one whose actual portion is greater than his
presumed share of the account.108 At least one court, therefore, has
visited upon the co-owners the consequences of the difficulty they
created by permitting the creditors of either of them, in effect, to ex-
ercise their debtor's power to withdraw the entire account for applica.
tion on his debts.109 Such a Solution, applied to federal tax collection,
might be consistent with the recommendation made earlier that the
federal tax collector should be permitted to reach any property which
the taxpayer had a legal right to take for his owri benefit, whether the
power was created by himself or another. 70 it may, however, be unduly
harsh if applied to more than the amount the taxpayer himself de.
posited in the account, since in the normal case it is doubtful that the
parties ever contemplated or intended that one of them would so
exercise the power with respect to deposits made by the other, or that
either of them acting in good faith would voluntarily have so exercised
it.
The basic problem is one of proof. The most equitable and practical
solution, which Congress should consider, would treat the taxpayer as
prima facie the contributor and owner, not of a portion but of the
entire account, subject to proof by the other co-owners that the tax-
167. Park Enterprises v. Trach, 233 Minn. 467, 471-7n, 41 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1O!il),
noted in 36 MINN. L. Rv. 98 (1951).
168. Id. The presumption was applied against the Government in Bishop v. Warren,
67-1 US. Tax Cas. 9406 (E.D. Wash. 1967).
169. Park Enterprise v. Trach, 23 Minn. 461, 47 N.W.2d 194 (1951).
170. See p. 621 supra.
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payer's interest is more limited.17- That would protect the rights of
innocent parties, if they have preserved adequate records, but would
properly place the burden of proof on the persons who are in possession
of the facts (or whose neglect may have made such proof impossible)' 7-2
To require less is to invite evasion of tax responsibilities.
The most which should be free from the tax collector's grasp, how-
ever, in any case where withdrawal is permitted without accountability,
should be the amount deposited (and not previously withdrawm) by the
non-indebted cotenants, even if the evidence, or a presumption of state
law, establishes that their fractional ownership in the account is greater;
for, as to the difference, the taxpayer has in effect made a revocable
gift.173 On the other hand, if state law permits the taxpayer's creditors
to reach more than the amount he himself contributed, the Government
as a creditor should be entitled to no less than others could take.27 4
10. Surviving Joint Tenants
Joint bank accounts have been called the "poor man's will," 7 5 and
joint tenancies in realty and other property are also used increasingly
to avoid the expense and inconvenience of probate for small estatesY-10
Among other advantages, the survivor takes free of the debts of the
deceased co-owner 77 Even if the probate estate, if any, is insolvent, the
survivor is ordinarily not considered to have acquired any property
from the decedent at his death, since in legal theory his interest vested
when the estate was created,'" In the absence of proof, normally im-
possible to produce, that the tenancy was originally created with
171. Leaf v. McGowan, 13 Ill. App. 2d 58, 141 N.E.2d 67 (1957). noted in 71 HAv. L.
Rsv. 557 (1958).
172. Cf. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88 (1934); Casey v. United States, .76 U.S.
41, 418 (1928).
178. Notes 99-101, 113 supra.
174. E.g., in states where the entire account can be reached by creditors generall,
(note 169 supra), or where the proportionate interest of one who is a donee can be xcached.
American Oil Co. Y. Falconer, 1-6 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418 (1939).
175. In re Edwards' Estate, 140 Ore. 481, 436, 14 P.2d 274, 276 (1932). See Kepner, supra
note 165, at 634.
176. Swenson & Degnan, Severance of Joint Tenancies, 38 MINN. L REV. 460, 469 (1954);
Casner, Estato Planning-Avoidance pf Probate, 60 COLUn. L. Rav. 108, 116 (1960).
177. Spikings v, Ellis, 290 Ill. App, 585, 593, 8 N.E.2d 962, 965 (1937). See Annot., 111
A.L.R. 171 (1937).
178. For some dissent (on policy) with respect to joint bank accounts, see Imirie v.
Imirie, 946 F.2d 652 (D.C. Qfr, 1957);
We need add only that the dangers inherent in situations of this sort are indeed
serious. If a wife can take by survivorship the funds of the commercial checking 2c.
counts of a business cgnducted by her husband, in disregard of the claims of creditors
or other interested persons, a ready means of producing fraud and injustice has been
created.,.. Much the 4amc is to be said of personal accounts, though here the risks
are less. and the wife's claims may perhaps be viewed with a more favorable eye.
Id. at 653-54.
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an intent to injure those future creditors who might exist at death, the
creditors are without remedy. 179
As we have seen, the Government's power to collect unassessed taxes
from the successors in interest of a deceased taxpayer is, under present
statutes, circumscribed by state law.8 0 If unsecured creditors have no
right under state law to pursue the survivor as a transferee of the
decedent, the Government has no remedy against the survivor to collect
taxes for the year of death, or any additional taxes which may have been
incurred for earlier periods but which had not been assessed before
death.81
Furthermore, it is doubtful that even a federal tax which was assessed
and became a lien before death can be collected from the joint property
after the taxpayer dies. The usual rule of state law is that nothing less
than an execution sale consummated before death will sever the joint
tenancy and defeat the non-indebted survivor's right to the entire
property free of lien. A mere judgment lien, to which the tax lien is
analogous, does not sever the tenancy, and the lien creditor faces the
risk the debtor's interest in the property will be extinguished if lie
predeceases a8 2 We have seen, with respect to life insurance, that the
existence of an inter vivos federal tax lien makes federal collection law
applicable, still subject to state rules of property rights but not to state
characterizations thereof nor to state remedial rights183 The Supreme
Court accordingly has rejected the state concept that the cash surrender
value (to which the lien had attached) was extinguished at death, and
that the right to the proceeds was a distinct property right free of any
inter vivos lien. Rather, the cash surrender value, which the taxpayer
could have taken for his own benefit while he lived, was held as a
179. Since the joint tenant's retained interest would ordinarily be reachable by his
creditors during his lifetime, he would probably not be rendered insolvent by the creation
of the tenancy, so it would be necessary to prove a then-existing intent to injure those
who may be creditors at his death. Splaine v. Morrissey, 282 Mass. 217, 184 N.E. 670 (1933);
cf. Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F.2d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1938).
180. See p. 611 supra.
181. Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 350, 354-56 (9th Cir. 1941); Irvine v. HelverIng,
99 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1938). However, if the surviving joint tenant is a spouse who joinedin a joint income tax return, he or she would be liable, not as a transferee of property
but as a co-obligor. INT. Rav. CODE Of 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
182. Musa v. Segelke S Kohlhaus Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937), 111 A.L.R.
168 (1937). Even a levy (Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 111. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945), 161A.L.R. 1133 (1946)), or an execution sale until consummated by deed after the redemption
period expires (Jackson v. Lacey, 408 111. 530, 97 N.E.2d 839 (1951)), has been held ineffec.
tiVe to prevent extinguishment of the right if death of the debtor then intervenes. A
mortgage given by the deceased joint tenant, on the other hand, is protected, although the
theoretical basis for the distinction has been undermined by the substitution of the lienfor the title theory'of mortgages. See Swenson & Degnan, supra note 176, at 488-92.
183. See pp. 611, 613 supra.
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matter of "economic reality" to be a part of the fund passing to the
beneficiary which remained subject to lien. 84 Comparable reasoning
might lead to the conclusion that as a matter of "economic reality"
the decedent's share of property held in joint tenancy, which he or his
creditors could have severed while he lived (thereby cutting off the
right of survivorship), passes to the survivor subject to existing federal
tax liens. But the absence of any litigation on the point suggests the
hopelessness of that argument under the present statutory scheme.
Congress should, therefore, consider amending the law expressly
to impose upon a surviving joint tenant liability for the federal taxes
of a deceased co-owner (whether assessed before or after his death),
to the extent of the share which the decedent could properly have
taken for his own benefit by severing the tenancy in his lifetime."' 5 The
power of Congress so to provide seems beyond question for, regardless
of the "refinements of tide," there is at the taxpayer's death "a distinct
shifting of economic interest" 80 and "definite accessions to the sur-
vivor's property rights," 187 which may be made the occasion for im-
posing liability upon the survivor'88 under the general federal standard
of transferee liability proposed earlier. 89 In fairness to the survivor,
however, such liability should be imposed only if the decedent lacked
sufficient other assets to meet his tax liabilities at the time of his
death.190
184. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1958).
185. In rejecting such a rule under present law, one court drew an analog, to the
expiration of a life estate. Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 Fd 350. 356 (9th Cir. 19i1). The
vital distinction, however, is that the remainderman's right could not have been extin-
guished by any act of the life tenant, while the joint tenant had the right at any time
to take his share in fee. Joint tenancies in which the survivorship right is not extin-
guishable are discussed in Section 11 infra.
186. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363, 371 (1939) (estate tax imposed).
187. Gwinn v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 224, 229 (1932).
188. See concurring and dissenting opinion in Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 350,
360 (9th Cir. 1941): "Had it seen fit to do so, Congress could by definition have declared
a surviving joint tenant a transferee of his deceased co-tenant for the purpose of collecting
the tax." Cf. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943) (lien for estate tax
imposed).
189. See p. 612 supra. The Special Committee on Federal Liens "suggested" such a
solution, but made no firm recommendation. 84 A.B.A. REP. 682 (1959). It is of interest
that Wisconsin has provided by statute that a long list of contractual and statutory liens
(including certain state tax liens but excluding, of course, federal tax liens) shall continue
to attach to property in the hands of a surviving joint tenant, to the extent of the interest
which the indebted co-owner had while he lived. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.455 (Supp. 1967).
See also id. § 49-26(5) (1957). An earlier version of the latter statute had been construed
to work a severance of the joint tenancy when the lien arose, thus defeating tie survivor's
right even in the equity remaining in the decedent's interest (Estate of Feiercisen, 263
Wis. 53, 56 NAV.2d 513 (1953)), but the present Wisconsin law expressly negatives such
a severance. See Swenson 9- Degnan, supra note 176, at 491-92, 497-98. The proposal made
herein, not being dependent upon the existence or effect of a lien, raises no problem of
severance.
190. The non-indebted joint tenant risks his entire unencumbered interest on the
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11. Tenancies by the Entirety and Similar Interests
About half the states recognize a special form of co-ownership between
husband and wife known as tenancy by the entirety, which presents
unique problems because neither spouse alone nor his or her creditors
may force a partition which would destroy the right of survivorship.
That feature of a right of survivorship indestructible by separate
creditors is also present in an ordinary joint tenancy in Michigan,10'
and can be created elsewhere by the device of setting up a joint life
estate with contingent remainder to the survivor.102 In a few states,
also, the homestead laws go beyond merely creating an exemption
(ineffective against the federal tax collector)193 and are construed as
vesting indestructible rights in the spouse.194
In the case of the tenancy by the entirety, the collection problem is
further complicated by the efforts of the state courts to harmonize the
anachronistic but "amiable fiction of the common law"'03 that the
husband and wife were one person-that one being the husband-with
the change of status wrought by the Married Women's Acts. The result
has been a variety of rules affecting separate creditors' rights in such
property, ranging from the common law rule still prevailing in Massa.
chusetts (under which the husband's creditors, like the husband himself,
could take the entire profits and right to possession, and the fee if he
contingency of survivorship, while he would take the taxpayer's share encumbered by the
tax claim if the taxpayer predeceases him. Swenson & Degnan, supra note 176, at 491.
That potential unfairness has been referred to in justification of the present rule, which
in effect requires the creditor to choose between prompt enforcement during the joint
lives (taking only the debtor's share, and causing the other to obtain his share outright,
by reason of the severance), or taking an all-or-nothing gamble by waiting to see which
survives. Zeigler V. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942). The real remedy for
that unfairness, however, would lie in denying survivorship rights, to a reclprocal extent,
to the indebted joint tenant if the other dies while such a lien is outstanding, Swenson
& Degnan, supra, at 502, a remedy that can be effected only by amendment of state law.
So long as state law gives the taxpayer the whole upon his survival, the tax is properly
enforceable against such enhanced property interest if he should be the survivor,
191. Midgley v. Walker, 101 Mich. 583, 60 N.W. 296 (1894). See Ballard v. Wilson,
364 Mich. 479, 110 N.W.2d 751 (1961).
192. Swenson S. Degnan, supra note 176, at 469.
193. United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Helfron,
158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947).
194. In such states, the lien is held to attach to the homestead, but It cannot be en-
forced by sale during the lifetime of the spouse. As to Texas law: Paddock v. Stemonelt,
147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2d 428 (1949); Morgan v. Moynahan, 86 F. Stipp. 522 S.D Tex.
1949). But see United States v. Stone, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9864 (ED. Tex. 1957). As to
Oklahoma law: Bigley v. Jones, 64 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Okla, 1916). But sea Evans v. Evang,
301 P.2d 232 (Okla. 1956). As to Tennessee law: Chandler v. Pilley, 60.1 U.S. Tax Cal,
5 9238 (Tenn. P. Ct. 1959). Contra, as to California law: Shaw v. United Stateg, 381 F.2d
493 (9th Cir. 1964); as to Florida law: Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Clr.
1962); as to Montana law: Aronow v. United States, 65.2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9692 (D. Mont.
1965).
195. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930).
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survived, but remained subject to the wife's right of survivorship)100 to
virtual complete immunity from separate creditors in the majority of
those states that still recognize the estate.1 07 A substantial minority,
including New York, take an intermediate position, permitting the
creditors of one spouse to reach a half share in the possession and profits,
as well as (except in New Jersey)108 his or her right of survivorship, sub-
ject, however, to the contingency of survival of the other spouse.100
The federal tax collector may, of course, claim such rights as the
minority states accord to ordinary separate creditors. 00 In the juris-
dictions following the majority rule, however, the Government is not
only denied the right to levy upon any interest in the entirety property
for the separate taxes of either spouse,-0' but it has been denied even
the protection of a lien, which might prevent the co-owners from
disposing of or encumbering the property while they live (unless they
settle for the value of the Government's interest) and which might be
enforced, with its chronological priority, when and if the taxpayer
spouse survives. 20 2 Furthermore, although the husband and wife are
privileged, in general, each to report half the income from entirety
property if separate tax returns are filed,'03 such income is itself con-
sidered entirety property (at least in some jurisdictions) and is held
196. Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927). As a corollary, however, the
wife's creditors can reach no interest while the husband lives, not even her right of sur-
vivorship. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613, 63 A.L.R. 231 (1929).
197. See 2 A-AE.icAN LAW OF PROPmTY § 6.6 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Annots., 165
A.LR. 969 (1947), 75 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1961).
198. Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A2d 565, 166 A.LR. 964 (1946)(wife's debt); Zubler v. Porter, 98 N.J.L. 444, 120 A. 194, 27 A.L.R. 826 (1923) (husband's
debt). In contrast, Kentucky permits sale of the right of survivorship, but the joint pos-
sessory interest cannot be disturbed. Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932).
199. See note 197 supra.
200. United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Tenn. 1962); Piip v. United
States, 186 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alas. 1960); United States v. Kaplan, 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
, 9532 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Lewis, 14 App. Div. 2d 150, 154,
218 N.Y.S.2d 857, 862 (1961); G.C.M. 1310, VI-I Cuz.r. Bu.L. 101 (1927) (Oregon).
201. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952); Shaw v. United States, 95 F. Supp.
245 (W.D. Mich. 1939).
202. United States v. American Nat'l Bank, 255 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358U.S. 835 (1958); United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951); Pettengill v.
United States, 205 F. Supp. 10 (D. Vt. 1962). The American National Banh opinion states
that the tax lien would attach to the property only at the death of the non-indebted
spouse, when the taxpayer first acquires an interest that is his alone. Under the rule in
Pennsylvania, however, a lien does attach to the interest of the indebted spouse during
the life of the other, for priority purposes, but the lien can be defeated not only by the
prior death of the debtor, Fleek v. Zillhaver, 117 Pa. 213, 12 A. 420 (1887), but by a joint
conveyance. Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 A. 953 (1912). Even a voluntary joint con-
veyance in anticipation of the death of the non-indebted spouse, under circumstances
that would constitute a fraudulent transfer if any other form of property were involved,
will defeat the lien. C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 5 A.2d 126, 121 A.L.R. 1022 (1939).
203. Commissioner v. Hart, 76 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1935).
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immune from levy for separate taxes.204 The immunity is said not to be
based on a mere exemption law, but to reflect a property right of the
non-indebted spouse to share the possession and income with no one
but the other spouse, and to convey the property freely with the con-
currence, not of a stranger, but of the other spouse.205
The result is to create, in something over a quarter of the states, a
privileged sanctuary from the collection of federal taxes, a fictional
bicephalous non-tax-paying personality which is permitted to accumu-
late wealth free of the citizenship obligations of either of the individuals
who comprise that unit and for whose exclusive benefit it exists.-00 The
immunity would be difficult enough to justify if it were confined to
homestead property-a special exemption, unlimited in amount, avail-
able only to taxpayers in certain states, and discriminatory against the
widowed, the unmarried and the apartment dweller, which Congress
has never seen fit to grant to taxpayers generally. But the immunity is
not so confined. It protects business real estate and the income there-
from,2 07 and in many states personal property as well. 208 In a number of
states bank accounts may be held by the entirety, thereby dedicating
those current funds (even though either may draw on the account) to
the exclusive benefit of the marital unit, to the exclusion of the separate
debts and tax obligations of either spouse.209 Occasionally, fraudulent
conveyance procedures may be invoked to reach such properties, -"10 but
204. Moore v. Glotzbach, 188 F. Supp. 267 (ED. Va. 1960); United States v. Nathanson,
60 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mich. 1945). But ef. Bernstein v. United States, 106 r. Supp, 213(W.D. Mo. 1952). In North Carolina, which otherwise follows the majority rule (Graben.
hofer v. Garrett, 260 N.C. 118, 131 S.E.2d 675 (1963)), the income can be reached for the
husband's debts because it is all considered to belong to him. Lewis v. Pate, 212 N.C. 253,
193 S.E. 20 (1937). Although Indiana treats the proceeds of sale of entirety property as
divisible and hence subject to seizure by separate creditors (Fogelman v. Shively, 4 Ind.
App. 197, 30 N.E. 909 (1892)), other states attach the incidents of the estate to the proceeds,
Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947); In re Bramberry, 156
Pa. 628, 27 A. 405 (1893).
205. Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 A. 953 (1912).
206. Cf. Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 563, 565 (W.D. Wash. 1965), quoted p, 642
infra. The "distinct legal entity, consisting of the unified personalities of the husband
and wife," has been analogized to "a corporate body." C.I.T. Corp. v. Flint, 33 Pa. 350,
354, 5 A.2d 126, 128 (1939). There is a vital distinction, however. Although the property
of a corporation cannot be reached for the debts and taxes of its beneficial owners, their
interests in the corporation can. There is no comparable remedy, in the jurisdictions fol.
lowing the majority rule, against one spouse's beneficial interest in the property of the
"unified personality" of which he or she is a part.
207. Note 204 supra.
208. 2 AimERcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6c (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Annot., 64 AL.R.2d
8 (1959).
209. Raffaele v. Granger, 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952). See Madden v. Gosztonyi Say, &
Tr. Co., 331 Pa. 476, 489, 200 A. 624, 631 (1938); In re Meyer's Estate (No. 1), 232 Pa. 89,
81 A. 145 (1911).
210. Payne v. United States, 247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 923(1958); Farachi v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9685 (ED. Mich. 1957); Iscovitz V.
Filderman, 334 Pa. 585, 6 A.2d 270 (1939).
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only if the creation of the tenancy was fraudulent; the remedy is thus
rarely effective for collecting subsequent taxes incurred while the
spouses are sharing the benefits of an existing tenancy by tie entirety.-211
The importance of the loophole may have diminished as a result
of the "income splitting" provisions which, since 1948, have encouraged
the filing of joint income tax returns,212 the joint and several liability
on which213 is collectible from otherwise immune entirety and home-
stead property of the spouses.214 But one who is determined to take
advantage of the immunity to avoid payment of his taxes (and there
have been such) runs little risk in filing a separate return. If the tax is
uncollectible, he is not concerned that the liability is larger than it
would have been on a joint return; and if the tax collector should find
available separate assets, the taxpayer still has the privilege, at least for
a time, of switching to a joint return to reduce his liability.2 15 Further-
more, the problem is not confined to income taxes, but extends to
employment taxes and other federal tax obligations of a separately con-
ducted business, especially where business realty and bank accounts are
held by the entirety.2 16
"The power of taxation is a fundamental and imperious necessity
of all government, not to be restricted by mere legal fictions."21T It
is hardly debatable that some way should be found to apply to the
tax liability the tangible property rights of the taxpayer spouse-the
right to use and enjoy the property, to share in its income, and to take
the whole if he or she survives.218 The perplexing problem, however, is
that the legal fiction reflects in part the fact that the rights of the
indebted spouse are "hedged about at all points by the equal rights"
211. American Wholesale Corp. v. Aronstein, 10 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1926). See McMullen
v. Zabawski, 283 F. 552, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1922).
212. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(a).
213. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
214. Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942) (homestead); Whittaker v.
Kavanagh, 100 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Mich. 1951) (entirety). Penalties incurred on a joint
return, although disallowed in the husband's bankruptcy (11 U.S.C. § 930) (19641)), may
be collected from entirety property, which is exempt from bankruptcy. Rubter v. Internal
Revenue Service, 339 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1964).
215. The option remains open for three years or until a deficiency notice is mailed(or certain other events occur). IN-r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6013(b).
216. See Imirie v. Imirie, 246 F.2d 652, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1957), quoted note 178 supra.
Of course, to get business credit in such a case, the spouse would ordinarily have to agree
to subject the entirety property to contract creditors of the business; but she is under no
such compulsion with respect to federal taxes.
217. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930), upholding a federal estate tax
on entirety property upon the death of one spouse.
218. As the Fourth Circuit said in another connection, estates by the entirety "should
not be allowed to escape necessarily incident and proper burdens of taxation.' Lang v.
Commissioner, 61 F.2d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 1932). aff'd, 289 U.S. 109 (1933).
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of the other,2 1 1 which must be protected from impairment."20 The
House of Representatives in 1954 made an abortive effort to remove the
immunity by extending the tax lien expressly to "the interest of such
person [the taxpayer] as tenant by the entirety,"221 but the Senate
deleted the language because it was "not clear what change in existing
law would be made" thereby.222 The question which the House pro-
posal left unanswered is: Having attached the lien to the taxpayer's
"interest," then what?223 How do you enforce a lien on the husband's
right to share the occupancy of a home with his wife?224 How do you
take his rights in the income and profits of entirety property, or in a
joint bank account, without impairing the wife's rights of survivorship
in the fund and her right that the entire fund be used for mutual bene.
fit? How do you sell a contingent right of survivorship except at great
sacrifice?225
It has been recommended above, with respect to future interests gen-
erally, that the tax lien, if and when it cannot be satisfied from other
sources, should be fastened to the property by appropriate judicial
proceedings within the period of limitations, with actual enforcement
by sale deferred until the survivorship contingency is resolved. "2 0 That
procedure should be adapted to the present situation and, with respect
to the contingent rights of the taxpayer spouse, should be applied even
in those states where an immediate sale would be permissible. If neces-
sary, a receiver could supervise the use of the property227 to protect the
Government's interests without interfering with the rights of the
non-indebted spouse. In those states where the right of one spouse to
219. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 504 (1930).220. That the property of one spouse cannot be taken for taxes of the other, see Hoeper
v. Tax Comm'n of Wisconsin, 284 U.S. 206 (1931); Cannon v. Nicholai, 80 F.2d 34 (10th
Cir. 1935); Sheridan v. Allen, 153 F. 568 (8th Cir. 1907). Since the exemption from credltorg
protects the non-indebted spouse in her (or his) right to untrammeled enjoyment of the
whole property, it has been doubted that Congress could change the rule if it would.
Ullman v. Rothensies, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9333 (E.D. Pa. 1939), appeal dismissed, 110
F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940). Nevertheless, the present vitality of the loeper rule has been
seriously questioned, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Scss. 20-22 (1941), and tho
Supreme Court had no difficulty in upholding an estate tax lien which Congress impressed
on entirety property (including the non-indebted survivor's interest therein). Detroit Bank
v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
221. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6321 (1954) (Code bill).
222. S. RE'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1954).
223. Actually, the language might have been wholly ineffective, for a court that was
wedded to the proposition that the husband's (or wife s) interest Is "like the rainbow in
the sky or the morning fog rising from the valley" (United States v. Hutcherson, 188 F,2d
326, 331 (8th Cir. 1951)) would have found little "interest" to which to attach the lien.
224. See Note, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 598 (1938).
225. The Special Committee on Federal Liens posed the problems for further study
but made no explicit recommendation. 84 A.B.A. REP. 681-82 (1959).
226. See pp. 617-18 supra.
227. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7403(d).
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sell the whole property with the concurrence only of the other spouse
is protected as a property right, and where an entirety character is
impressed on the proceeds, the court order could permit sale free of the
lien, upon joint application, with supervision of the reinvestment of
the fund in entirety property, to which the lien would be transferred.2- 8
In the case of unreinvested funds, and entirety bank accounts generally,
the problem of balancing the property interests is more difficult. To
prohibit withdrawals for consumption would obviously be undesirable,
and would intrude upon the rights of the non-indebted spouse. Perhaps
a withdrawal could be regarded as pro tanto severing the tenancy in the
fund, entitling the tax collector, in the shoes of the taxpayer spouse, to
demand an equal distribution.29 Strictly speaking, it is only a with-
drawal for separate benefit which would have that effect, and the non-
indebted spouse has the right to have the entire account applied for
their mutual benefit.20 But it does not seem to be beyond the power
of Congress to require that the tax obligations of one spouse rank at
least on a parity with family expenditures out of the common fund.
If there is a constitutional problem it should be a vanishing one, since
future accretions at least should validly be subject to the new rule,
The right to the income from entirety property, in those states
where the income is impressed with the entirety character, should be
handled in the same way as sale proceeds and bank accounts, with
investment permitted subject to the lien on the taxpayer spouse's
interest, but with consumption matched by application of an equal
amount on the tax. Sale of the life interest of the taxpayer spouse should
be precluded, even in those states which permit it to creditors generally,
since the survival contingency would make it unmarketable at a fair
price.
The right of possession of non-income producing property, such as a
residence, involves a more serious problem, particularly in the states
following the majority rule, where the non-indebted spouse has a
property right to use and occupy, not half, but the whole, and she
(or he, as the case may be) cannot be charged rent for permitting the
taxpayer spouse to continue to occupy the property as a licensee. Even
228. Compare the court orders entered where the minority rule prevails, In United
States v. Ragsdale, 205 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Tenn. 192), and in First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Lewis, 14 App. Div. 2d 150, 218 N.YS.2d 857 (1961), in order to protect the tax
lien on the husband's right, without impairing the wife's right of survivorship. Like
protection against acts of the non-indebted spouse was denied under the majority rule,
in In re Meyer's Estate (No. 2), 232 Pa. 95, 81 A. 147 (1911).
229. Cf. Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 A. 172 (1934).
230. Note 209 supra.
639
The Yale Law Journal
in the minority states, where creditors of one spouse can convert the
estate into a tenancy in common with right of survivorship, no obliga-
tion of the non-indebted tenant to pay rent arises in the absence of a
formal ouster of possession.231 It may be that, with respect to existing
tenancies, little can be done in that regard beyond affixing a lien and
bringing the property under supervision.
232
The suggested procedure is not a wholly satisfactory solution, of
course, since it is cumbersome and may hold the tax liability open
indefinitely. It would operate, however, only in situations where the
tax goes uncollected under present law, so the Government might
be satisfied with half a loaf. I venture to predict that the mere avail-
ability of the remedy will induce tax payment (or a reasonable settle-
ment) in most cases, and that the need for actually implementing the
procedure will rarely arise.
A more direct and effective approach might be considered by Con-
gress with respect to tenancies by the entirety created and amounts
added to entirety bank accounts after enactment of the legislation,
except those which are traceable to entirety property previously held.
Only the states, of course, can abolish the anachronistic tenancy or
change its incidents generally,2 3 but it seems a reasonable constitu-
tional hypothesis that, as to interests created after Congress speaks, state
law cannot authorize the creation of property rights one of the incidents
of which is that they cannot be severed in order to satisfy the federal
taxes of a co-owner. In such cases, therefore, the lien might be madeimmediately enforceable, by physical division where appropriate, 234 but
otherwise by sale of the whole, thereby avoiding the sacrifice that would
result if a contingent interest were sold. Division should probably be
made according to actuarial interests, rather than equally, in order to
reflect fairly the value of the respective rights. 23 5
231. Finnegan v. Humes, 252 App. Div. 385, 299 N.Y.S. 501 (1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 682,
14 N.E.2d 389 (1938), noted in 23 CORNELL L.Q. 598 (1938). See generally Annots., 51
A.L.R.2d 388 (1957), 27 A.L.R. 184 (1923).
232. It might reasonably be provided, however, that (in states where an ouster would
entitle the cotenant to rent) the exclusive possession of property not capable of being
shared with a stranger amounts to a constructive ouster. See 20 Air. Jui. 2d Cotenancy
§ 42 (1965).
233. Abolition was recommended in Report of the Committee on Changes In Substan.
tive Real Property Principles, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section, A.BA.
(1944).
234. See Section 8 of Part IV.A supra.
235. Unless the tenancy was created in fraud of creditors (note 210 sutra), division
even of a bank account on the basis of each party's contribution seems inappropriate
since, unlike joint bank accounts generally (Section 9 of Part IV.A supra), the spouse of
the contributor acquires rights which cannot be defeated by withdrawal. See note 209
supra.
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The remedies suggested above should be made applicable to indi-
visible homestead rights and indestructible rights of survivorship,20 as
well as to tenancies by the entirety.
12. Community Property
Comparable problems, although without the complication of an
indestructible right of survivorship, may occasionally arise with respect
to community property, a form of marital co-ownership existing in
eight states and with traces in some of the half dozen others which
adopted such systems to gain federal tax advantages in the 1940's and
promptly repealed them when the occasion passed.2T Since the laws
and the interpretations thereof vary widely in detail, generalizations
are difficult and dangerous, especially for a mere Easterner not versed
in the lore. s8
The common denominator, however, is that husband and wife are
considered to have equal, vested present interests in the community
property, subject usually to the husband's power of management, and
that most income from property or services realized during marriage
(except profits from the disposition of separate property and, in some
states, the income from such property) is divisible between the spouses
for federal income tax purposes.2 9 Thus, in general, they can achieve
on separate returns the "income splitting" effect which is permitted to
spouses elsewhere only if they file joint returns- 0 and incur the burden
of joint and several liability for the entire tax.2 4 The question when
arises whether the separate tax liabilities incurred by husband and wife
may be collected from the community property, since except for gifts
and inheritances they would frequently have no way to accumulate
separate property after marriage to meet such obligations.
Community property is subject to seizure for debts incurred for the
benefit of the community, and in Arizona and Washington for no other
debts. In California and the majority of community property states,
however, the husband as manager has power to subject the entire
property (except, usually, the wife's earnings) even to his separate debts,
although the wife lacks such power even with respect to her "vested"
236. See p. 634 supra; 84 A.B.A. REP. 682 (1959).
237. 2 A-mRwA LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 7.4, 7.36 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
238. See id. Part 7; DE F NIA, PRImcipLEs oF Cou.uwrn, PiornrR (1943).
239. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 US. 101 (1930); cf. Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44
(1944), rejecting, for federal tax purposes, the permissive s)tem initially adopted in
Oklahoma.
240. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2(a).
241. INr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6013(d)(3).
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half interest.242 In the majority states, therefore, there would be no
problem concerning the husband's tax,248 unless perhaps the wife's
earnings (half of which would have given rise to separate tax on the
husband) were the only available source for collection.244 In the latter
circumstance, as well as in the case of the wife's tax in those states and
the tax of each in Arizona and Washington, the question is whether
the separate taxes are community debts.
A leading authority has expressed the view that, like a tax on the
property itself,24" a tax on community income is a community obliga-
tion,240 but the few decisions in point are divided.2 7
In certain states, no portion of the community property can be
taken for antenuptial debts of one spouse-a principle that has been
labeled "marital bankruptcy," since one who brought no separate
property to the marriage (or who thereafter consumed it) may never
be able to acquire separate funds, even from his or her own earnings,
from which to pay such liabilities.248 That rule was applied against
the federal tax collector in one case,240 but another judge of the same
court declined to do so, saying:
242. 2 AmESucAN LAW OF PRO'ERTr §§ 7.29-7.32 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). The various
laws are reviewed in De la Torre v. National City Bank, 110 F.2d 976 (1st Cir. 1940).
243. fBensinger v. Davidson, 147 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956); Funk v. Furnish, 61-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9650 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Penalties incurred by the husband as a corporate
officer (INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6672) were held collectible from community property in
Mulcahy v. United States, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9159 (5th Cir. 1968). And, of course, the
community property is liable for withholding and employment taxes incurred by the hus-
band in operating a community business. Smith v. Hamilton, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 92942
(S.D. Cal. 1954).
244. The wife's earnings were held immune from the husband's antenuptial taxes in
Bice v. Campbell, 231 F, Supp. 948 (N.D. Tex. 1964), and for postnuptial penalties Incurred
by him as an officer in Mulcahy v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Tex. 1966), but
no reported case has directly involved the question of collecting the husband's tax on half
his wife's earnings from such earnings. See note 246 infra.
245. Baca v. Village of Belen, 30 N.M. 541, 240 P. 803 (1925).
246. 1 DE FUNIAK) supra note 238, at § 241, disagreeing with the fears of a contrary result
expressed in G. McKAY, CoMMuNTrY PROPERTY § 840 (2d ed. 1925), and in Mitchell, Taxa.
tion and Community Property, 14 So. CAL. L. lMv. 390, 391 (1941). In accord with do
Funiak, see Andersou, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIV. L. 11v.
241, 254-55 (1953).
247. The wife's tax was held collectible from community property under California
law in In re Ryan, 51-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9493 (S.D. Cal. 1949), and under Hawaii law In
Santos v. United States, 277 F.2d 806 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913 (1960). But Call-
fornia law was otherwise construed in Gilmore v. United States, 290 F.2d 942, 949-50 (Ct,
Cl. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). Significantly, California law provides
with respect to state income taxes that the one who receives, spends or controls the dis-
position of community income is liable for the tax thereon, as well as the one to whom
it is taxable. 61 CALir. Rxv. & TAX. CODE § 18555 (1956).
248. DE FuNiAK, supra note 238, at § 158, responds to the "marital bankruptcy" criti-
cism by stating that one whose debts exceed his property at the time of marriage could
in any event have availed of ordinary bankruptcy in order to get a fresh start. in bank-
ruptcy, however, discharge is subject to conditions; and in the case of taxes, the liabilities
dischargeable are limited. 11 U.S.C. §§ 32, 35, as amended (Supp. I, 1965-66).
249. Stone v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Wash. 1963), immunizing the hus
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Permitting a "marital bankruptcy" to be operative against valid
and admitted tax obligations would not only be unjust and un-
reasonable but violative of sound public policy.0
Congress should remove whatever doubt there may be that the entire
community property may be taken for the separate taxes of either
husband or wife so far as they are attributable to community income, as
well as for non-income taxes arising from activities undertaken for the
benefit of the community. If the states can make the community a
distinct entity, Congress surely has the power to subject it to appro-
priate liabilities for federal taxes. Whenever separate property is
insufficient, antenuptial taxes and later taxes attributable to separate
income and activities should be made collectible from a spouse's half
interest in the community property (or perhaps from his or her actual
contribution thereto), unless collectible under state law from the
property as a whole.2s' The argument for this position, set out in the
preceding Section, need not be repeated here.
13. Partnerships and Subchapter S Corporations
The taxation of partnerships presents a curious dichotomy, each
aspect of which raises its own peculiar problems. A partnership is
both a taxpaying entity and an aggregate of individual taxpayers. Cer-
tain taxes incurred by the business (withholding, social security and
excise taxes) are liabilities of the partnership itself. But the federal
income tax is not a partnership liability; it is imposed on the partners
band's salary from his own antenuptial taxes. The situation was not comparable in Bice
v. Campbell, 231 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Tex. 1966), where only the wife's earnings were im-
munized from the husband's antenuptial taxes.
250. Draper v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 563, 565 (W.D. Wash. 195), pointing out
that "public policy" had been relied upon to subject community property (the husband's
earnings) to levy for alimony to a former wife (Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash. 2d 698, 97 P.2d
147 (1939); Greear v. Greear, 303 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1962)), and holding that "the Federal
income tax, the economic life-blood of our nation" is at least of equal dignity with an
alimony claim. In a property tax case the legislative policy of protectifig the family against
separate debts was overriden by a higher public policy, in Oglesby v. Poage, 45 Arz. 23
40 P.2d 90 (1935), which was relied on in support of the Draper ride in Prater v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 754 (D. Ariz. 1967).
251. It has been argued, as a reason for immunity, that there is no available mechanism
for equalizing the community interests by setting aside a part for the non-indebted spouse
to balance the share taken for the other's separate debts, there being no accounting be-
tveen the spouses until dissolution of the community. 1 Dz FUNIAn, supra note 238, at
§ 158; Stone v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 201, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1963). But state courts
that have mastered the difficulties of specially treating such forms of community property
as the wife's earnings, and of administering the "public poll" exceptions cited in note
250 supra, are not incapable of dealing, immediately or at dissolution, with such inter-
spousal accounting problems as may arise. The analogy to a partnership's immunity from
individual partners' debts, relied on in Stone, supra, is faulty, since a partner's interest in
the partnership may be reached for his separate debts, while there is nothing comparable
in the case of community property. Cf. note 206 supra, and Section 13 of Part IV.A infra.
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as individuals even if the partnership earnings are accumulated as
firm assets and are not distributed to them.
252
It is now firmly established that, even though the individual partner
may have no funds from which to pay his income tax, the Government
ordinarily is not entitled to collect it by levy upon any portion of the
partnership's bank accounts25 3 or its other claims, 25 4 or to sell partner-
ship property,255 but can enforce its lien only against the partner's
interest in the partnership, subordinate even to unsecured creditors
thereof.25 6 Similarly, in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings,
the statutory priority of the Government 257 reaches only that surplus,
subject to the claims of all partnership creditors.258
Those consequences follow from the rule of partnership law that an
individual partner's interest in the assets of the partnership consists
only of his share of the surplus after all partnership debts are paid.
Although now expressed as a rule of property, at least in the Uniform
Partnership Act,259 that principle originated in the idea that each
partner had an "equitable lien" on partnership property to have it
applied to the payment of partnership debts, an equity to which
partnership creditors were subrogated.2 60 Perhaps because the issues,
as they affect federal tax collection, were litigated to a conclusion before
252. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 701.
253. I.T. 3356, 1940-1 Cum. BuLL. 72. The tax collector was permitted to reach partner.
ship bank accounts, on unique facts, where there were no partnership creditors to be preju.
diced and each of the partners was indebted individually. United States v. Balanovskl, 131
F. Supp. 898, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957).
254. Stuart v. Willis, 244 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1957), holding individual taxes not collect-
ible from contract proceeds owed to a joint venture. Although a joint venture is treated
like a partnership for federal tax purposes (INT. Rxv. CoDE of 1954, § 7701(a)(2)), another
court has questioned whether they are thereby brought within the rule stated in the text,
which is based upon a principle of state partnership law. In re Bruce Constr. Corp., 217
F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Fla. 1963), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. United States v. Owens,
329 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1964).
255. Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1948).
256. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408, 414 (1925); cf. United States v. Worley,
213 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955) (lien against partners, not
affecting partnership assets, does not follow such assets into hands of corporate transferee).
The Government's priority may turn on whether property is merely held in tenancy in
common, rather than operated as a partnership. Barrett & Hilp v. Samish, 56-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9212 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
257. See Part II.A in First Installment.
258. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925); United States v. Hack, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 271 (1834). The Government's otherwise sweeping right of setoff is likewise subject
to the limitation that an individual debt, raised as a counterclaim to a suit by a partner.
ship against the United States, may not be "unfairly satisfied out of partnership assets,"
to the prejudice of other partners and partnership creditors. Scott v. United States, 354
F2d 292, 297-98 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (by implication).
259. UNIFORM PARmNEsmP Aar §§ 18(a) and 25.
260. Fitzpatrick v, Flannagan, 106 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1882); Case v. Beauregard, 99 U.S,
119, 124-25 (1878).
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the days when "equitable liens" were branded as not "choate," the
principle was accepted by the federal courts as a rule of property, bind-
ing on the United States.261
If property rights are involved, they are not those of the partnership's
unsecured creditors, whose rights are derivative and defeasible by con-
certed action of the partners. - 2 We have, therefore, another instance,
somewhat analogous to those heretofore discussed, in which it is in
the interest of co-owners that their property not be subject to lien or
seizure for the debts of either of them, and they bring about that im-
munity through a private arrangement, sanctioned by law.2 3 There-
fore, an argument could be made that taxes, the universal obligation
for the support of government, should not be subject to defeat by
such arrangements, and that federal liens for an individual's taxes
should be made applicable to and enforceable out of his share of
partnership gross assets, subject only to prior encumbrances thereon.2 '"
The appropriateness of that solution may be questioned, however.
Except in marginal cases where the "partnerships" are little more than
co-ownerships (and ought to be treated as such, if the line can reason-
ably be drawn), 65 the immunity of partnership assets from individual
debts serves an important business function. Whatever philosophical
distinctions might be drawn, that immunity is not qualitatively differ-
ent from the principle which immunizes corporate assets from the
individual debts of stockholders, making only their equity (subject
to all corporate debts) amenable to individual creditors, including the
tax collector.266
There is, however, one important difference already adverted to.
Whereas, in the case of a corporation, individual tax is ordinarily
payable only on distributed income, which thus is at least momentarily
available in his hands for satisfaction of the tax, a partner may be
taxable on income which does not reach his hands. We have here
another instance of the problems which may arise when the tax law
imposes income tax liability on one other than the person or entity
that received and retained the income. Therefore, while the desir-
261. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 910-11 (1954).
262. Case v. Beauregard, 99 U.S. 119 (1878).
263. See Section 11 of Part IV.A supra.264. If the constitutionality of altering existing "propert rights" of partner is thought
doubtful, the rule could be made applicable only prospectively, to partnerships created or
assets contributed after the date of enactment See p. 6-0 supra.
265. Cf. Barrett 9: Hilp v. Samish, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9212 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
266. Cf. Goldfine v. United States, 300 F.2d 260, 264 (Ist Cir. 1962); Lias v. United
States, 196 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1952).
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ability of radical surgery is doubtful, there may be need for a poultice
for this sore spot. A precedent for a possible solution may be found
in an early district court case in which the partners had allowed their
shares of income to accumulate for three years, and had failed to pay
taxes thereon for those years. Although the statutory lien for the taxes
admittedly did not reach the partnership assets, the court impressed an
equitable lien on the retained earnings for the amount of individual
taxes attributable thereto.267 While the present force of that decision is
unclear,268 it might well be confirmed by statute.2 9
A comparable situation may arise in the the case of a corporation
which duly elects under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, 70
thereby being relieved of any federal tax on its income, which is taxed
instead to its stockholders, whether or not they receive distribution
thereof.271 Perhaps corporate assets should be made amenable to
seizure for the individual taxes attributable to the undistributed in.
come in such cases.
To whatever extent it is determined that individual taxes should be
collectible from partnership or corporate assets, some affirmative action
by the tax collector (whether by assessment or by court proceeding)272
should be required in order to fix a lien on such assets, with priority
267. In re Brezin, 297 F. 200, 304-07 (D.N.J. 1924).
268. The Supreme Court in United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408, 415 (1925), dis-
tinguished the Brezil case, saying that "Whether or not this case was correctly decided on
its peculiar facts," no such facts (accumulation of untaxed income) had been shown in
Kaufman.
269. This solution was suggested, without recommendation, by the Special Committee
on Federal Liens. 84 A.B.A. REr. 682-83 (1959). The Report raised for consideration the
following questions:(1) Whether the lien should secure other individual taxes (including income taxes not
attributable to partnership profits), on the theory that the undistributed profits belong to
the partner: I submit that there is no logical basis for such an intermediate position, be.
tween the "radical surgery" and the "poultice." There is as much, or as little, reason for
making the partnership capital subject to the general tax liabilities of the partners as
there is to reach the income they have elected to leave in the business. If the lien Is to
be confined to the income, its logical basis rests on the fact that the tax is attributable to
such income.
(2) What effect should be given to a partnership agreement restricting withdrawal of
profits: There was no such restriction in Brezin. But I submit that, if the principle of
impressing a lien on the undistributed earnings for the tax thereon is soun , no agree4
ment of the parties should frustrate it.
(3) What effect should be given to losses which reduce undistributed profits after the
taxable year: Such losses were given no effect in Brezin, apparently on the theory that,
if the taxpayer had. exercised his right to withdraw the profits when earned, the loss
would have fallen on the partnership capital. The problem may be relatively academic,
since loss carrybacks may in that event have eliminated the individual tax liabllltieg for
the accumulation years as well.
270. INT. R.EV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1371-78.
271. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 1373.
272. Because of the conflicting interests involved, and the desirability of limiting the
procedure to cases of necessity, it may be advisable to require court action. See p. 621
supra.
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over purchasers and secured creditors. It should not be necessary for
such other persons to identify and search for federal tax liens against
every partner or stockholder before they deal with the business entity.-73
A different kind of problem is created by those federal taxes which
are imposed upon the partnership itself. Such taxes, of course, are liens
upon the assets of the partnership. 74 In addition, however, without
further action by the tax collector, those taxes give rise to federal tax
liens against each individual partner who is, under state partnership
law,275 a "person liable to pay" such tax.270 In bankruptcy or insolvency,
the partnership tax (whether it had become a valid lien or not) will
enjoy the same priority in individual assets as would an individual tax
liability, notwithstanding the principle of partnership law (embodied
in the Bankruptcy Act)2 77 which marshals individual assets first against
individual debts.278
The difficulty arises from the Government's attempts to bind secured
creditors of and purchasers from the individual partners by liens filed
against the partnership. There is no problem, of course, if the partners
are also named individually in the notice of lien, 70 but one which
names certain partners followed by "et al." should not be (and has
not been by the courts) considered fair warning to persons dealing with
those unnamed.280 Sometimes the partnership name itself may suffice
to disclose the identity of the partners, although a decision holding that
273. See p. 621 supra.
274. Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674, 679 (10th Cir. 1948).
275. Limited partners would have no liability, and hence no lien against them (Rev.
Rul. 54-213, 1954-1 Cur. BuLL. 285), unless by active participation they have incurred
liability under state law. Heller v. United States, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 49,084 (N.M. Cal.
1954). A member of a defective limited partnership, who has done what state law requirm
to rid himself of liability, is also free of lien. United States v. Coson, 286 F.2d 453 (9th
Cir. 1961).
276. In re Crockett, 150 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Undenood v. United States, 37
F. Supp. 824 (ED. Tex. 1939), aft'd, 118 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1941). Although the individual
partner is not the "taxpayer," he is (y virtue of general partnership law) a "persn liable
to pay any tax," and his property as thus subjected to lien by Ima'. REv. CoDE of 1954,§ 6321. A notice and demand served upon the partnership as such, and not satisfied, is
considered a notice and demand upon each partner and thus (when not complied witl)
fixes the lien on all. American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 337, 363 P.2d 99 (1951),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); cf. United States v. Coson, 286 F. 2d 453, 464 (9th Cir.
1961).
277. 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1964). See UNIFORf PARTNmsHw Acr § 40(1).
278. Lewis v. United States, 92 U.S. 618 (1876); In re Crockett, 150 F. Supp. 352 (N.D.
Cal. 1957). As to partnership taxes, the Government stands as a creditor of both the part-
nership and the individuals; as to individual taxes, it is an individual creditor only. See
United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1925) (reconciling the Lewis case).
279. In Underwood v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 824, 827 (ED. Tex. 1959), priority in
individual assets was based on a tax lien filed against A, B, and C, "doing busine as
Hanover Refining Company."
280. F. P. Baugh, Inc. v. Little Lake Lumber Co., 297 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1961). cert.denied, 370 U.S. 909 (1962); cf. Coson v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 671, 676 (S.D. Cal.
1958), modified on other grounds, 286 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1961).
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a lien filed against "Oscar Sundberg and Sons" was notice to those deal-
ing with the unnamed sons individually seems to go to the limit of the
law.281 Carried to its extreme, the apparent position of the Government,
that filing in the firm name will bind those dealing with the individuals,
would require such third parties (with no help from the records) to
ascertain all the partnerships, joint ventures and syndicates in which
those individuals may be involved. The law should prescribe that, in
order to bind those dealing with the property of individual partners,
a filed lien against the partnership must specifically name them, in such
manner that the filing officer will index the lien against their names.
B. Priorities of Federal Tax Liens
A primary concern of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was the
relative priority of federal tax liens and other liens. Although the
amendments did not go as far as some might have liked, the reforms
accomplished were important and far reaching. 282
Having previously acknowledged the achievements of the Act,2-" it
is with some hesitation that I include priority questions in the "agenda
for the next decade." Nevertheless, a recital of battles lost and causes
abandoned or deferred may be helpful in laying the foundation for
further study and for the development of necessary accommodations in
the years to come.
1. Filing of Liens
The federal tax lien, although it arises automatically whenever an
assessment is not paid after notice and demand, is "not valid" against
purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanics' lienors and judg-
ment lien creditors until notice of the lien has been filed in an office,
usually designated by state law, in tie state, county, or other govern-
mental subdivision where the property subject to the lien is "situ-
ated."284 Until 1966 the law did not define the word "situated," and the
decisions left much uncertainty as to where the tax collector should file
and third parties should search for federal tax liens on tangible and in-
tangible personal property.285 The Special Committee on Federal
281. American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 837, 363 P.2d 99 (1961).
282. See Part I in First Installment, and sources cited at 228 n.3.
283. Plumb, The New Federal Tax Lien Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 271, 295 (1967).
284. INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(a) and (0. If for any reason the state designation
goes beyond the power delegated by that provision, filing is to be in the fedelal district
court. Id. § 6323(f)(1)(B). See United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 US. 2.91
(1961).
285. See PLUMB & WRIGHT 55.
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Liens, with the approval of the American Bar Association, had proposed
to resolve the conflict by prescribing filing at the residence of the tax-
payer in the case of intangibles and certain mobile tangibles, and at
the physical location in other cases.280 The Treasury, however, while
willing to seek out each jurisdiction where a taxpayer owned realLy,=; z7
was adamantly opposed to having the generality of its lien further
limited by a requirement that it do the same with respect to his
personal property. It persuaded Congress, therefore, to prescribe filing
against all tangible and intangible personal property only in the juris-
diction where the taxpayer resides at the time of filing.28s Although a
search at the residence may occasionally be burdensome to a lender
on or a purchaser of personal property located at a distant place, we
can be grateful for the certainty the law now provides. To reopen that
question, I am satisfied, would serve no purpose. -SD
Congress, accepting in principle although not in detail another Bar
recommendation, -2 ° provided in the 1966 Act that the filing of a notice
of lien shall cease to be effective against intervening as well as subse-
quent purchasers and encumbrancers unless the notice is refiled after
six years,201 thereby making it unnecessary for the searcher to be con-
286. 84 A.B.A. REP. 687-88, 709 (1959). The Ruvism UroNr FrrMM.A, Tx ILmxV REGS-
TRATION Aar (1962 version), would have required filing in the office where a security agree-
ment or financing statement or notice with respect to the particular property would be
filed-frequently different offices for different types of property, and sometimes more than
one office for the same property (UnEOasF COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-401). In the face of a
Treasury contention that such requirements could not v-alidly be imposed on the federal
tax lien by state law (Rev. Rul. 64-170, 1964-1 Cu.. BULL. 499), that Act was repealed
by two of the three states that had enacted it. See PLUMB & WIulrr 59.
287. Physical location determines the jurisdiction in which federal tax liens on real
property are to be filed. L'r, REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(O(l)(A)(i) and (2)(A). It is prob-
able that the line between real and personal property will be drawn by state law stan-
dards (Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 US. 204 (1946)), although it
would have been helpful to say so expressly, in order to preclude the development of
unpredictable federal judicial definitions. A footnote in the committee reports, although
relating to another subject,,states that "it is intended that what becomes part of the realty
is to be determined by local law." H.R. RE'. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966);
S. R . No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).
288. Ixr. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(f)(l)(A)(ii) and (2)(B). Corporations and partner-
ships are considered to "reside" at the "principal executive office of the business" (id.§ 6323(f)(2)-an unfortunate divergence from the "chief place of business" concept in the
UNWiORIM COMMERCAL CODE (§ 9-103(2)). Cf. I G. Gn.seoRE, SEcuaRM TAxs.'cno.s w PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 10.9, at 324 (1965). The law provides no guidance concerning the "resi-
dence" of a trust or estate, particularly in situations where the fiduciaries reside or have
their offices in more than one jurisdiction.
289. The House had last-minute misgivings and deleted the proposed amendment,
which had been in the bill as introduced; but it was restored in the Senate on the basis
of strong representations by the Treasury (S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966))
and was then adopted by the House. 112 Coxo. REc. 27071 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1966).
290. 84 A.B.A. REP. 688, 710 (1959).
291. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 9 323(g). Refiling must occur during the 12 months end-
ing six years and 30 days after the date of assessment.
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cerned with older lien notices, 2 2 While the purpose of the provision
is sound,293 it seems in two respects to have gone beyond the necessities
of the case, to the possible detriment of the revenue.
It is only those who become purchasers or secured creditors after
expiration of the six year period who can be injured by a failure to
refile. If the notice of lien, originally properly filed, is invalidated also
as against those who acquired their interests within the six-year period,
with actual or constructive notice of the prior lien, it "places a quite
arbitrary burden on the [federal revenue], while it bestows entirely
undeserved benefit on [such purchasers and creditors]." 2 4 Yet that is
the apparent effect of the refiling provision, which is said to nullify the
effect of the original lien notice (in the absence of timely refiling) "as
against any person without regard to when the interest in the property
subject to the tax lien was acquired." 25 The apparent purpose of so
providing was to avoid the possibility of circular priority, which could
arise, for example, if the federal tax lien remained superior to a first
mortgage perfected within the six-year period yet was inferior to a
second mortgage perfected after such period.20 But such circuity would
be present in only a fraction of the cases in which the law now confers
an undeserved benefit on those who lost nothing by the failure to
refile. And when it does arise the circuity would be readily soluble,
under familiar principles, 297 without need to confer such a benefit.298
292. While a lien would normally have expired six years after the assessment (INT.
REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6322, 6502(a)(1)), many events may cause its life to be extended,
and refiling warns third parties that this has occurred. See PLUMB &- WVRxrT 46.48.
293. For the difficulties formerly encountered by searchers, see United States v. Hodes,355 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 586 U.S. 901 (1967); United States v. Herman,
186 F. Supp. 98 (E.DIN.Y. 1960).
294. Adapted from Lockhart v. Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F.2d 658, 662 (2dCir. 1940), which involved a chattel mortgage refiling statute. See 1 GILMOaE, supra note
288, at § 21.2.
295. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1966), and Temp. Treas. Reg. §
400.1-1(b), construing INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(g)(1), a cryptic provision which ought
to be rewritten even if its substance is not to be changed.
296. Concerning circular priority, in another context, see First Installment 231.32 n.3l,
297. See In re Andrews, 172 F.2d 996, 1000 (7th Cir. 1949), involving chattel mortgage
refiling. The solution there adopted may be illustrated by assuming a $7,000 federal tax
lien, a $15,000 first mortgage attaching while the federal lien remained valid, and a $3l,000
second mortgage attaching after the federal lien should have been refiled. Assume the
proceeds are $16,000. The amount of the first mortgage ($15,000) would be set aside, leav.
ing the balance ($1,000) for the second mortgagee, who thus gets all he would have te-
ceived if there were no federal lien. The $7,000 federal tax lien is then paid (as was the
holder of the non-refiled chattel mortgage in the cited case) out of the $15,000 set aside
for the first mortgage, leaving only $8,000 for the first mortgagee. That solution is unfair
to the first mortgagee, however, as he gets less than the $9,000 he would have had If the
federal lien (to which alone he is junior) and the first mortgage were the only claims.
The burden of that differential should fall on the Government, whose failure to reflie
caused the loss. Therefore, the amount of the prior federal lien ($7,000) should first be
set aside, leaving $9,000 for the first mortgagee; the second mortgagee, being superior to
the federal lien, should then be satisfied from the amount set aside, but only to the
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Refiling of a stale tax lien would afford small protection to those pur-
chasing or lending on the security of personal property if, as the House
bill had initially prescribed,2 9 refiing occurred only in the jurisdiction
of original filing of the notice of lien, at a residence perhaps long
since abandoned by the taxpayer. A Senate amendment, therefore, pro-
vided that refiling should occur not merely in the original office but
also in the jurisdiction of the most recent residence of the taxpayer of
which the tax collector had received written information, such as might
be given by a tax return.30 0 But the additional requirement was not con-
fined, as it should have been, to liens on personal property. One search-
ing for liens on Teal estate will be concerned only with the notices filed
or refiled at the physical location of the property, and will be amply
protected if the notice was refied there; yet he may take advantage of
the tax collector's failure to refile as well at the latest known residence
of the taxpayer. On the other hand, an encumbrancer or purchaser of
personal property would hardly be prejudiced by a failure to refile
in some jurisdiction where the original notice may have been filed be-
cause the taxpayer once resided there; as to him, a refiling at the recent
residence should, by itself, have the same effect as any original filing in
that place.
The refiling provision should therefore be revised to state that re-
filing at the physical location will suffice to bind real estate, and that
refiling at the most recent known residence will suffice as to personalty.
extent of the $1,000 that would have been left for him if the first and mond mortgages
were the only claims.
298. Section 9-408(2) of the Uniform Commerdal Code states that, upon failure to
timely file a continuation statement, the security interest "becomes unperfected." The
Comment of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws construes that provision in the
same way that the House Report construes Section 6323(g) of the Internal Revenue Code,
stating that the rule thus avoids circular priority. The Comment is criticized in 1 GxumoM
supra note 288, at § 21.6, at 589, as being "wrong, not only in principle but as an expla-
nation of the statutory text. It is no doubt desirable to avoid circular priority s)stems,
but not at such a cost. Moreover, as the Andrews case shows, solutions to circular systems,
when they do arise, are not hard to come by."
299. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1966).
00. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1966). The information must have
been received at least 90 days before refiling, and must have been imparted In the manner
to be prescribed by regulations. Irrr. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 632(g)(2)(B). Not even a new
address shown on a later tax return will bind the Treasury in the case of assessments
made before January 1, 1967 (because such information had not theretofore been coordi-
nated with the delinquent collection files). Inexcusably, however, the Treasury has de-
dined to be bound even by information that is actually in the collection file, unless it was
received in writing from the taxpayer himself or his representative and related to an un-
paid tax liability. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.1-1(c)(2). The test should be the one adopted,
with respect to third parties' "actual notice or knowledge," in Mr. REv. CoDE of 1954.
§ 6328(i)(i), namely whether the fact has been brought to the attention of the individual
acting in the transaction, or would have been brought to his attention if the organization
had used due diligence.
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Moreover, only one who acquired an interest after the required refiting
period should be entitled to benefit from the failure to refile.
The six-year refiling requirement has ameliorated, but not elimi-
nated, the problem of the prospective encumbrancer or purchaser of
personal property who, to be safe, must ascertain the present and former
residences of his debtor or seller (and any prior owner) and make a
search in each place. In this mobile age, many people may change their
county of residence one or more times in any six-year period. The
Bar, therefore, also proposed a requirement for refiling in the new
jurisdiction within one year after a change of residence.801 The Treasury
successfully opposed that provision, maintaining that the tax collector
is in no position to keep close track of the residences of all delinquent
taxpayers. That, however, should not be the sole consideration. Con-
gress has in other circumstances accepted some diminution of its
security (despite the impossibility of protective action) by subordinat-
ing duly filed federal tax liens to innocent parties who, for various
reasons, could not reasonably be expected to discover them.302 It might
well do the same for the sake of lenders on and purchasers of per-
sonalty who are justifiably ignorant of a lien filed in a jurisdiction other
than that of the present residence of the borrower or seller. 0 3
If that proposal still proves unacceptable, it might be a reasonable
accommodation of the interests involved to prescribe that the tax
collector must refile within a specified time after he does in fact learn,
through his collection efforts, of a change in residence to another juris-
diction. 0 4 While that would not protect everyone, it would at least
reduce the chance of entrapment without imposing a significant burden
on tax administration.
The focus for legislative activity with respect to federal tax lien
filing, however, has now shifted to the state level. The privilege which
Congress long ago granted to the states to regulate the filing of federal
301. 84 A.B.A. REP. 688, 710 (1959); Cf. UNIFORM5 COMMERCIAL CODE § 9"103(2), re-
quiring refiling of financing statements within four months after the state of situs of
personality changes, and the alternative form of § 9-401(3), providing similarly with re-
spect to the county of situs. See 1 GILMoaRE, supra note 288, ch. 22.
302. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b). See First Installment 229, 233,
303. A test of reasonableness might well be applied to determine the extent of the
inquiry that would be required, in the light of the size of the transaction and other cir-
cumstances.
304. Cf. UNIFORM CONDrITONAL SALES Acr, § 14. Consideration should be given to
whether knowledge obtained from a subsequent tax return (unless and until the informa.
tion is actually associated with the collection case for prior years) should suffice to require
refiling at the new address. While such information is required to be availed of in reillng
six-year-old liens (note 300 supra), the reasonableness of requiring the addresses on all
delinquent accounts to be checked against new returns would depend on the feasibility of
using computers for the purpose.
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tax liens is subject to conditions which were materially tightened by
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. Any state law which requires filing
at the location of personal property rather than at the residence of the
owner is now invalid, as is any law which prescribes more than one
office for filing against the personalty of any one taxpayer.""°5 Any
Torrens Act or similar law that prescribes a different office for filing
federal tax liens against registered realty than for other realty in the
same county is likewise invalid.30 0 Failure promptly to conform such
state laws to the new requirement will put local lenders and purchasers
to the inconvenience of searching for federal tax liens at the office of
the clerk of the federal district court, 07 not merely during the period of
invalidity but for years afterward.3°s
New York in 1966 led the way in conforming its law in anticipation
of the new federal requirements.309 In addition to eliminating location-
filing and dual-filing requirements, however, it went a long way toward
the goal of coordinating federal tax lien filing provisions with the
Uniform Commercial Code. The New York law has become the model
for the 1966 version of the Revised Uniform Federal Tax Lien
Registration Act, and should be considered for general adoption.310
505. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(f)(1)(A)(ii) and (2)(B). For example, VA. CODE § 55-
139.1 (1950), requiring filing federal tax liens against personal property at its location. And
AaiZ Ray. STAT. § 11-464 (Supp. 1967), requiring filing of federal tax liens on motor ve-
hides with the Motor Vehicle Bureau, while such liens on other personalty are filed in
county offices, is dearly invalid now, even assuming (as held in K-R-K Inv. Co. v. United
States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9668 (D. Ariz. 1966)) that it was valid before. It is unclear
whether such special filing provisions, if not repealed, would cause the entire state law on
federal tax liens to be invalid, or whether the special requirement can simply be disre-
garded as surplusage. The Senate Report on the 1966 Act seems to take the former view,
saying that, "where the State designates more than one office, notice of lien is to be filed
with the appropriate Federal district court." S. REP. No. 1703, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1966). But INTr. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(l)(l)(B) provides for federal court filing only
"whenever the State has not by law designated one offlice which meets the requirements"
(emphasis added). Here, the state has designated one office, and only one, which meets
the requirements. See generally PLUMB & WRIGHT 59-61.
306. Rev. Proc. 67-15, 1967 INr. R v. BuLu. No. 13, at 24 (involving Cook County, Illi-
nois). The Illinois law has since been conformed to federal standards. Rev. Proc. 63-1,
1968 INT. Rav. BuL.. No. 2, at 31.
307. Note 284 supra. While the Government's practice in such situations has been to
file copies of tax lien notices in county offices even when a state law is considered invalid
such copies are filed "solely as a matter of convenience, and not as a matter of legal
effectiveness," and the risk of any slip-up rests on the searcher who fails to check the
official filings in the district court. Rev. Proc. 67-15, supra note 805.
308. A lien once properly fied in the federal court need not be refiled in a state-
designated office after the state law is changed. In re Dartmont Coal Co., 46 F.2d 455 (4th
Cir. 1931). Furthermore, in the absence of a change of residence, the only required place
for refiling after six years will be the same federal court, even if the state lay, has mean.
while been conformed. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.1-1(c)(), example (7).
309. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 240(2) (McKinney, Supp. 1967). See LEG. Doe. No. 65(F) (N.Y.
1966).
310. Unlike the ill-starred 1962 version of the REvism U.irrown FEDMAL TAx LtEn
REGISTRA ON Acr (note 286 supra), which sought complete coordination, the New York
law was cleared with the Treasury before enactment.
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The New York version of the Commercial Code, like that of most
states, provides for central filing against some types of personal property,
and local filing against others; in some circumstances, both are re-
quired. 11' Any attempt to require filing of federal tax liens in the same
places would be invalid under the "one office" rule of the new federal
law, if for no other reason. 12 The next best thing is to require filing
against all personal property of a taxpayer at the one place where most
Commercial Code searches would be made in connection with the
particular taxpayer. Since most purchases and secured transactions
involving personal property of individuals would relate to consumer
goods or farm personal property, with respect to which Commercial
Code filings would be at the local level, the New York law requires
federal tax liens against individuals to be filed in county offices. Since
most such transactions involving personal property of corporations,
associations and partnerships would be commercial transactions, in
which (despite the requirement of both central and local filing in some
circumstances) most Commercial Code searches would be made at the
state level, federal tax liens against these business entities must be filed
with the Secretary of State. Thus, with relatively few exceptions, pro-
spective purchasers or lenders may search for federal tax liens in the
same office where they would normally search for security interests.
2. Effect of Actual Knowledge of Unfiled Lien
A question that has long been troublesome is whether a third party's
actual knowledge of an unfiled federal tax lien has the same effect as
the constructive notice that would have been imparted if the lien had
been filed. Most of the decided cases have protected purchasers and
secured creditois in such circumstances, on the ground that the law
makes the lien "not ... valid" against them unless it was filed, and
imposes no condition respecting their lack of knowledge of the unfiled
lien. 13 But the Government, with some dubious support in the cases,
has maintained that actual knowledge was as effective as filing,31 4 and
311. UNrOR, M COINIMERCAL CODE § 9-401(1).
312. See notes 206 & 305 supra.
313. United States v. Beaver Run Coal Co,, 99 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir, 1938); Runyan
Mach. g- Boiler Works v. Old Screw "Captain Pete," 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9179 (ND. Fla.
1955); Smith v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 702, 710 (D. Hawaii 1953); Schmitz v. Stocknana,
151 Kan. 891, 101 P.2d 962 (1940); Profaci v. Mamiapro Realty Corp., 180 N.Y.S.2d 851
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
314. The Comptroller General ruled even a bona fide bank loan to be subordinate to
a known but unfiled lien. 87 Comp. Gen. 817, 819 (1958). But the only supporting Cases
involved transfers to controlled corporations for stock consideration (Hayward v. United
States, 2 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1924); United States v. Woodside, 40.2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9492
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at one time sought to have that position confirmed by the statute.31'
The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 does not clearly adopt either view,
although it arguably supports the former majority view that made actual
knowledge immaterial if notice of the lien had not been filed.3 10
There is much to be said for freeing third parties from ie effect of
known but unfied liens, at least if they act in good faith and give new
value. The usual reason for the District Director's failure to file notice
of a lien for a delinquent tax assessment is that the taxpayer is
faithfully meeting agreed payments and appears to have a good chance
to get back on his feet if his credit is not impaired by the filing of a
lien. It would be inconsistent with that purpose to take the position
that the taxpayer is precluded from obtaining secured credit from
anyone who, by careful credit investigation or otherwise, becomes
familiar with his tax situation.317 The cogency of this argument has
been lessened, however, by the availability of the new procedure for
subordination of the lien by agreement.318 If the premise of the argu-
ment is sound, that the District Director wants the delinquent taxpayer
to operate normally, a prospective lender or purchaser in the normal
course who knows of the lien should have no trouble obtaining such a
subordination-but on terms tailored to protect the revenue in the
circumstances of the case. 19 Hence, there may now be something to be
said for making an unilfed lien, unless subordinated, binding on those
with actual knowledge of it.
In any event, it is difficult to justify the extreme position taken in
some of the decisions, which accorded priority to related parties who,
with knowledge of an unfiled lien, acquired their interests as security
for or in satisfaction of antecedent debts.3  And surely, even one who
(V.D.S.C. 1940)), or security taken by related parties for antecedent debts after knowledge
of the lien United States v. Caldwell, 74 F. Supp. 114 (M.D. Tenn. 1947).
315. The House version of the 1954 Code bill so provided (see H.R. REP. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., A407 (1954)), but the Senate preferred to "continue to rely upon judi-
cial interpretation" (S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 575 (1954)), and the Senate view
prevailed.
316. This view is based on new Section 6323(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, protect-
ing the priority of the security for disbursements made within 45 da)s after the filing of
notice of the lien "or (if earlier) before the person making such disbursements had actual
notice or knowledge of tax lien filing" (emphasis added). While the security for disburse-
ments made before filing is not expressly dealt with, it would be anomalous if such secu-
rity were subordinated to known but unfiled liens, while post-filing advances are protected
unless not only the lien but also the filing thereof is known.
317. 84 A.B.A. RP. 669 (1959).
318. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6325(d)(2.
319. Ordinarily, because of confidentiality requirements (P~r. REv. CoDE Of 1954,
§§ 6323(1)(3), 7213), it is impossible to get revenue employees even to admit the existence
of a federal tax liability that has not been placed on public record. But, if the taxpayerjoins in the request for subordination, that difficulty should be eliminated.
320. Runyan Mach. & Boiler Works v. Oil Screw "Captain Pete," 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
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gives new value with knowledge of the lien should not be protected
if he participates with the taxpayer in a scheme to convert the tax-
payer's property into spendable, concealable cash in order to hinder
or defeat collection of the tax. The American Bar Association took an
intermediate position and would deny protection only in those two
special circumstances, 21 but the provision was omitted from the bill
as enacted.
Any rule which bases the priority of a purchaser or a secured creditor
on such a subjective fact as knowledge of an unfiled lien-either gen-
erally or in the special cases last mentioned-may involve dangers to
an innocent subsequent transferee of the purchased property or
assignee of the security interest. It would obviously create havoc in tie
secondary market for secured obligations if a security interest which on
its face is superior to the tax lien were in fact subject to a hidden
infirmity because of the original creditor's knowledge of the lien
before it was filed. The Bar proposal would have met that problem by
removing the infirmity when an innocent party thus entered the
picture.3 22
The proposal also sought to resolve the circuity problem which may
result where, for example, a first mortgage is taken with knowledge of
the lien and is invalidated against the federal lien (under one or
another of the rules considered above), but there is an innocent second
mortgagee or bona fide purchaser who is behind the first mortgagee but
ahead of the federal tax collector, who is superior to the first mort-
gagee.323 Unfortunately, the complexity of the remedies recommended
for resolving those peripheral problems contributed to the demise of
the entire proposal. Perhaps, if it is revived, the lien should be viewed
only as the triggering circumstance, and the remedy should be fr-amed
in terms of a personal liability of the person enjoying the preference or
participating (even for new value) in the fraudulent transfer, so that
innocent parties' rights would be in no way involved.
9179 (N.D. Fla. 1955) (transfer to controlling stockholder with knowledge of lien, as
indemnity for past endorsements); Schmitz v. Stocknam, 151 Kan. 891, 101 P.2d 962 (1940)(transfer to grandmother to secure past advances with intent to defeat a known tax lien
that was filed the next day). When a lien is neither filed nor known, however, an ante.
cedent consideration should, and apparently does, suffice. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong,,
2d Sess. lln. (1966).
321. 84 A.B.A. REP. 669, 688, 692, 701, 710 (1959).
322. Id. at 669, 689-90, 717.
323. Id. at 689, 713-18. The federally oriented circuity solution adopted in UnitedStates v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), in First Installment 231-32 n.31, would pro.
duce a result unjust to the innocent second mortgagee if applied in a case where the
circuity arises from the Government's failure to file notice of its lien; hence, it was pro.
posed to protect the innocent party at the expense of the federal lien. See generally 4
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.33 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
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3. Secured Financing
A major contribution of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was the
removal or amelioration of the threats to the security of financing trans-
actions which had resulted from the "choateness" doctrine developed
by the courts 2 4 Under the previous decisions, a security interest was
not deemed "choate," and was not protected against intervening federal
tax liens, until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the
lien and the amount payable became fixed and certain. Lenders, there-
fore, could not safely make additional advances under an existing
financing arrangement, or permit the substitution of security, without
again searching for federal tax liens.
3 2 5
Nowhere was the problem more acute than in the field of com-
mercial finance, where loans and collateral may turn over daily. If
Congress failed to resolve the problem in this area, it was not for lack
of good intentions. In explaining the new provision protecting com-
mercial loans or purchases of obligations made in ignorance of a filed
tax lien within 45 days after such filing,20 both committee reports
state categorically that:
The provision added by the bill is designed to keep this obligation
[to search before each advance] within practical bounds by giving
the interests arising under the agreements providing for these loans
or purchases priority over a filed tax lien if the loans or purchases
are made not later than 45 days after the tax lien 'filing and before
the lender or purchaser had actual notice of the filing. This gen-
erally gives an inventory or accounts receivable, etc., financier
assurance that his loans or purchases are not inferior to some
recently filed tax lien as long as he searches the records at least
once every 45 days.3
27
324. See Part I in First Installment. The Act failed to provide relief for lenders in
cases of insolvency of the debtor (see First Installment 235), but lenders may take heart
from a recent decision holding an assignment of present and future accounts to secure
present and future debts to be "choate," even under the stringent standards applicable
in Rev. Stat. § 3466 cases. It does not appear, however, that any of the indebtedness or
the accounts arose after the event of insolvency. Creditors Exch. Serv. Inc. v. United
States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9745 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
325. See First Installment 231, n.27-28.
326. INms. Rav. CoDE of 1954, § 6323(c)(1) and 2). See PLum & WMcirr 80-82. See also
Coogan, The Impact of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1965 upon Security Interests Created
under the Uniform Commercial Code, to be published in the Harvard Law Review in
April 1968.
327. H.R. RE'. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1966); S. RaP. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1966). It has been objected that 45 days is not enough time to work out a
distress situation. Coogan, supra note 326. Actually, the timing is tighter than that com-
ment suggests. The lender can safely permit substitution of collateral until 45 days after
filing of the tax lien, but that may be much less than 45 days after its discovery. And if
new loans are needed to complete pending contracts or othenvise keep the debtor afloat,
they will enjoy no priority under Section 6323(c)(2) if made at any time after discovery
of the filed len, although protection may in some circumstances be achieved under the
purchase money security principle (note 380 infra) or perhaps under In re Halprin, 280
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The possibility exists, however, that the intended relief may have been
nullified, at least for optional future advances against existing collateral,
by the unanticipated effect of one of the conditions which Congress
attached thereto.
The Treasury was insistent that some standard of perfection be
imposed upon security interests, since those that had not achieved
such dignity that they would be protected under local law were not
thought worthy of protection against federal tax liens.3 28 But against
whom must the interest be "protected"? In whose hypothetical shoes is
the tax collector to stand? For certain purposes of the Act, he is (some-
what anomalously) treated as if he were a "subsequent purchaser with-
out actual notice,"329 but that standard would not do in the case of
security interests, at least in inventory and obligations, which in some
circumstances can be sold free of existing commercial security in-
terests.3 0 Therefore, following substantially the pattern of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the federal tax collector was, with respect to security
interests, placed in the shoes of a holder of "a subsequent judgment lien
arising out of an unsecured obligation." 331
Until quite late in the legislative process, however, it was recognized
that security for future advances involved special problems, in terms of
F.2d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1960), which extended that principle to cover other contract financ.
ing. Essentially, the 45-day rule merely spares the lender from constant searching of the
files; but to work out a distress situation, once a lien is discovered, he must bring the
District Director to the conference table and negotiate a subordination or discharge of tle
lien. PLvAm & Wamrr 87-88.
828. The American Bar proposal, reasoning that the tax collector was not a "reliance"
creditor (see United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp, 893, 399 (D.N.H.
1964); and United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587, 588 (1958) (dissenting
opinion)), had taken the opposite approach, making such interests "effective" against the
tax lien if local law preferred them over third parties "acquiring liens upon or interest in
the property for value, with or without notice, either generally or subject to such limita.
tions or exceptions as may be provided by law" (84 A.B.A. Rra:, 692, 701 (1959))- failure to
record or file would merely have affected the burden of proof (id. at 686, 70).
329. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(h)(2) and (6) (as against mechanics' lienors andpurchasers). The Treasury and Congress evidently were influenced by the view, reflected
in the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 11, 1965-66)), that the holder of "a
lien which is so tenuous that it can be defeatedby transfer to a bona fide purchaser" has
"reason to know that [his] security is extremely vulnerable," H.R. R z. No, 686, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1965). In bankruptcy, nevertheless, Congress permitted belated perfec.
tion against bona fide purchasers if the lien was valid against other lien creditors on the
fatal day. No such locus poenitentiae was allowed as against a tax lien. See pp. 673, 677,78
infra.
380. E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 9-307, 9-308.
331. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(h)(1). The Chandler Act of 1938 had placed the
trustee in bankruptcy in the position of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, with unil.
ticipated effects on commercial financing. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co, v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434 (1943). The 1950 amendments of 11 U.S.C. § 96(a), relating to the time
when preferential transfers are deemed perfected, and § 110(c), relating to the title ac.juired by the trustee, substituted the test of perfection against a creditor obtaining a
lien by legal or equitable proceedings. S. REP. No. 72, 81st Cong., 1st Ses3. (1949), See3 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.38 (14th ed. 1967).
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perfection as well as in other respects. The Treasury-drafted bill on
which hearings were held in March 1966 conditioned the relief for
future advance security upon "all requisite actions under local law to
protect the priority of such security interest [having been] taken."' 32
That broad, if imprecise, language might have supported the inference
that filing of a commercial security interest (or any alternative method
of perfection provided by the Uniform Commercial Code) 3 would
suffice to protect the security for future advances against the tax lien,
as it would against intervening security interests3 34 In the final stages,
however, the draftsmen's instinct for symmetry and precision prevailed,
and the "judgment lien" test of perfection, applicable to security in-
terest generally, was extended to security for future advances.335 Those
outside the Treasury who knew commercial finance law awoke too late
to the possible effect of what had been done.
The chosen point of reference to local law, namely, protection against
"judgment liens," was particularly unfortunate because the Uniform
Commercial Code, now enacted in 49 states, the District of Columbia,
and the Virgin Islands, does not deal expressly with the subject and
there are no pertinent judicial interpretations under the Code. The
leading commentators on the Code cannot agree on whether a judg-
ment creditor, obtaining a lien by levying upon commercial collateral,
would prevail over the security for optional advances yet to be made
against existing collateral pursuant to a previously filed financing state-
ment.mo The problem arises from the fact that a security interest is not
332. Section 6323(f)(4) of H.R. 11256, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., as introduced (set out in
Hearings before the House Comm. on Vavs and Means on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290,
89th Cong. 2d Sess. 3, 6 (1966)) (emphasis added).
333. UNFOPM CONMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302-9-306.
334. UNIFORM CoBBIEcRIAL CODE § 9-312(5).
335. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(c)(l)(B) ("protected under local law against a judg-
ment lien arising, as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation') (em-
phasis added). Additional conditions that must be met, in the case of commercial financing,
are that the transaction must be covered by a written agreement entered into before tax
lien filing, and that the collateral must be "commercial financing security" acquired before
the 46th day after tax lien filing. Id. §§ 6323(c)(1)(A) and (2)(B). It seems that the required
"agreement" need not be a firm commitment to make loans, but the matter is not free
from doubt. See Young, Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. OF Cm. L REV. '723, 732-
33 (1967).
336. Compare 2 G. GILMORE, SECUwRTY INTEREtSTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3jr.6 (19C5.
with Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities among Secured Cred-
itors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HAuv. L. REv. 838, 867 (1959); Coogan & Gordon, The
Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code upon Receivables Financing-Some Answers and
Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1529, 1549 (1963); Coogan, Intangibles as
Collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARe. L. REv. 997. 1019 (190). The
Coogan articles also appear as chapters 7A, 15 and 21 of P. CoocA.v. W. HocAN & D. VAGTs.
SECURED TRAs.crioss UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1963). See also Creedon.
Impact on Life Companies of the FEDERAL TAX Liruts Acr oF 1966. 20 PRoc. Assoc. UFt,
INS. COUNSEL 1, 30-37 (1967); Note, Nonconsensual Liens under Arlide 9, 76 YAIF L.J.
1649, 1663-68 (1967).
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deemed perfected, as against competing liens, until (1) it has "attached"
and (2) the applicable steps (filing or otherwise) required for perfection
have been taken.337 It does not "attach" until, among other things,
"value" has been given.3sS
Professor Grant Gilmore argues that, if a series of optional loans are
to be made on existing collateral (e.g., a contract right), the lender ac-
quires a single security interest, of fluctuating amount, which attaches
once and for all by the giving of "value" when the first loan is made,310
and which, having been filed, is then fully protected against intervening
judgment liens with respect to all future advances covered by the agree-
ment.340 On the other hand, Peter Coogan argues, or at least warns of
the possibility, that each optional loan gives rise to a separate security
interest, which attaches and hence is perfected only when the particular
advance is made, and is vulnerable to intervening liens arising from
levies by judgment creditors.341 If the latter view is correct, one making
a series of optional commercial loans on existing collateral remains as
vulnerable to federal tax liens as before, and cannot, as Congress plainly
contemplated, protect himself if he merely "searches the records at least
once every 45 days. 342
In his latest article, soon to be published, Coogan suggests an inter-
mediate position, that the commercial lender who makes future op-
tional advances may be protected against intervening judgment liens
of which he lacks actual knowledge, just as he was in the majority of
States before the Commercial Code.343 Although the Commercial Code
rejected that line of distinction as applied to intervening security in.
terests,3 44 it may perhaps survive with respect to judgment liens8 45 But
337. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303(1).
338. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).
339. The "single security interest" view is in line with the traditional (although not
unanimously held) concept of a real estate mortgage covering future advances. 4 J. Fo,-
EROy, EQUITy JUIRISPRUDENCE § 1199 (5th ed. 1941); G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, §§ 114, 117
(1951). "Value" includes "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract," and
the first loan would be such. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(44)(d). Of course, the
lender who is bound by a commitment has no trouble with the perfection requiremlent,
because the commitment itself constitutes "value" and causes the security Interest to
attach at once to existing collateral. Id. § 1-201(44)(a). Whether the committed lender
enjoys any greater protection than INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 632 (c) gives the Voluntary
lender is discussed note 399 infra.
340. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(5).
341. He also refers to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-311, exposing a debtor's tiglts
in collateral to involuntary transfer by levy, etc., "notwithstanding a provision in the
security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default."
342. Note 327 supra.
343. Coogan, supra note 326, The prior law is described in 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
336, at § 35.4. See also note 350 infra.
344. See Comments to UNIFOa1 COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312.
345. While the lien creditor's knowledge of an earlier but unperfected (not nonexistent)
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it would be easier to see the knowledge test as a limitation on Gilmore's
theory3 46 than as an escape from Coogan's general thesis that each ad-
vance gives rise to a new security interest which, it seems, should be
subject to judgments which had theretofore become liens, whether
known or unknown to the lender.347 In any any event, the new Coogan
theory may not resolve the question under federal law, which neglects
to say whether the hypothetical judgment lienor against whom the
security must be protected is one who is known or unknown to the
lender. 48
A related problem arises in the case of optional loans for the con-
struction or improvement of real property, which enjoy limited pro-
tection against intervening federal tax liens, without reference to the
45-day limitation otherwise applicable, but still subject to the require-
ment that the security be protected under local law against a judgment
lien arising as of the time of tax lien filing.34 9 Whatever the rule may
be for commercial loans, most states do hold that the maker of optional
real estate loans is subject to intervening judgment liens actually known
to him, but not those of which he is ignorant. 9 Logic would suggest
that, if the tax collector stands in the shoes of a judgment lienor, the
lender should be protected against intervening federal tax liens of
which he had only constructive notice, and subject to those of which he
had actual knowledge. But whatever merit that solution might have as
a possible amendment to the statute, the language of the present law
affords no dear basis for drawing such a distinction.
security interest is relevant to his priority (UNIFORM CoMMERCIAl. CODE § 9-301(1)(b)), the
Code is silent concerning the effect of the secured lender's knowledge of the intervening
lien. Cf. Creedon, supra note 336, at 35 n.114.
346. 2 G. GnzioRE, supra note 336, at § 35.6, however, apparently regards a "per.
fected" security interest covering future advances as good against intervening liens, known
or unknown.
347. 4 J. POMEROY, EQurTy JURISPRUDENCE § 1199 (5th ed. 1941).
348. INT. Rv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(c)(1)(B).
349. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 632 (c)(1)(B) and 6323(c)(3). See PLUMn & Wzucirr
85-86. The security for cash disbursements for such construction or improvement, cven
though made more than 45 days after tax lien filing and with knowledge thereof, is
protected if they are made pursuant to a written agreement entered into before such
filing and are duly protected against judgment liens. The protection of post.filing ad-
vances, however, extends only to the security consisting of the real property itself or (in
the case of loans to a contractor) the contract proceeds. With respect to loans secured
by contract proceeds, as well as crop and livestock loans (which anomalously are included
in "real property construction or improvement financing'), the preceding discussion of
Commercial Code chattel security would be applicable, so far as the perfection require-
ment is concerned.
350. 4 AmIpcAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 16.73-.74 (A. J. Casner ed. 195-); I L. JoxES,
MORTcAcES §§ 452-53 (8th ed. 1928); G. OSBORNE, MORMAGES §§ 118-19 (1951); AnnoL, 138
A.LR. 566 (1942). Cases involving judgment liens include Reidy v. Collins, 134 Cal. App.
713, 26 P.2d 712, 716 (1953); Schmidt v. Hedden, 38 A. 843 (1897); Ackerman v. Hunsicker,
85 N.Y. 43 (1881). In the minority states, the lender must search for intervening judg-
ment liens and hence also for federal tax liens. Creedon, supra note 336, at 37-8.
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In retrospect, it seems that the statutory point of reference to local
law should have been protection against, not a judgment lien, but "a
security interest subsequently perfected by filing or recording, of which
the holder of the prior security interest does not have actual notice or
knowledge."3 5'' A commercial security interest, expressly covering
future advances, would be protected in that sense as soon as a financing
statement is filed or an appropriate alternative step is taken, with no
need for concern about whether the security interest technically had
"attached" when the federal tax lien was filed.35 2 Such a solution seems
preferable to amending the Commercial Code to resolve what appears
to have been a relatively academic question in the states until the Fed-
eral Government undertook to make itself, without need for a levy, a
universal judgment lienor.
Short of amending the federal law, or taking the long and painful
course of amending or litigating the effect of the Commercial Code in
every state, I submit that there is a fair construction of the present
statute which, if written into the regulations, would resolve the issue
in harmony with the intention of Congress as expressed in the com-
mittee reports. That construction is that the federal perfection require-
ment is satisfied when the lender (or factor) has taken the only action
(by filing or otherwise ) which state law provides for protection of his
federally defined "security interest" (i.e., "an interest in property ac-
quired by contract [the financing agreement] for the purpose of se-
curing payment... of an obligation . . . .")313 against judgment liens. If
the protection provided by state law is incomplete, in that it does not
extend to future advances, that is irrelevant, because-once the pre-
scribed action under state law has been taken-it is federal law that
prescribes in detail the extent to which the protection, as against federal
tax liens, is broadened to embrace additional advances.35 4 The seman-
tics of that construction may be debatable, but to reject it is to say to
351. The 1950 Bankruptcy Act amendments (note 331 supra) were not a reliable prece-
dent for Congress, once the "judgment lien" test was extended, by amendment of the tax
lien bill, to security for future advances. Security for future advances was not a problem
under 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1964), since the giving of new consideration would negative a
preference. See id. § 96(a)(8). And the trustee's status as a hypothetical judgment creditor
under 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964) raised no problem in this regard because the notorious
fact of bankruptcy would ordinarily terminate a line of credit.
352. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(5). See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 826, at § 85.7.
353. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(1). The question whether the Commercial
Code creates one security interest or many (see p. 660 supra) is Irrelevant, under this
view, since federal law provides the definition.
354. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(2); cf. Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635,
638 (D. Mass. 1967). It must be acknowledged that the first decision under the Ilew
provision does not support this analysis (which was not argued). United States v. Strollo,
67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
662
Vol. 77: 605, 1968
Federal Liens and Priorities
Congress, "We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it,
and therefore we shall go on as before." 3ara
If the suggested interpretation of the present federal law, or the
amendment thereof proposed above, were applied to construction and
improvement loans, the recording of the mortgage would fully satisfy
the perfection requirement and, if the other conditions were met, the
security for optional future advances would be protected against inter-
vening federal tax liens known or unknown to the lender, since the fed-
eral law itself does not cut off the protection of construction loans when
knowledge of the lien is obtained (as it does in the case of commerical
loans).358 That is not necessarily an undesirable, or even an unintended,
result, however, since the construction loans presumably enhance the
value of the property, and completion would ordinarily be beneficial
to the Government. 57
A number of problems arise where after-acquired property is to serve
as security for either present or future loans. Congress was understand-
ably reluctant to permit taxpayers to pledge their future earning power,
to the exclusion of intervening liens for federal taxes. Therefore, the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, with severely limited exceptions, denies
protection to security interests so far as they embrace property not yet
owned by the debtor at the time the federal tax lien is filed. 3 s
355. Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (Ist Cir. 1908) (Holmes, J., sitting on
circuit). For further development of the distinction between the concepts of "protected"
under the Federal Tax Lien Act and "perfected" under the Commercial Code, see Young.
supra note 335, at 735-39.
356. The 45-day leeway allowed for making additional commercial loans, note 326
supra, is cut short immediately when actual, rather than constructive, notice of a federal
tax lien is obtained. In contrast, presumably because many construction loans are made
pursuant to commitments, Section 6323(c)(3) imposes no restriction with respect to either
the time of making the advance or the lender's knowledge of the tax lien. If any restraint
is to be imposed on optional construction loans, it must be found in the perfection pro.
vision (Section 6323(c)(l)(B)).
357. One writer has noted "some legislative tendency to provide that a mortgage for
optional future advances shall have priority even though the mortgagee has actual notice
of intervening claims. The main reasons for giving the mortgage such a continuing pri-
ority seem to be... the need, in some cases, to make further advances to protect those
already made. ... Similarly, a loan for the construction of a building may require a
later loan to complete the construction, since only a completed building can earn the
income to pay back the first loan." Perry, Priority of Liens against Real Property, in CUn-
RENT TRENs IN STATE LXGISLATION 1953-1954, at 331, 351 (1954). The American Bar Associ-
ation proposal adopted that philosophy, imposing no conditions on the protection of
construction or improvement loans except that the money be used for the intended pur-
poses. 84 A.B.A. RnP. 684, 702 (1959). The Treasury, as late as the March 19G0 hearings
(when the perfection requirement in the bill was admittedly worded differently), was ap-
parently not averse to protection of nonobligatory construction and improvement loans.
1966 Hearings, supra note 332, at 48.
358. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(1)(A). See PLUMB & WVMxurr 89-96. It is argued
in Creedon, supra note 336, at 47, that the effect of Section 6323()(l)(A) is only to make
the security interest attach to the property simultaneously with the federal lien, and that
it does not follow that the federal lien will prevail. Under prior law, bowever, It was
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One of the exceptions, already noted, permits commercial financing
security to embrace collateral acquired by the debtor within 45 days
after the filing of a federal tax lien, thus permitting some leeway for the
turnover of inventory and accounts.309 Surprisingly, the "judgment
lien" question which cast a cloud on the similar leeway which Congress
intended to provide for future advances against existing collateral does
not appear to affect the permitted acquisition or substitution of new
collateral. Although all the experts would agree, in this instance, that
the security interest cannot "attach" to the new collateral, and hence
cannot be "perfected" with respect thereto, until "the debtor has rights
in the collateral, '" 3 0 that concession does not lead to the conclusion
that a federal tax lien filed before the attachment of the security in-
terest to new collateral must prevail (no matter which interpretation of
federal law is adopted). On the contrary, since a hypothetical inter.
vening judgment creditor likewise could not attach a lien to the col-
lateral until it is acquired by the debtor, and then could do so in most
states only by making a levy, it would seem that the security interest-
which, under the Code, ordinarily attaches automatically to new col-
lateral the moment it is acquired 301-would be "protected" against a
judgment lien with respect to such property.362
held that "the federal tax lien is superior to any simultaneously attaching interest" in
after-acquired property (United States v. Graham, 96 F. Supp. 318, 321 (S.J. Cal. 1951),
aff'd sub noma. California v. United States, 195 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
831 (1952)), even if the nonfederal lien was earlier in date and attached automatically.
Berkowitz v. Maxwell House Hotel Corp., 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
But cf. United States v. Blackett, 220 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding, at least where the
federal lien arose first, that liens attach to after-acquired property in order of priority
of time). The rule applied as between private liens in such circumstances is discussed in
note 362 infra.
559. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(2)(B). The American Bar proposal would have
permitted substitutions of collateral, without time limit, to the extent necessary to main.
tain unimpaired the value of the creditor's security as of the time of tax lien filing. 84
A.B.A. REP. 685, 704 (1959).
360. UMFORAI COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1). Although there is some suggestion thatfuture earnings and inventory of a business may be viewed as a present asset in the nature
of a "general intangible" in which "the debtor has rights" and to which a security in-
terest, therefore, may "attach" before actual acquisition of the claims and goods (2 G.
GILMsoa, supra note 356, at § 45.5), that would have no bearing on the present question,
as the House Report on the 1966 Act expressly excludes "general intangibles" from the
qualified category of commercial financing security. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 42 (1966). Cases involving the question of preference under 11 U.S.C. § 96 v ew afloating mass of inventory or receivables as an "entity," the "transfer" of which occurs
when the security interest in the entity is created. Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp,
635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967); In re Portland Newspaper Pub. Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 399.-400(D. Ore. 1967). But those courts did not deny that the substituted items are after-acquired
property (see Rosenberg v. Rudnick, supra at 638-39). The test under 11 U.S.C. § 96 is
one of perfection against judicial lien creditors (see note 362 infra), whereas the Federal
Tax Lien Act has added a further restriction concerning the time when the collateral
may be "acquired." See generally Young, supra note 335, at 746-47.
361. UNIrot COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303(1), and Comment 1.
362. See Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory under Article 9 of the Urii/orni
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The limitation of the protection to commercial security "acquired"
within 45 days after tax lien filing does, however, raise problems of
interpretation which, if not resolved favorably by the regulations, may
have to be re-examined by Congfess.36a Commercial security goes
through a normal cycle, from inventory or contract rights to accounts
or chattel paper to cash. The ultimate collateral for most commercial
financing is the cash proceeds expected at the end of the cycle, " and
under the Commercial Code the security interest normally follows
through each mutation in the collateral. 303 It would be unthinkable if
collections (or conversions into non-cash proceeds) after the 45th day
were deemed to result in an acquisition of new and different property
against which the intervening federal tax lien had priority. Similarly,
the conversion of accounts into returned or repossessed goods,300 or of
materials into a product or mass,307 or of a contract into a modified or
substituted contract, 0 8 all of which under the Commercial Code may
(in some circumstances) result in a shifting of the security interest,
should not be treated as involving after-acquired security for purposes
of the federal tax lien law, unless possibly to the extent of any value
Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 51 (1962). In United
States v. Strollo, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), involving the pre-
Code Florida law, the attachment of the security interest to the after-acquired contract
right was not automatic, so there was an interval during which a hypothetical judgment
creditor could have levied. Therefore, a federal tax lien arising within 45 da)s before the
new collateral was acquired and assigned to secure new advances was preferred, in reliance
on INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(1)(B). That situation might arise under the Code if
the agreement does not contemplate automatic attachment. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-204(1); Creedon, supra note 336, at 34. In some states, also, a judgment may become
a lien on personalty prior to levy (e.g., N.Y. Civ. Pputc. LAw & RuLEs § 5202(a) (MeKinney
1963); MSS. CODE § 1555), and thus may attach automatically to after-acquired property
(see Baker v. Hull, 250 N.Y. 484, 166 N.E. 175, 176 (1929)), simultaneously with the U.C.C.
security interest. Perhaps in such a case a judgment lienor and the holder of a security
interest would share ratably in the after-acquired property (Annot., 67 A.LR. 101
(1930); Note, Nonconsensual Liens Under Article 9, 76 YAL LJ. 1649, 1656.63 (1967)),
and the security interest would be deemed "protected under local law against a judgment
lien" only pro tanto. See Creedon, supra note 336, at 33-34.
363. See PLoIJM & WRIGHT 93-95.
364. 2 G. GnianOR, supra note 336, at 1317, 1336.
365. UNIFORM COMMERCLL CODE § 9-306. See 2 G. GiueoRE, supra note 336, at dh. 27.
Incredibly, the Government has contended, unsuccessfully, that a security interest in the
proceeds of goods (pre-U.C.C. trust receipt) was not "choate" because it was uncertain
how much the proceeds would be. The 1966 Act, although applicable, was not cited.
Creditors Exch. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9745 (S.D. T. 1967).
366. UIOst COMMMCIAL CODE § 9-306(5). See 2 G. GilxtoPE, supra note 336, at § 27.5.
But cf. 3 AV. COLLIER, BANKRUFCY 60.51A[9] (14th ed. 1967). The problem under the
Federal Tax Lien Act is discussed in Young, supra note 335, at 740-43.
367. UNIFORM COMMIERCLAL CODE § 9-315. See 2 G. GIa.onE, supra note 336, at §§ 31.4-3.
When materials acquired before or within the 45-day period are combined with others
which were not owned or were not subject to the security interest within that time, an
apportionment (cf. UNI toa Co.taERcux. CODE § 9-315(2)) of the product would be
appropriate. See Coogan, supra note 326.
368. UNIFORM COMMECIAL CODE § 9-318(2). See 2 G. Gi;mIom, supra note 336, at
§ 41.10.
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added after the 45-day period.369 Again, the future payments to be
earned under contract rights or chattel leases assigned as collateral
should be regarded as existing property and not as property "acquired"
only when the payments are earned.370 If the law is otherwise construed
in those respects, commercial necessity would seem to compel its early
amendment.
A security interest in the rents or royalties from real estate stands il
a much more doubtful position.37' So far as the rent assignment may
secure construction or improvement loans made after tax lien filing,
priority over the tax lien is clearly denied.372 In other cases, even as
security for present advances, its protection depends upon establishing
that the right to future rents was property in existence at the time the
tax lien was filed. Rents under a net lease, not conditional upon future
performance by the owner, might qualify as present property, but
otherwise the security seems vulnerable.37 3 Significantly, Congress had
before it, but ignored, requests from the American Bankers Association
and others that the law make clear that rents under existing leases are
not after-acquired property for this purpose.374 Remedial legislation
seems unlikely in the future because of the Government's fear of abuse
where realty is held through corporations with no means to pay taxes
on their net income from rentals if the rents are subject to a prior
security interest.3
75
369. The comparable bankruptcy problem is discussed in 2 G. GILtORE, supra note
336, at § 45.6.
370. "Contract rights" (which, by definition are "not yet earned by performance"
(UNIFORM COMxaCIAL CODE § 9-106) and in which the "debtor has rights" when the
contract has been made (id. § 9-204(2)(c)) and "chattel paper" (which includes chattel
leases (id. § 9-105(l)(b)) are expressly mentioned as qualified "commercial financing
security," in H.R. REP'. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966). It must be contemplated
that "contract rights," at least, are "acquired" when the contract is entered into, since
when thereafter earned they would no longer be "contract rights" but "accounts." UNI-
FOM CoMrMRCIAL. CODE § 9-106. In a bankruptcy context, see 2 G. GILM MoRr, supra note
336, at § 45.5; Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942). Under the Federal Tax
Lien Act, see Young, supra note 335, at 743-48.
371. See PLUMB & WRIGHT 95-96. Such security (unlike rents from a chattel lease, note
370 supra, apparently falls outside the scope of the commercial financing exception. H.R,
Rn. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1966); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-1010).
372. See p. 661 supra.
373. Contra, Creedon, supra note 336, at 42-43. For a discussion under prior law, see
Havighurst, Relative Priority of Federal Tax Liens and Assignments of Rents in Lease
Financings, 19 Bus. LAw. 939, 953 (1964).
374. A provision added to the American Bar Association bill, H.R. 4952, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963), at, the instance of the American Bankers Association, provided broadly:
A security interest in contractual rights to future payments or performance, whether
such rights are fixed or conditional, shall not be deemed a security interest covering
after-acquired property.
Efforts to incorporate that provision in the bill which was finally enacted (H.R. 11256,
89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966)) were unsuccessful.
375. By forcing the creditor to foreclose on the property itself, the Treasury would
hope to put the rental income in the hands of one with taxpaying capadty.
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A variation of the "proceeds" problem arises when the property se-
curing an obligation is stolen or destroyed by fire. Although the insur-
ance proceeds have sometimes been held to stand in the place of the
security, subject to the same priorities,:'" one court has held under
prior law that the proceeds (despite a "loss payable" clause) constitute
after-acquired property of the debtor, to which an intervening federal
tax lien attaches in preference to the secured party3T While proper
drafting of the policy provision might avoid the problem,378 it would be
hard to justify the Government's taking the proceeds of the security
under any conditions, whether such proceeds result from a sale or
from loss or destruction.
Among the noteworthy omissions in the 1966 legislation is a specific
provision recognizing the superpriority of purchase money security
interests, which the American Bar Association had urged.3 Congress
chose instead to deal with the matter in the committee reports, which
state:
Although so-called purchase money mortgages are not specifically
referred to under present law, it has generally been held that these
interests are protected whenever they arise. This is based upon the
concept that the taxpayer has acquired property or a right to prop-
erty only to the extent that the value of the whole property or
right exceeds the amount of the purchase money mortgage. This
concept is not affected by the bill.380
At least under state law, that "concept" is not dependent upon reten-
tion of title in the vendor, or upon the application of the title theory of
mortgages.381 A mortgage (to the vendor or to a financing party) which
is deemed a lien,382 or a "purchase money security interest" under the
Commercial Code,383 is equally effective for the purpose, at least if it
376. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank v. Federal Ins. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 487, 260 N.Y.S.2d
814, 815 (1965); Lumbermen's Undenvriting Alliance v. Fall Creek Box & Mfg. Co., 62-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9795 (D. Ore. 1962).377. Home Ins. Co. v. B. B. Rider Corp., 212 F. Supp. 457, 461-63 (D.N.J. 1963). The
case is weakened as authority since the terms of the loss payable clause were not placed
in evidence.
378. See Sullivan, The Impact of the Federal Tax Lien upon the Massachusetts Mort-
gage Lender, 44 B.U.L. Rhv. 156, 165-66, 174 (1964).
379. 84 A.B.A. REP. 691-92, 719 (1959).
380. H.R. RE. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966); S. REP,. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1966). Young, supra note 335, at 748-52, argues for a narrow construction of
that language, confining the protection to sellers and leaving lenders to protect themselves
under the general rules for security interests.
381. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106E (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
382. United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870).383. See Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968 INr. Rv. BuLL. No. 6, 24, 68-7 CCH STANo. FEn. T&"X
REP. 1 6524. The Commercial Code has obliterated the distinctions based upon retention
of title and, in effect, treats either a conditional vendor or a third party financier as
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attaches simultaneously with the purchase so that only an encumbered
title is acquired. That much of the concept, at least, is incorporated in
federal law.3 4 So far, however, as state law may give "purchase money"
priority to a security interest which is not taken simultaneously but is
viewed as a part of the same transaction,83  it may possibly go beyond
the concept stated in the committee report and may be vulnerable to
the argument that, once the taxpayer has acquired a property right, the
question of priority of liens thereon is to be determined solely by fed-
eral law.386 One might wish that Congress had stated its own definition
of a purchase money mortgage, or had adopted state definitions, rather
than referring vaguely to a concept that may or may not set the limits
under state law.387
A further consequence of the failure of the statute to deal expressly
with purchase money security interests is that the status of those which
are unperfected under state law is left in doubt.388 Most of the decisions
under prior law held perfection unnecessary as against the federal tax
lien, whether the vendor's interest was a retained title389 or a conimer-
cial security interest,390 and whether the federal lien arose before or
after the transaction.3 9' The courts generally adopted the view that,
holding a security interest. UNront COrMmCIAL CODE §§ 9-107, 9-202, 9-.312(3) and (4),
and the Comments to those sections and to Section 9-507; In re Yale Express Sys., Inc.
370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
384. See PLUAM & WIuGr 71-72. For a unique, and perhaps unreliable, application
of the purchase money concept to protect a Commercial Code loan to finance the manu-
facture of goods, made after the filing of a tax lien, see In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407, 410
(3d Cir. 1960).
385. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106E, at 223 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); Perry,
supra note 357, at 337. Regarding purchase money security under the Uniform Cotnner-
cial Code, see 2 G. GiMoRE, supra note 336, § 29.2, at 782.
386. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-14 (1960). Rev. Rul, 68.57, 1908
INT. REv. BULL. No. 6, 24, 68-7 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6524, states that "a purchase
money security interest or mortgage valid under local law is protected even though It may
arise after a notice of federal tax lien has been filed." If "valid" is intended to mean
"enjoying the priority status of purchase money security," local law in this regard may
control.
387. The American Bar proposal, note 374 supra, included a definition substantially
in the language of the Commercial Code (but embracing purchase money security in real
as well as personal property, and extending also to an equitable or statutory vendor's
lien), and then, as against the tax lien, accorded the interest so defined the priority which
it would enjoy over the pre-existing liens under state law.
388. PLUMB & WRIGHT 98.
389. Gauvey v. United States, 291 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1961); General Motors Accep.
tance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433 (W.D.N.C. 1965), United States v. Anders Contr.
Co., 111 F. Supp. 700, 704 (W.D.S.C. 1953); Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. South
Carolina Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 32, 138 S.E.2d 812 (1964).
390. United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills, 241 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D.N.H, 1964),
Contra: Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115, 118 (10th Cir. 1961) (pre.
U.C.C.).
391. There were tax liens arising both before and after the unrecorded conditional
sales in the Anders, G.M.A.C. and Planters Bank cases, but no distinction was drawn. The
tax lien arose subsequent to the conditional sale in Gauvey and Lebanon Mills. In DIN-
mond T the tax lien arose first but was filed after.
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since tax liability is not a matter of voluntary contract, the federal tax
collector is not the kind of reliance creditor the recording acts were
designed to protect.392 As a general proposition, however, Congress re-
jected that viewpoint in the 1966 Act, apparently on the ground that,
while the Government does not voluntarily extend credit, it may rely
upon the record in deciding what collection action to take. Ac-
cordingly, a requirement of perfection against subsequent judgment
liens was incorporated in the federal statutory definition of a "security
interest."393
It seems safe to say that a commercial purchase money security in-
terest which is perfected by filing any time within the ten days of grace
allowed by Section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code will be
protected from either antecedent or intervening federal tax liens, since
there is never a time when the security interest, although yet unfiled, is
not "protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien."
But it is possible to go further and argue for the protection of a com-
mercial or other purchase money security interest that is never filed or
recorded at all, on the theory that the general federal definition of "se-
curity interest," including its express requirement of perfection, has no
relevance to the priority of such interests. Since Congress elected to
view purchase money interests, not as "security interests" enjoying
superpriority by federal law, but as encumbrances limiting the prop-
erty right which the taxpayer acquires and to which the federal tax lien
may attach, there may still be vitality in the earlier decisions holding
that a purchase money security interest which is good against the tax-
payer purchaser himself is good against the federal tax lien, whether the
latter attaches before or after the purchase.0 4 If, as a matter of policy,
392. United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills, 241 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.N.H. 1964). See
note 328 supra.
393. Irr. RE,. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(l)(A).
394. As against antecedent liens, a purchase money security interest is gencrally valid
without need for perfection. United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362.
365 (1870); Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., go Fed. 322, 328-29 (6th Cir. 1898). The
requirement of IN-r. Rnv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(h)(1)(A), that a security interest be pro-
tected against judgment liens, would in any event not be relevant where the filing of
the federal tax lien antedates the security interest, since Section 6323 does not provide
protection in such a case. Rather, protection must come from Section 6321, limiting the
tax lien to property "belonging to" the taxpayer, which (under the committee reports
and the earlier cases) is the net equity he acquires. Section 6323(h)(1) has no application
to Section 6321. The same theory, that the purchase money security interest limits the
taxpayer's property right to which the federal tax lien can attach, could be applied
against after-arising federal tax liens, thereby making protection under Section 62 ,(h)(l)
irrelevant in such cases. United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills, 2.11 F. Supp. 393, 395
(D.N.H. 1964); cf. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Toys
of the World Club Inc., 288 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1961). Some decisions, however, have
made perfection of the purchase money interest an element in the "choateness" required
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Congress believes the federal tax collector should always be treated as a
reliance creditor, then this gap in the statute should be closed by re-
quiring that purchase money security interests be perfected within the
period prescribed by state law, in order to prevail over either an ante-
cedent or an intervening federal tax lien.395
One provision which was sought by the Bar, in order to remove a
gross judicial inequity, would have protected the security for disburse-
ments which one is required to make, after federal tax lien has been
filed, by reason of a binding obligation undertaken in good faith before
the lien was filed.390 Congress was willing, however, to go only part way,
by protecting the security taken, before tax lien filing, to indemnify
sureties, endorsers, issuers of letters of credit and others who are bound
to make later disbursements "by reason of the intervention of the rights
of a person other than the taxpayer. 39T The protection of a lender who
is committed only to the borrower is subjected to the same conditions
as the maker of optional advances (although he may perhaps have less
trouble meeting the requirement of perfection against judgment
lienors).398 Such a lender, unless he can qualify for the special protec-
to limit the taxpayer's property right. Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115
(10th Cir. 1961); United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1957) (equitable vendor's
lien).
395. If the tax collector is a reliance creditor at all, he is such whether the tax lien
arose before or after the purchase money security interest, since collection efforts with
respect to antecedent tax liabilities may be influenced by the taxpayer's later apparent
ownership of property.
396. 84 A.B.A. REP. 684 (1959). Although the Internal Revenue Service at one time
indicated a liberal view with respect to obligatory advances under a construction loan
(unpublished ruling A-619373, August 24, 1956, addressed to the United States Say. and
Loan League, reproduced in Prather, Federal Liens as They Affect Mortgage Lending,
13 Bus. LAw. 118, 122 (1957)), at least two courts declared the security for obligatory dis-
bursements not to be "choate" as against intervening federal tax liens. American Stir.
Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 337, 368 P.2d 99 (1961), cert. denied, 868 U.S. 989 (1962);
United States v. Ringler, 166 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1958). The security (other than the
proceeds of the bonded contract itself) held by a surety to indemnify himself against loss
on a bond written before tax lien filing was similarly treated in United States v. R. F.
Ball Const. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (as that cryptic per curiam was explained in United
States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963)). The decisions are well analyzed In
Sullivan, supra note 378, at 162-65 (1964).
397. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(4) (emphasis added). Although the issuer of an
irrevocable letter of credit is cited (H.R. Rr_. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966)) as
an example of one who could avail of the provision, he may frequently enjoy a higher
priority, even against tax liens filed before the letter was issued, under the purchase
money security principle, note 380 supra. But see Young, supra note 985, at 756.E7. Sttnl-
larly, sureties may, by subrogation, enjoy a higher priority so far as their security consists
of proceeds of the bonded contract itself. Central Sur. & Ins. Co. v. Martin Infante Co.,
272 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1959); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority,
241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
398. Note 339 supra. Section 6323(c)(4) would apparently protect the security of one
who makes a commitment for the permanent financing of a building (even though lie
does not qualify as a construction lender), if that take-out commitment is relied upon
not only by the owner but by the maker of the short-term construction loan.
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tion accorded real property construction and improvement loans or
crop and livestock loans, must search for intervening federal tax liens
at 45-day intervals and provide appropriate escape clauses in his loan
commitments.399
Furthermore, even as applied to those who become bound to third
parties, Congress attached a condition, making the protection available
only if the "obligatory disbursement agreement" was entered into in
the course of the trade or business of the person who is bound. That, in
my opinion, is one of the most indefensible terms in the entire Act.
One who endorses a note or signs a bail bond for a friend, and takes a
security interest in property of the friend before there is any federal tax
lien on file, is surely as much entitled to protection against subsequent
federal tax liens as the business endorser or the surety company. 00
Moreover, the restriction is not merely inequitable but is irrational as
well, because it gives undue weight to the formal manner in which the
security is held. For if the security is held by the obligee on the note or
bond, the accommodation party will always get the benefit of it, either
by being relieved pro tanto if the security is enforced by the obligee,
399. See Young, supra note 335, at 739. INr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(l) provides
as a general rule that a security interest, properly perfected, "exists" when the collateral
is "in existence," but only "to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted vvith
money or money's worth." That seems to be a carefully constructed scheme to exclude
both after-acquired collateral and future advances, except to the extent provided in
Section 6323(c), which protects certain security interests which "came into existence"
after the federal tax lien was filed. Regretfully, I must disagree with Peter Coogan, supra
note 326, who argues that the security for loans made after tax lien filing, pursuant to
a pre-filing commitment made only to the borrower, is protected by Section 6323(h) with-
out need to refer to Section 6323(c). He contends that the lender in making the commit-
ment has not merely given "value" (UNIFOR.I COMNIERCL.L CODE § 1-202(44)(a)) but has
met the more stringent federal test of having "parted. with money or money's worth"
even before the loans are made. In the tax laws, h owever, the phrase "money or mones
worth" means something "reducible to a money value," and is narrower than the common
law or statutory concept of contractual consideration. Commissioner v. Wemass, 324 US.
303, 305 (1945); Treas. Reg. § 301.6323-1(b)(1). Congress underscored its restrictive inten-
tion in this instance by adding the words "to the extent that" and "parted with." (Con-
trast the language of Section 6323(h)(6), relating to purchasers, which was construed in
H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966), to embrace an unpaid obligation.)
When the lender has "parted with" only his commitment, it cannot be said that the
commitment itself is reducible to a money value equal to the amount to be loaned.
2 G. Gm. Eia, supra note 336, at § 35.4. Under Coogan's view, Section 6323(c)(4) would
add nothing to the protection already more freely available under Section 6323(h)(1).
except in the very limited circumstances in which the security is to embrace certain
after-acquired property (principally that which is "directly traceable" to the loans). It is
more reasonable to suppose that Congress was unwilling (except in the meritorious cases
covered by Section 6323(c)) to permit a taxpayer to tie up his property indefinitely as
security for advances that he might draw upon at will, than that Congress was concerned
merely with precluding one category of committed lenders from enjoying priority in after-
acquired property "directly traceable" to their loans.
400. The discrimination was no mere oversight. When attention was called to it, Con-
gress made doubly sure by spelling out the exclusion of accommodation endorsers in the
committee reports. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sen. 9, 44 (196G); S. REP. No.
1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
671
The Yale Law Journal
or by subrogation if it is not.401 Ordinarily, only those unsophisticated
in the strange ways of the tax law will be trapped.402
An important reform accomplished by the 1966 Act was the protec-
tion of an otherwise prior mortgagee with respect to his outlays for
such items as real property taxes and insurance premiums.40 3 But that
protection was extended only to his lien on the mortgaged property
itself. Left in uncertainty was the status of cash deposits which the mort-
gagor may be required to make in escrow, in anticipation of property
taxes and insurance premiums that are not yet due. The federal tax
collector asserts the right to levy upon such escrows as property of the
taxpayer, thereby diverting them from their intended purpose. The
mortgagee's interest in the deposit, even if it is denominated a "trust,"
is probably no more than a security interest to indemnify the mortgagee
against loss, and none of the special rules protecting the security for
future disbursements appear to protect it against intervening federal tax
liens.40 4 That matter should be expressly dealt with.405
4. Purchasers
Secret, unfiled federal tax liens have, since 1918, been subordinated
to purchasers of property from the taxpayer. But before the 1966
amendments that protection was held to be effective only if the pur-
chaser had obtained a deed.40 6 Therefore, families who had entered
into executory contracts for the purchase of homes and had taken
possession, but whose payments were insufficient to have entitled them
to deeds, were subordinated to liens for federal taxes subsequently as-
sessed against the seller; they not only lost their homes, but their equi-
table lien for recovery of their payments was held not to be "choate"
enough to prevail over the later federal liens.40 7 The purchaser of all
the assets of a business, who had received deeds which erroneously
omitted a portion of the real estate intended to be sold, was similarly
subordinated, provoking a dissenting judge to declare that
the morality of the Government's taking property which
was sold to, paid for by, and in equitable conscience and law be-
401. Subrogation rights are recognized in INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(i)(2).
402. In some circumstances, however, the obligee may be unwilling or not permitted
to hold the security, so that even the wise may be endangered.
403. INT. REV. CODe of 1954, § 6323(e), aided by Section 6323(b)(6).
404. See PLUMB & WRIGHT 106.
405. See proposal by the United States Savings and Loan League in Hearings on I1.R.
11256 and H.R. 11290 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
234 (1966).
406. See United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218, 221 (1955) (dictum).
407. Leipert v. R.C. Williams & Co., 161 F. Supp. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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longed to a stranger, is so disturbing to me that before the heavy
hand of the tax gatherer falls, it is for Congress to speak clearly to
declare that this is the conscience of the country.408
Congress spoke, in the 1966 Act. It declared that one who has entered
into a written executory contract or option to purchase property shall
have all the protection of a purchaser with title. But what Congress
gave with one hand, it took away with the other, for it prescribed that
even a purchaser with title should enjoy protection only if his interest
was "valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without
actual notice."' 09 Since sellers customarily will not permit contract pur-
chasers or optionees to record their interests because of the potential
cloud on tide if the deal should fall through and because of the pub-
licity which would be given to the contract price, their new "protec-
tion" is probably illusory-although the home buyer in possession
presumably meets the condition.410
Normally, at least where real estate is involved, an intervening fed-
eral tax lien would be discovered when the title is searched at the time
of closing. The perfection requirement at least serves the salutary pur-
pose of inducing the parties to invite the tax collector to the settlement
table (for which there would be no incentive if the buyer were pro-
tected unconditionally from the date of the contract or option), thereby
enabling the seller's tax liability to be collected from ie proceeds. But
it goes too far in bringing the tax collector to the table in the unde-
served role of a hypothetical subsequent bona fide purchaser, having no
obligation to give the contract purchaser or optionee the benefit of his
bargain (which can be particularly important in long-term lease options,
or in cases where large sums have been expended in assembling land or
preparing for construction), or even to recognize a lien for the recovery
of payments already made by the purchaser or optionee.411 In good
408. United States v. Creamer Indus. Inc., 349 F.2d 625, 629-30 (5th Cir. 19t).
409. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(6). The Leipert case, 161 F. Stipp. at 358, had
at least gone so far as to protect those who had received deeds, even though unrecorded.
Cf. notes 389-90 supra.
410. 4 A.--ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.12 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 H. TiFA.Ny, LAw
or REAL PROPERTy § 1287 (3d ed. 1939). Nevertheless, in the view of the Government.
the home buyer in possession under an unrecorded purchase contract remains as vul-
nerable as ever to later federal tax liens against the seller. Happily one court, relying on
the legislative history and on the rule of New York law that the possession of the contract
vendee put subsequent purchasers on notice, decided for the home buyer. Engel v. Tinker
Natl Bank, 269 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
411. Although many state recording acts deny "purchaser" status to those who have
not taken title (45 Am. JuR., Records and Recording Laws § 147 (1943)), the effect is
mitigated by giving a lien for payments made under the contract. 3 ArmcCAN LAw oF
PROPERTY § 11.78, 4 Id. § 17.10 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). That Hen, at least in some states,
prevails over subsequent judgment liens although not over bona fide purchasers. See
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conscience, those rights should be recognized, at least unless some ac-
tion or inaction of the tax collector has demonstrably-not merely
hypothetically-been based upon his reliance on the apparent title of
the seller.
It may be responded that the holder of an unrecorded contract or
option takes a calculated risk that the rights of others will intervene,
and that to accord him a greater equity against the federal tax lien than
state law would give him against private third parties would result in
circular priority, which-while not insoluble-would divert the benefit
of the Government's self-abnegation to the holders of otherwise junior
liens.412 A solution which would be fair in all circumstances is elusive.
But we would be much closer to such a solution if the contract pur-
chaser or optionee-as well as the purchaser with an unrecorded deed--
were given at least such rights as state law would give him if the Govern-
ment were (as it is in fact) an intervening lien creditor, not a bona fide
purchaser.
The law has long protected purchasers of stocks, bonds and negoti.
able instruments against duly filed but unknown federal tax liens
thereon, in recognition of the practical impossibility of searching for
such liens, or even of tracing the chain of ownership, when such prop-
erties are purchased.413 Similar practical problems exist with respect to
negotiable warehouse receipts and bills of lading, to which the Amer-
ican Bar Association vainly recommended that the protection be
extended.41 4
Since 1964 purchasers of motor vehicles have also been protected
against unknown federal tax liens.415 The provision, while it inciden-
tally protected retail purchaser of vehicles, was primarily intended for
Notes, 37 Micu. L. REv. 163 (1938); 33 Co aNEL L.Q. 301, 305 (1947). The vendee's lien
in Leipert, 161 F. Supp. at 358, was good against judgment creditors but lost out to the
federal lien.
412. If the federal tax lien were subordinated to a vendee's lien, which was not cffcctive
against certain third parties under state law, the circular priority principle (See1 Virst
Installment 231-32 n.31), would award the Government the amount left after the vendee's
equitable share, but would give the vendee's share to the third party. The Special Comn-
mittee struggled with a proposed preventive, but found it too complicated for adoption,
See 83 A.B.A. REP. 519-21 (1958); 84 A.B.A. REP. 710-13 (1959).
413. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(1). The provision also protects security interests
in such properties.
414. 84 A.BA. REP. 693, 719 (1959). The proposal was not clear concerning whether a
federal tax lien already attached to the goods beore they were delivered to the carrier
or warehouseman would continue valid against a purchaser of (or lender on) the nego-
tiable document, as would a previously perfected security interest in the goods. See UNI.
Foasr COMMRCIclAL CODE § 7-503, and Comment. Commercial convenience would scem to
call for a liberal position. The question may be academic if the proposal next discussed
is adopted.
415. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(2). This provision does not apply to security
interests.
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the convenience of the "automobile or truck dealer buying hundreds
of used cars or trucks each year [who] finds it difficult to follow the
normal procedures" of searching for federal tax liens.4 16 The American
Bar Association, believing that the practical problem was not confined
to any one product, had recommended that a purchaser of any tangible
personal property in the ordinary course of business of the seller should
not be required to search for, or be subject to, federal tax liens on file
against the seller.417 Congress in 1966 accepted the proposal, but inex-
plicably confined the relief to the retail level.4 8 Therefore, a wholesale
purchaser (of property other than motor vehicles) may find himself
subordinated to federal tax liens on file against the distributor, the
manufacturer, or even the producer of the raw materials that went into
the product, and a purchaser on a commodities market remains subject
to the risk of liens against the unknown producer of the goods410
A further 1966 amendment makes a search of the files unnecessary
in the case of one who without actual notice or knowledge of a lien
buys, in a "casual sale" for less than $250, household or personal effects
or "other tangible personal property described in § 6334(a)"-i.e.,
property exempt from levy. c The exception is supposed to cover pur-
chases from neighbors or through the classified columns. But the pur-
chaser at a household auction, or the purchaser of one or more of sev-
eral items offered in the same classified advertisement, still buys at his
peril, because the protection is expressly denied to one who knows that
the sale is "one of a series of sales"-the stated premise of the limitation
being that "the series of sales itself may be an indication that the seller
is having credit problems" and thus may be subject to tax liens.42 1 A
more reasonable inference may be that someone has died, retired from
416. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 155-56 (1964).
417. 84 A.B.A. REP. 690, 718 (1959); Cf. UNxIos.r CO NIMERCIAL CODE § 9-307.
418. INT. RE V. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(3). In order that one who had read of a store's
tax difficulties need not cease dealing with it, both the Bar proposal and the law as
enacted made the buyer's actual knowledge of the Hen immaterial, unless he participated
in a scheme to hinder or defeat collection of the tax.
419. See Schmitz v. Stocknam, 151 Kan. 891, 896-97, 101 P.2d 952, 965 (1910), in which
wheat was pursued into the hands of a purchaser from a purchaser from a farmer-taxpayer.
420. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b)(4). Regarding exemptions from lcvy, see Part
IV.A.1 supra. The technique of cross-reference to a provision passed for another purpoie
is unfortunate, as it is unclear how many of the qualifications of § 6334(a) are incorporated
by the words "described in." For example, to be exempt from levy, livestock and poultry
must belong to a taxpayer who is a head of a family; must the casual purchaser of a
horse inquire into the owner's family status? Tools and books (unless they are -choolbooks
or qualify as household or personal effects) are exempt from levy only if they are "neces-
sary for the trade, business or profession of the taxpayer"; must the purchaser a-certain
at his peril whether they were "necessary'? And what of sales by a widow (herself subject
to tax liens) who never used the items in any trade, business or profession of her oun?
421. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
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his trade, been transferred overseas or remodeled his kitchen. But
caveat emptor applies nevertheless in such cases, with respect to federal
tax liens.
As a practical matter, because of the administrative burdens of pur-
suing the purchasers in most such cases, it will probably be a rare case
in which anyone suffers from the petty and irrational restrictions im-
posed on the relief for sales in the ordinary course of business and casual
sales. 421a But if that is the case, it underscores the unimportance of those
restrictions to the revenue. They should be removed.
5. Tracing the Proceeds of a Subordinated Loan or Purchase
From time to time, because of ignorance, neglect or the practical diffi-
culties of making a search in the circumstances, a purchaser or secured
lender may fail to discover a prior federal tax lien on the property in-
volved.422 The Government will be unjustly enriched if it is entitled to
take both the property and its proceeds to satisfy the tax debt in prefer-
ence to the purchaser or lender. Consideration might be given to al-
lowing such a person a prior right to recover the proceeds mistakenly
paid by him, if they can be traced.423
6. Mechanics' Liens
The statutes of every state recognize the justice of impressing a lien
on real property for the protection of those by whose services or ma-
terials the property is improved. A number of states go so far as to prefer
the lien, subject to various conditions, even over pre-existing encum-
brances on the property, on the theory (analogous to that underlying
the priority accorded purchase money mortgages) that the encum-
brancers should not enjoy a windfall from the enhancement of the
421a. "Your committee has been informed that, as a practical matter, the Internal
Revenue Service rarely proceeds against the purchaser unless the item involved has sub-
stantial value." H.R. REP,. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1966).
422. See, e.g., Pipola v. Chicco, 274 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1960) and United States v. Stuts.
man County Implement Co., 274 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1960), where little sympathy was
shown to the victims of the errors. Regarding the procedural rights of such persons, see
Part V.F, in the third installment of this article.
423. The Special Committee considered, but did not adopt, the following language:
A person who purchases property or acquires a security interest, without actual notice
or knowledge of a lien under section 6321 which has priority over his interest, shall
be entitled to enforce a constructive trust upon the consideration given by him, If
such consideration can be traced, whether or not such constructive trust would exist
under local law.
The American Bar Association did make a general recommendation for the protection of
constructive trusts, since they are equitable interests vulnerable to bona fide purchasers
and hence may not be "choate" by present judicial standards. 84 A.B.A. Rra. 664, 691
(1959). See section 11 of Part IV.B infra. Congress, however, ignored that recommendation,
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value of their security when that enhancement has not been paid for' 2 4
The majority, however, reject that approach, presumably concluding
that the prospective lienor is in a position to discover the encumbrance
from the records and, if he wishes, to negotiate with the encumbrancer
for a subordination agreement before conferring an unsought and
perhaps unwanted "benefit" upon him. The majority states differ
among themselves concerning the point at which the prospective lienor
may be expected to consult the records and beyond which he will be
protected against any later encumbrances, or against bona fide pur-
chasers of the property. Some look to the date when the particular
lienor began his services, but a larger number fix the priority of all liens
on the project at the time of visible commencement of work on the
entire improvement, while others look to the contract date. A few deny
protection against encumbrances or purchases intervening before actual
filing of notice of the mechanics' lien, but most view such filing only as
a condition subsequent, not affecting the priority of the lien. -5
Until the 1966 Act, however, a federal tax lien might deprive the
mechanics' lienor of the product of his work and materials, even if the
federal lien first arose after the project had been completed, the me-
chanic's lien had been filed and suit had been begun to enforce it.420
A major accomplishment of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 was the
elimination of that inequity. 27
The new law protects a mechanics' lienor2 against any federal tax
lien which is not duly filed by the date as of which the mechanics' lien
424. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106G (A. J. Casner ed. 1952).
425. Id. § 16.106F. The laws currently in force arc digested in the Mechanics' Lien
Laws chapter of the annual CREDrr MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWs, publisied by the Na.
tional Association of Credit Management.
426. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), rcu'g 22 F.2d 359
(7th Cir. 1955). See First Installment 230-31, n.24.
427. See PLUMB & "pRIGHT 127-33.
428. A "mechanic's Henor" is defined as one who has a lien for "services, labor or
materials." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6323(h)(2). Unless liberally interpreted, that language
may exclude the liens which some state laws extend to lessors of equipment and suppliers
of power, whose contribution to the liened structure the American Bar Association thought
equally worthy of protection. 84 A.B.A. REP. 692, 705 (1959). One who for any reason
does not have a mechanics' lien under state law, or who falls outside the federal deli-
nition, is powerless to obtain equivalent protection against federal tax liens by contracting
for a security interest, because of an inexplicable and unwarranted restriction of the
protection of construction financing (p. 661 supra) to those making cash disbursements.
INT. R V. CODE of 1954, § 6323(c)(3)(A). The protection of the new law is extended to liens
on contract proceeds as well as on the property improved; but claimants to contract
proceeds may frequently enjoy a higher priority (in fact a superpriorit)) over tax liens
against the general contractor, independently of that provision. See PLuNmI & Wrucirr
130-33. Since only liens on real property and contract proceeds are covered, a material-
man's statutory right to repossess materials not incorporated in the work is left unpro-
tected. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Foley, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9729 (W.D.N.Y. 1967) (under
N.Y. Lien Law § 39-c).
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"becomes valid under local law against subsequent purchasers without
actual notice." 420 But a restriction is imposed: The priority can be
fixed no earlier than the time when the particular lienor begins to fur-
nish services, labor or materials, even if state law sets an earlier date.410
Congress should consider whether that arbitrary restriction, apparently
imposed in the interest of uniformity, or in the belief that the facts
would be more readily susceptible of proof,431 serves a sufficient pur-
pose to warrant the trouble it may cause. It requires prospective me-
chanics' lienors to check for federal tax liens at a different point of time
than they may be accustomed, under local law and practice, to search
for other encumbrances. It may frequently result in circular priorities,
and inequities even to those who have made a search at the proper time,
in cases where 'some mechanics' lienors are superior to and others in-
ferior to the federal tax lien yet are equal among themselves under state
law,432 or where a mortgage intervenes between the state law priority
date and the date recognized by federal law.433 On the other hand, the
restriction apparently will be ineffective in any case where there is a
general contractor who is himself unpaid, since the others may claim
through him and with his priority.43 4
Congress did not, nor did the Bar recommend that it should,43 give
429. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(a) and (h)(2). That the tax collector would more
appropriately be equated to a lien creditor than to a bona fide purchaser, see Section 4
of Part IV.B supra.
480. On the other hand, if the state law sets a later date as of which the priority Is
fixed, that date controls for purposes of the federal law. Since mechanics' liens are crea.
tures of state policy, it was felt that they should enjoy no greater rights than they had
under local law, even though some lack of uniformity among the states results.
431. The view has been expressed, however, that the difficulties of determining the
commencement date are "considerably greater" under such statutes than under those that
look to commencement of the work as a whole. 4 Am.ueAN LAW or PRomrmr § 16.100F,
at 231 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). The American Bar proposal, which would have recognized
the priority date under state law (unless state law prescribed superpriority), placed the
burdens of proving such date on the mechanics' lienor. 84 A.B.A. Rr. 686, 05 (1959).
There is no comparable provision in the law as enacted.
432. Some of the states which, like the federal law, date the priority of a mechanics'
lienor against other encumbrances from the commencement of his own contribution also
provide, inconsistently it seems, for equality among the mechanics' lienors themselves.
Decisions in such states permit the intervening encumbrance to create two different classes
of mechanics' liens, thereby destroying their statutory equality. An alternative solution,
consistent with the federal circular priority rule (First Installment 231-32 n.31) would be to
set aside an amount equal to the mechanics' liens having priority over the federal lien,
plus whatever remains after satisfying the federal lien, and to divide that sum propor
tionately among all the mechanics' liens-thereby preserving their equality, but penallz.
ing the earlier lienors who could not have discovered the federal lien by searching when
they commenced their participation.
433. Although the mortgage may have been perfected before the federal lien, the
mortgagee, rather than the later mechanics' lienor, would be the one to suffer. See First
Installment 231-32 n.31, 233 n.39.
434. Subrogation rights are recognized against the federal tax lien. INT. REV. CoDE of
1954, § 6323(i)(2).
435. 84 A.BA. RPs,. 705 (1959).
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consideration to recognizing the superpriority over pre-existing encum-
brances and liens which some states grant to mechanics' lienors to the
extent that they add value to the liened property.43 0 The mechanics'
lienor can prevent unjust enrichment at his expense of the federal fisc
by searching for tax liens at the prescribed time and, if it is important
to him in the circumstances, by asking the tax collector to subordinate
any lien which may be on file437-thereby letting the tax collector
decide whether the proposed improvement would really be beneficial to
the lien. If there is real inequity, as distinguished from mere incon-
venience, in not recognizing such superpriority, it is the injustice suf-
fered by a mortgagee, antedating the federal tax lien, who is subordi-
nated to the later mechanics' lien while the federal lien absorbs the
value added to the property by the improvement 4as But there is a limit
to how far Congress can be asked to go in bowing to state rules of
superpriority in order to prevent injury to innocent parties in isolated
cases.439
Congress did, however, recognize a superpriority for mechanics'
lienors in a very limited class of cases-where the contract with the
property owner provides for a price for repairs and improvements of
not more than $1,000.440 Although the committee reports justify the
superpriority on the broad grounds that "it is unreasonable to expect
construction workers and contractors to search for filed tax liens prior
to undertaking small repair and improvement work," and that "the
work is likely to add to the value of the property and, therefore, in-
crease the Government's chances of collection," 441 the law proceeds to
add some of the kind of petty and irrational restrictions that we have
noted in other connections. The property must be a personal residence,
occupied by the owner and containing not more than four dwelling
units. The "construction workers and contractors" must make their
search, however small the job, if the resident owner holds the title
through a corporation, or if the owner lives off the premises, or if the
436. Note 424 supra.
437. A subordination agreement may be entered by the federal tax collector ivherc he
finds that the chance of ultimate collection of the tax will be enhanced thereby-as
where the work arrests deterioration of the property or puts it in condition for a more
favorable sale. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6325(d)(2). The procedure is described in Tempo-
rary Treas. Reg. § 400.2-I(c) and Rev. Proc. 68-8, 1968-8 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 8,
438. First Installment 232 n.31, 233 n.39.
439. Congress removed the most frequent source of circular priority inequities by
bowing to state rules of superpriority for real property taxes. Ir. REv. CODE Of 1954,
§ 6323(b)(6).
440. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(7).
441. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966); S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1966).
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property is a larger rooming house or apartment house, and, of course,
if it is a nonresidential property. Furthermore, the worker or material-
man whose part in the job is $1,000 or less is unprotected if the total
price under the general contract exceeds 1,000. And, while the rule,
when applicable, eliminates the circular priority problem in those states
which give mechanics' lienors a superpriority, it can give rise to new
circular priority situations in those which do not.442
7. Landlords' Security Interests and Liens
A landlord who takes security for rent is particularly vulnerable to
application of the "choateness" doctrine,443 since the debt secured is
constantly changing and the collateral may also be subject to change.',1 "
The best any landlord could do under prior law, in competition with
federal tax liens, was to sustain his priority to the extent of rent accrued
before the federal tax lien was filed.445 But, like a commercial lender, 40
a landlord is in effect extending credit on a day-to-day basis, and cannot
feasibly keep searching for federal tax liens against his tenants in order
to protect his rent as it accrues.
The American Bar Association recommended, therefore, that land-
lords' security interests be protected with respect to rent accruing be-
fore or within three months after the filing of a federal tax lien, thereby
making it unnecessary for a landlord to search the records unless he let
the rent go delinquent for a longer period. 447 In the case of farm tenan-
cies, where it may be reasonable or necessary to let the rent go until a
crop is harvested, the recommended limit was one year's rent. There
442. Suppose a $1,000 federal tax lien is ahead of a $10,000 mortgage, which state law
prefers over a later $900 mechanics' lien, which federal law prefers over the federal tax
lien. A federally oriented solution to the dilemma might place the mechanics' lie ahead
of both the federal tax lien and the mortgage, in effect causing the mechanics' lien tobe satisfied at the expense of the mortgagee. Cf. In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d
155 (3d Cir. 1956). However, since the circuity results from a subordination provided byfederal law, the equitable solution would be to take the mechanics' share out of tihe
amount otherwise payable on the federal lien, leaving the mortgagee with the proceeds
in excess of the prior federal tax. Jordan v. Hamlett, 312 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1963).
443. See Part I in First Installment.
444.- In cases involving the insolvency priority under REv. STAT. § 3466 (Part ILA in
First Installment), the landlord's contractual security was held "inchoate' in United
States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Tex. 1963); Terry v. Title
& Trust Co., 207 Ore. 356, 295 P.2d 161 (1956). The Government argued that such securit
was also not "choate" as against a federal tax lien, in Hare v. United States, 204 XV.2y823 (9th Cir. 1961), but prevailed in that view only as to post-filing rents. Cf. Evans v.
Stewart, 245 Iowa 1268, 66 N5V.2d 442 (1954), which antedated the full flowering of the
"choateness" doctrine.
445. Hoare v. United States, 294 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1961).
446. See Section 3 of Part IV.B supra.
447. 84 A.B.A. REP. 686, 706 (1959).
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would have been no time limit in the case of deposits or other security
in the actual possession of the landlord.48
Congress declined, in the 1966 Act, to deal directly with landlords'
security interests. Arguably, however, they now enjoy limited priority
under the general catch-all provision whicl protects the security for
"disbursements made" within 45 days after a tax lien is filed and
without notice thereof." 9 The word "disbursements," being used in
contradistinction to "cash disbursements" in a related provision, 4ro
dearly embraces disbursements in kind, and it may not place too great
strain on the language to extend it to the furnishing of value in the
form of the right to occupy the premises&a Nevertheless, it would be
better to remove the doubt, and to tailor the time limits on the protec-
tion to the practicalities of the landlord's situation.45 2
If the landlord elects to rely on a statutory landlords' lien rather than
taking a formal security interest, it is clear that he will be subordinated
to federal tax liens arising either before or after the accrual of the rent
obligation.4 53 While state laws vary greatly in the terms of the protec-
tion accorded landlords' liens, even the strongest of them can be struck
down under the "choateness" doctrine.454 Whenever state law provides
a landlords' lien of sufficient dignity to serve the practical function of a
protection against third parties,4" 5 that lien should be recognized by
448. When a deposit is made to cover the rent for the final period of a lease, the
Government asserts the right to levy on it as property of the tenant. In Mar)land Natl
Bank v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 504 (D. Md. 1964), that contention failed only be-
cause the amount was found to be a payment of advance rent, rather than security
therefor.
449. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(d). The security interest would be protected there-
under only in property owned by the tenant and covered by the security interest on the
date of tax lien filing, and only if the interest is perfected against judgment creditors
as of that date. Failure to record a lease containing a chattel mortgage clause would be
as fatal as under prior law. Mason City & Clear Lake R.R. v. Imperial Seed Co., 152
F. Supp. 145, 156 (N.). Iowa 1957). See PLUmB & WRicirr 142-44.
450. INr. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(c)(3).
451. Hoare v. United States, 294 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1961) ("As each month under
the lease went by, the lessees' use of the premises represented in effect the acceptance and
use of value advanced by the lessors.')
452. See pp. 68-81 supra. After 45 days, rent would normally be only 15 days delin-quent, if at all, and the landlord could not reasonably be expected to begin searching
for liens.
453. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Leventhal, 316 F-d
341 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Weissman, 135 So. 2d 235 (Fla. App. 1961); United
States v. Lawler, 201 Va. 686, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960). INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(d), relied
on in note 449 supra, is confined to "security interests," which must be contractual, not
statutory. Id. § 6323(h)(1).
454. See PLI M & WVRIGIT 141-42. The landlords' lien held not to be "choate" in United
States v. Leventhal, 316 F.2d 341 (D.C. Cir. 1963), was valid against chattel mortgages
given after the property was placed on the premises, although not against purdasers of
goods in the ordinary course of business. See dissent in United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d
503, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
455. A "bona fide purchaser" test of perfection would be too stringent, for the same
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federal law as on a parity with a landlord's security interest, enjoying
protection with respect to rent accrued before or within a limited period
after the filing of a federal tax lien.450
8. Liens on Causes of Action
In many states an attorney has a top-priority "charging" lien by
common law or by statute against any fund his efforts create, by suit or
settlement, for the benefit of his client. In some circumstances, also, an
attorney may protect himself by taking an assignment of a portion of
the claim, or otherwise contracting for a lien on the recovery. Until the
1966 amendments, however, the attorney in either case risked having
the product of his efforts taken to satisfy his client's federal taxes,
whether the lien arose before or after the suit, because his lien was con-
sidered not to be "choate" until the suit was finally disposed of and the
lien was confirmed by court order.45 At best, and then only if his right
was in the nature of a contractual security interest, the attorney might
be preferred to the extent of the value of his services performed before
the federal tax lien arose. 45
The new law, however, subordinates even a pre-existing federal tax
lien to the right of an attorney to share in the fund he created, if it is "a
judgment or other amount in settlement of a claim or of a cause of
action," whether his lien is founded on local law or on "a contract en-
forceable against such judgment or amount."40 9 The law embraces liens
on administrative claims, such as workmen's compensation or fire insur-
ance as well as on claims pursued in court.40 But if an insurance ad-
juster, accountant, or other non-lawyer prosecutes such a claim, in reli-
reason that it could not be adopted in the case of commercial financing: business ncccs-
sity compels that the lien yield to certain purchasers. Notes 331 & 454 supra. A require.
ment of perfection against security interests might be appropriate. P. 660 supra.
456. The American Bar Association so recommended. 84 A.B.A. Rrx. 686, 706 (1959).
457. United States v. Pay-O-Matic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), alJ'd Per
curiam sub nom. United States v. Goldstein, 256 F.2d 581 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
830 (1958); First State Bank v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 204, 210-12 (D. Minn. 1958).
Contra, Nelson Trans. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 64-1 U.S. Tax, Cas. 9488 (D. Neb.
1964); Filipowicz v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 619, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
458. In re City of New York, 11 App. Div.,2d 240, 205 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1960), alJ'd on
other grounds, 12 NrY.2d 1051, 190 N.E.2d 240 (1963); cf. United States v. Ringler, 166
F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1958) (mortgage on client's property). See also Hoare v. United
States, 294 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1961).
459. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b)(8). Query, whether payment in full, obtained
by the attorney without going to judgment, would qualify as a "settlement" to which
the priority would apply. The language proposed by the American Bar Association
("cause of action or the proceeds thereof') might have been clearer. 84 A.B.A. RKs'. 691
(1959).
460. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1966).
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ance on a contractual interest therein, he remains subject to the full
rigors of the "choateness" doctrine. 40'
The defense lawyer who protects the taxpayer's right to a fund
already in his hands,4 62 or the lawyer who assists in the sale of prop-
erty,463 in reliance upon a contractual right to a share of the funds in-
volved, may be defeated by intervening federal tax liens under the
"choateness" rule. While a superpriority relieving the lawyer of tie
necessity to search for tax liens at the inception of his services might be
inappropriate in such cases,464 some protection against tax liens filed
after that time should be provided. 05
There is one limitation on the relief granted by the new Act which,
while it may sometimes operate unfairly, is unlikely ever to be undone.
When the Government itself is sued, it may (with a limited exception)
offset any tax or other claim it may have against the plaintiff,4 0 and
that right of offset is not subordinated to the attorney's lien.07 The
winning counsel may thus find himself with no fund from which to
satisfy his claim for compensation because of some entirely unrelated
matter arising during the litigation.408
Numerous states give hospitals, and some give doctors, dentists and
nurses, a lien on a cause of action for personal injury. It makes sense
that the part of the recovery that reflects hospital and medical bills of
the injured person should go to pay those bills. Yet if he happens to owe
federal taxes, the recovery will be applied thereto in preference to the
461. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 226 F. Supp. 512 (NJ). Ill.
1963); Home Ins. Co. v. B. B. Rider Corp., 212 F. Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1963); United States
v. Oakland Truck Sales, 207 F. Supp. 175 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
462. United States v. Beaver, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9281 (W.D. Pa. 1956). aff'd, 252
F.2d 486 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Grubert, 191 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
463. United States v. Shearer, 248 F. Supp. 433 (D. Mass. 1965).
464. In those instances where loss of the case would deplete the funds otherwise subject
to the tax lien, or where the sale is more advantageous than any the tax collector could
arrange, the attorney, having discovered the tax lien by checking the files at the inception
of his services, can protect himself by obtaining a subordination agreement under I,'r.
REv. CODE of 1954, § 6325(d). See also Freitag v. The Strand of Atlantic City, Inc., £05
F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1953).
465. A provision requiring periodic searches for liens (as provided in Section 6323()(2)
for commercial finance, and as above proposed for landlords) would not be appropriate.
Once the attorney has invested substantial time in the case, he cannot make himself whole
by withdrawing from the case, if the tax collector should decline to agree to subordination.
466. United States v. munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
467. INT. RE.v. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b)(8); H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1966).
468. Madden v. United States, 371 F.2d 469 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Brooks v. United States, 271
F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Ky. 1967); Brozan v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
The provision for judicial award of attorneys' fees in cases under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (28 U.S.C. § 2678) does not override the Government's superior right of setoff. United
States v. Cohen, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9138 (5th Cir. 1967).
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hospital and other claims.46 9 Congress in 1966 failed to adopt a Bar
recommendation for protection of those liens, 470 but the matter merits
further consideration.
9. Attachment and Garnishment
Under state law an attachment or garnishment before judgment gives
the plaintiff rights in specific property to the exclusion of subsequent
lien creditors, encumbrancers and even purchasers.4 71 In some states the
attachment or garnishment prevails even over pre-existing interests
which are not duly recorded.4 2 The Supreme Court has held, neverthe-
less, that an attachment or garnishment lien is not "choate," as a matter
of federal law, until the amount recoverable is finally fixed by judg-
ment, and hence that a federal tax lien arising after the attachment or
garnishment and filed at any time before judgment will prevail.473
Since attaching creditors474 were initially unsecured, their position
does not have the same equitable appeal as that of the purchasers, se-
cured lenders and mechanics' lienors who act in reliance on the seller's
or debtor's apparently clear title to his property. Therefore, the Bar
made no recommendation for their relief.47 Yet it seems a persuasive
case could be made therefor. Their equitable position is at least as
strong as that o the creditor who persuades his debtor voluntarily to
give security for an antecedent unsecured debt-a creditor for whom
the Bar urged 476 and Congress apparently granted 47z relief.
Furthermore, attaching creditors are "reliance" creditors at least in
the sense that they may incur considerable expense in obtaining and
maintaining the attachment, and the further expenses of suit, in the
belief that their "execution in advance" (as an attachment has been
called)478 will assure collection of the ultimate judgment. If the court
469. In re Walton's Estate, 20 App. Div. 2d 386, 247 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1964).
470. 84 A.B.A. RiaP. 691, 720 (1959).
471. 7 C.J.S., Attachments §§ 272-73 (1937).
472. Id. § 276.
473. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. Liverpool & London
& Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955); United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 3,10
U.S. 47 (1950).
474. For convenience, this term will be used to include also those who obtain garnish.
ments before judgment.
475. 84 A.B.A. REP. 659-60 (1959).
476. 84 A.B.A. Rt'. 692, 701 (1959).
477. Although the 1966 Act was silent on the subject, the committee reports state that
the term "money or money's worth" (the parting with which is a prerequisite to protec.
tionr of a security interest) "is intended to include money previously parted with if, under
local law, past consideration is sufficient to support an agreement giving rise to a security
interest." H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 n.3 (1966); S. REP. No. 1708, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 n.4 (1966).
478. See United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955).
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has only in rem jurisdiction, as is frequently the case where attachment
is obtained against a nonresident or absconding defendant, tie inter-
vention of a federal tax lien of sufficient magnitude may leave the plain-
tiff with nothing, not even an empty personal judgment, in return for
his expenditures.
Congress as long ago as 1913 determined to protect judgment lien
creditors, not merely against subsequently arising federal tax liens but
also against those already existing but unfiled.&4 0 Yet ordinary judgment
creditors cannot make as appealing a case of reliance on the debtor's
apparent title as those who commence their suit by attachment. Even
though the non-attaching plaintiff may have decided to incur the ex-
pense of suit on the strength of the debtor's apparent capacity to satisfy
a judgment when obtained,4 0 he consciously took the risk that the
property he relied upon might be encumbered or dissipated pending
the suit.481
Perhaps the most cogent argument against extending that protection
to attaching creditors is that the collection of taxes should not be de-
layed to await the outcome of private litigation. Yet the argument loses
force upon analysis. If Jones and Smith dispute the title to a piece of
property, the Government cannot seize it for Smith's taxes and cut off
Jones with the argument that tax collection carlnot be delayed while
the ownership is litigated. The situation is not markedly different where
a creditor acquires an interest in the debtor's property, by attachment,
which is fully perfected against other third parties, subject to litigation
over its amount. Furthermore, Congress was not deterred by any such
practical considerations from recognizing the equities of mechanics'
lienors and certain contingent security interests. 482 The real issue is
479. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016. Until the 1966 amendment, the
words used were "judgment creditor" rather than "judgment lien creditor," but the
courts interpolated the requirement that the judgment must have become a lien. Fore v.
United States, 339 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 912 (1965). It appears
that judgment liens remain subject to the full rigors of the "choateness" test (United
States v. Cohen, 271 F. Supp. 709 (S.D. Fla. 1967); ILR. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. 35 (1966)), Congress having declined to adopt the more liberal standard of perfection
proposed by the Bar. 84 A.B.A. RnP. 660-61 (1959). See PLUMB & %VRicirr 113-15.
480. See Perry, Priority of Liens against Real Properly, in CuRMr" T.,Ds ri STATE
LEGISLATION, 1953-1954, at 333, 381-82 (1954).
481. Many states decline to extend the protection of their recording acts to judgment
creditors, although the modem tendency has been to protect them. 2 A. F ,EENAv, JuDc-
m-NTs § 970 (5th ed. 1925); 5 H. TiFFANY, REAL PROPRTY § 1282 (3d ed. 1939). Congress
itself has been ambivalent in its treatment of judgment creditors, excluding them from
the benefit of certain collateral protections which are accorded the other favored classes.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(1) (protection against previously filed but unknown
liens on securities), and § 6324 (protection against the secret spedal liens for estate and gift
482. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 6323(a), (c), (h)(2).
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whether the equities involved have sufficient weight to justify bearing
the attendant costs.
Paradoxically, if the defendant lifts the attachment by giving bond,
and indemnifies the surety by giving the same or other property as
security, the surety's contingent security interest is protected against
intervening as well as existing but unfiled federal tax liens, even though
some delay in collection will result.48 3 Are the practical difficulties,
then, sufficient justification for discrimination against the plaintiff
whose attachment is not thus lifted?
10. Miscellaneous Liens
State laws provide a great variety of other liens-for innkeepers and
garagekeepers; for carriers and warehousemen; for agisters and owners
of breeding animals; for artisans and repairmen; for laborers on farms,
railroads, oil wells, mines and forests; for seamen, musicians and book-
keepers; as well as for the reimbursement of the state for old age assis-
tance, to name a few.
Congress in 1966 carved out one category of such liens for special
protection. In recognition of the fact that it would be most unusual for
a repairman or artisan to search for federal tax liens before performing
the services for which local law gives him a possessory lien, and of the
fact that such services normally result in an increase in or restoration
of the value of the liened property, federal law now provides that even
a previously filed federal tax lien shall be subordinate to a possessory
lien "securing the reasonable price of the repair or improvement" of
tangible personal property.4 4 Other possessory liens, however, while
they may be sufficiently "choate" to prevail over after-arising federal
tax liens, remain vulnerable to those which arose earlier, whether filed
or unfiled.4s8
The American Bar Association recommended, but Congress did not
grant, a like superpriority for liens for the care, safekeeping, preserva.
483. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(c)(4). "In such a case an amount sufficient to cover
the potential obligations usually is set aside and used for these obligations. Only after
these obligations have been met is any remainder available to satisfy the liability secuired
by the Federal tax lien." H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966); S. Rap. No.
1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
484. r. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6323(b)(5). So far as local law may grant the lien but
deny it superpriority as against earlier security interests (see the limitations in UNIVou1t
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310), the circuity of liens envisioned, note 442 supra, may arise,
Cf. Note, Nonconsensual Liens Under Article 9, 76 YALu L.J. 1649, 1659.61 (1967).
485. United States v. Toys of the World Club, Inc., 288 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1961). It ap.
pears that most possessory liens today are enforceable without resort to judicial proceed.
ings. RESTATEMENT, SEcuRIT § 72, Comment b (1941); cf. id. § 48.
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tion or carriage of personal property, innkeepers' liens, liens on female
animals and their young for services of a breeding animal, and liens
upon animals, vehicles or vessels for damage done thereby.48 The
factor of enhancement of value of the liened property is present in some
of those cases, although it is less tangible than in the situations Con-
gress chose to favor: business property, at least, ordinarily gains value
when transported to another place, or when safeguarded from the
elements, else the owner would not incur the cost of such services. 48T
But there is a more persuasive reason for recognition of the super-
priority of those additional liens. The tax collector, by not enforcing
the tax lien, clothes the owner with power to make normal use of the
property and with apparent authority to incur liens for the cost of
normal services thereto by persons who could not be expected to make
a search for federal tax liens.488 To enforce a prior tax lien at their
expense compels them to bear another's tax burdens, from which they
could not reasonably protect themselves even by normal diligence. That
ground alone, without reference to enhancement of value of the liened
property, has sufficed to motivate the grant of superpriorities to pur-
chasers of and lenders upon securities, purchasers of motor vehicles,
retail and casual purchasers, and life insurance and passbook lenders.4
That still leaves a mixed bag of other statutory liens, mostly non-
possessory, which for want of specific recognition by Congress would
generally be subordinated under the "choateness" doctrine to both
existing and subsequently arising federal tax liens.& 0 Some of them,
although labeled "liens," represent no protected interest in the debtor's
property, but rather are equivalent to rules of priority in the distribu-
tion of whatever the debtor may have at the time of insolvency or
liquidation; such "liens" deserve no consideration as against the federal
tax lien, unless perhaps on a selective basis it is found that federal
policy coincides with that of the state.491
Others, however, by reason of filing or other form of perfection, are
attached so firmly to the debtor's property that they will bind a pur-
486. 84 A.BA. REP. 645, 691, 719-20 (1959). The superpriority would have applied
whether the lien arose from local law or by contract.
487. And the service of a breeding animal adds value comparable to "repair or im-
provement"
488. Concerning the priority of such Hens under state laws, see 2 G. Gt. mom, S"cunlr"
INTERs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, ch. 33 (1965).
489. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 6323(b).
490. See Part I in First Installment.
491. See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966), relating to 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)
(1)(A) (1964), invalidating such "Hens" in bankruptcy. See Kennedy, The BanIruptcy
Amendments of 1966, 1 GA. L. REv. 149, 154-56 (1967).
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chaser without knowledge of the lien. A lien of that dignity should be
regarded as a property right, which the lienor is as much entitled to
rely upon as if he had taken contractual security for his claim, and
which federal law ought to respect.492 The judicial doctrine of "choate-
ness," so far as it holds that a federal tax lien prevails over an earlier
private lien thus perfected merely because the private lien is not en-
forceable without judicial proceedings 493-a condition that has never
been thought requisite to the priority of mortgages4 9'-should be
overturned by Congress.495
11. Victims of Crime
Money which is borrowed and must be repaid is, of course, not tax-
able income.490 Nevertheless, it is now established that the avails of
embezzlement,497 extortion,498 swindling 99 and sales of stolen goods 0(1
are taxable despite the existence of an unquestionable obligation to
make restitution to the victims. Even amounts expressly denominated
492. CI. Note, Nonconsensual Liens Under Article 9, 76 YALE L.J. 1649, 1656 (1967),
discussing the requirement of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-310 that artisans' liens be
perfected by possession in order to enjoy the protection thereof. The Note suggests that
e restriction may have been motivated by the thought that, if bankruptcy should occur,
any priority over secured creditors which the law might give a nonpossessory lien would
inure to the benefit not of the artisan but of the unsecured creditors represented by the
trustee (11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(2) (1964), before the 1966 amendment), and points out that
such reason would no longer be valid since liens on personalty perfected otherwise than
by possession are now recognized in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(l)(B) (Supp. 11, 1965-66),
as amended, 80 Stat. 264. That may be a good reason for liberalizing the Federal Tax
Lien Act as well as the Commercial Code in this respect.
493. Cf. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956); In re Lehigh
Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965). Priorities of state and local tax liens,
which often are enforceable without judicial proceedings, are separately discussed In Part
IV.C, in the third installment of this article.
494. The failure of the conventional mortgage to satisfy the standard test of "choate-
ness" is demonstrated in Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign ol
the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L. REV. 724, 732-33, 739.42
(1965).
495. The Special Committee on Federal Liens, in its Preliminary Report, considered
recommending a general catch-all provision, that a lien not otherwise specifically dealt
with should be protected against after-arising federal tax liens (but not against pie-exist-
ing unfiled tax liens) if it "has been so far perfected that it would continue to attach tothe property subject thereto in the hands of a bona fide purchaser (or of any bona fidepurchaser other than a purchaser in the ordinary course of trade." 83 A.B.A. Rv. 449,
471-72, 5 518 (1958). The Committee ultimately determined, however, that, "rather thanjeopardize the chance of obtaining relief in the more serious situations expressly dealt
with, it should not recommend a broad catch-all provision, but should leave the problem
of broadening the relief to be dealt with in the light of future experience." 84 A.B.A,
REP. 645, 707 (1959). v496. ng. Woodsam Associates v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d r357, 359 (2d Cir. 192).
497. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See Libin 8: Haydon, Embezzledl Funds
as Taxable Income: A Study in Judicial Footwork, 61 MieH. L. REV. 425 (1963).
498. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
499. Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948).
500. Schira v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957); Marienfeld v. United States,214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954).
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as loans have been held taxable when obtained by a confidence man
who did not mean to repay if he could avoid it.501 There is, of course, a
certain equitable appeal to the view that the criminal should not be
permitted to live "lavishly 502 on untaxed ill-gotten gains while honest
citizens pay taxes on their earnings. 5 03 But the problem has another
facet that is too easily overlooked.
Unless the criminal has independent wealth, the primary source
from which his tax liability must be satisfied is the very money or
property to which his innocent victims must look for restitution,ul
and the natural result is an unseemly scramble by the United States to
obtain a share of the loot in preference to its rightful owners.01o- Of
course, in those situations where the victim's title to the misappropri-
ated property remains complete and unimpaired, a tax lien running
against the wrongdoer cannot attach to that property."00 But if under
local law the criminal obtained even a voidable title, or one subject to
a constructive trust, the victim's equitable interest is ordinarily subject
to defeat by a bona fide purchaser from the wrongdoer; and such
vulnerability may be enough, under the "choateness" doctrine, to sub-
ordinate the victim's equitable interest to a federal tax lien against
the holder of the voidable legal title,507 or to the absolute federal priority
501. United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967).
502. Id.
503. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961).
504. "'[-]istory probably records few instances of independently wealthy embezzlers
who have had nonstolen assets available for payment of taxes." Jamnes v. United States,
366 U.S. 213, 228 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
505. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946); McKnight v. Commissioner.
127 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1942); and the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 227 (1961), in which Wilcox and McKnight were overruled.
506. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6321; State v. Byrne, 54-2 US. Tax Cas. 9371 (Wash.
Super. 1954).
507. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1957)., in which a "lien,
equitable in nature," which "arises only because equity in good consdence requires it to
accomplish right and justice" but which "is, or may be, outranked by many liens of inno-
cent purchasers and others" and which can be enforced only by suit, was held subordinate
to a federal tax lien. That description, applied to a vendor's lien, fits a constructive trust
as well, unless a distinction is made that if the property is divested of the trust by transfer
to a bona fide purchaser, the trust attaches to the proceeds. Cf. United States v. Dunn,
268 US. 121 (1925). That possibility of substitution of property subject to the trust may,
however, itself be evidence of absence of "choateness." Cf. United States v. Scovil, 348 US.
218, 220 (1955); First Installment 231 n.27. Perhaps the position of a constructive trust,
as a "property right" of the creditor-beneficiaries rather than a mere lien, has been
strengthened by Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 515 (1960), on remand, 10 N.Y.2d
271, 176 N.E.2d 826 (1961) (see Libin & Haydon, supra note 497, at 438-42), which pre-
ferred over a federal tax lien a statutory trust which state law impressed on contract pro-
ceeds for the benefit of subcontractors and others; but the proceeds there were still in
the hands of the owner and the trust fund may not yet have become vulnerable to bona
fide purchasers. Cf. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1958).
The Government apparently argued the bona fide purchaser test of "choateness" of a
trust in commingled but traceable funds in Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. Schmidt, 66-2 U.S.
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if an insolvency proceeding ensues.508 Furthermore, if the victim is
unable to trace the money or property taken from him, as is commonly
the case, he will stand as a mere general creditor 900 in competition with
the Government's all-embracing lien or priority.510 His plight is
dramatized by a recent bankruptcy case in which the available fund was
exhausted by the Government's priority claim for taxes incurred by a
confidence man on sums he had "borrowed," leaving nothing from
which the victims could be repaid. 1'
The search for a complete solution requires consideration of ques-
tions of substantive tax law and policy, both criminal and civil, that
would carry us well beyond the scope of this study. The unqualified
taxability of unlawful receipts has, since the days of Al Capone5 12 en-
abled the Federal Government to punish wrongdoers who would
otherwise escape when local law enforcement breaks down; but the
appropriateness of federal involvement in prosecutions for essentially
local crimes-or rather, for failure to share the fruits of the crimes with
Uncle Sam-is open to question, particularly since they are frequently
in addition to, rather than in lieu of, state prosecutions for the under-
lying crimes.518 On the civil side, while there no doubt are instances in
which the victim's failure to seek restitution may leave the criminal
with a net benefit on which he should pay a tax,514 the justice which is
due even to a wrongdoer seems to require that some form of netting
be provided for when restitution is made.18
Tax Cas. 9578 (S.D. Fla. 1966), but its position was rejected on the ground that as a
pre-existing creditor it was not there in the position of a bona fide purchaser. The Gov-
ernment conceded priority so far as embezzled funds could be traced into specific property,
in Springfield Brewing Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9430 (111. Cir. Ct.
1963) (Finding 20). See PLUrMB & WRIGHT 155-57.
508. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 252, n.4 (1961) (dissenting opinion of
Whittaker, J.), referring to REv. STAT. § 3466, 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964), which is discussed in
First Installment, Part II.A.
509. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1924).
510. Springfield Brewing Co. v. First Natl Bank, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9410 (IU. Cir.
Ct. 1963); Kennedy v. Puritan Church, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9964 (D.D.C. 1958); United
States v. Naples, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9210 (S.D. CaL. 1953).
511. United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1967).
512. See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553
(1932); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). The principle that unlawful gains
are taxable was expressly left unimpaired in Marchetti v. United States, 36 U.S.L.W. 4143,
4144 (U.S. 1968).
513. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 230 (1961) (dissenting opinion of
Black, J.).
514. Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 1953). See Commissioner v,
Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1946). The suggestion that taxability be deferred until the
statute of limitations expires or the victim releases his claim (see dissent of Mr. justice
Whittaker in James v. United States, 866 U.S. 213, 253 (1961)) may be unrealistic in the
light of the policy of the tax law to affix the tax at the time when the money may still
be available for its payment.
515. Congress has recognized the inequity of imposing tax on amounts received "under
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Assuming, however, that no substantive reform in this regard is
found acceptable, attention should then be focused on the collection
aspect, with a view to protecting the victim's right to restitution out
of whatever assets the wrongdoer may have."10 The victim's right to
reimbursement is surely an equity superior to the Government's claim
to so much of the tax as is attributable to inclusion in the criminal's
income of the amount unlawfully taken, without regard to whether
the victim can trace his money or property into the available fund;
to that extent, the victim should enjoy an unconditional statutory
preference over the federal tax lien and over the federal priority in
bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. To the extent that the tax
liability arises from other income of the wrongdoer, the victim should
be given priority with respect to money or property into which he is
able to trace what he lost,5 17 but the Government should enjoy its
usual lien or priority position in the wrongdoer's other assets.518
a claim of right" and then allowing a deduction for the repayment in a later year when
the taxpayer may have insufficient income to offset it. Accordingly. Section 1341 of the
1954 Code allows a form of netting of the repayment against the income (in a complex
manner that need not be here detailed). But in the case of the embezzler, who had no
"claim of right" in the first place, the Service denies him the benefit of Section 1341 and
insists on taxing the receipt even though repayment has been made (for which a prob-
ably wasted deduction will be allowed in the later year). Rev. Rul. 65-254. 1965-2 Cu.T.
BuLL. 50. Even if Section 1341 were made applicable it would not help te victim, because
the wrongdoer (if on the cash basis) still could not avail of Section 1341 unless he had
first made repayment (reas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(e)), and repayment may be impossible until
the tax has been refunded or has been removed as a lien on the property from which
repayment might be effected. That "vicious circle," which results from the mechanics of
Section 1341, should be corrected by making an adjudicated or acknowledged liability to
repay sufficient to trigger the relief, regardless of the taxpayer's accounting method.
516. See dissent of Mr. Justice Burton in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 414
(1946) ("This priority of the tax lien is hardly an adequate argument to eliminate the tax
itself. At most it is an argument for Congress to modify the tax lien in favor of the
victim.") See also United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748, 752 n.5 (th Cir. 1957)
(Since Congress decided that income shall be taxable, and that a properly obtained lien
for taxes shall have first priority in Bankruptcy, it is their decision and not ours that the
United States shall take all and the other claimants nothing.')
517. Whether the federal Hen arose before or after the wrongful taking, the Govern-
ment should not "be so zealous in keeping money or property which is known to belong
to a citizen of this country and which has been seized and wrongfully withheld." Ma-
chinery Center, Inc. v. Kelly, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. J 9187 (E.D. Mo. 1962) (in which the
tax collector had seized a bank account into which a third party's funds were traceable).
The American Bar Association proposed recognizing the priority of constructive trusts
(84 A.B.A. REP. 664, 691 (1959)), but did not deal with the other aspects of the priority
problem arising in cases of this type.
518. Circular priority may result where, for example, a bona fide purchaser from or
secured lender to the wrongdoer has priority under local law over the victim's claim, but
is inferior to a federal tax lien that had been filed. As sud cases ,ill probably be rare,
the solution might best be left to the good sense of the courts, rather than adding a
complexity to the statute. Cf. p. 656 supra. I suggest that the equitable solution would
be to set aside an amount equal to the prior federal tax and award the balance to the
third party, who thus gets all he had a right to expect; the amount set aside should then
be paid to the victim to the extent that his equity superior to federal claim is recogmized
under the principles stated in the text.
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